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A Humean theory of moral intuition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Antti Kauppinen
Antti Kauppinen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin, College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, P.O. Box 35, FI-40014, Finland
*
*Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which the phenomenal feel of emotions is crucial for their intentional content.

Keywords

moral intuitionsentimentalismquasi-perceptualismemotionphenomenal intentionality
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , 2013 , pp. 360 - 381
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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