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How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2020

Stephanie Collins
Stephanie Collins*
Affiliation:
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Are obligations of collective agents—such as states, businesses, and non-profits—ever overdemanding? I argue they are not. I consider two seemingly attractive routes to collective overdemandingness: that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would be overdemanding for members; and that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would frustrate the collective’s permissible deep preferences. I reject these. Instead, collective overdemandingness complaints should be reinterpreted as complaints about inability or third-party costs. These are not the same as overdemandingness. Accordingly, we can ask an awful lot of collective agents.

Keywords

Collective agencycollective obligationoverdemandingnessought implies can
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 7 , October 2020 , pp. 815 - 831
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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