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Intending, knowing how, infinitives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jennifer Hornsby
Jennifer Hornsby*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Humanity Faculty, Oslo, Norway
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.

Keywords

Intentionknowledge howintellectualisminfinitivesde se
Type
Distinguished Lecture
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , February 2016 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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