Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Almost everyone accepts that parents must provide a good enough upbringing in order to retain custodial rights over children, but little has been said about how that level should be set. In this paper, I examine ways of specifying a good enough upbringing. I argue that the two dominant ways of setting this level, the Best Interests and Abuse and Neglect Views, are mistaken. I defend the Dual Comparative View, which holds that an upbringing is good enough when shortfalls from the best alternative upbringing in terms of the child's interests are no more significant than the parents' interest.
For comments on drafts of this paper or detailed discussion of the ideas in it I am grateful to Andrew Williams, Fabienne Peter, Matthew Clayton, Luara Ferracioli, Chris Mills, Stephanie Collins, Nici Mulkeen, Anca Gheaus, Adam Swift, Tim Fowler, Zofia Stemplowska, Eamonn Callan, Julie Rose, Anne Newman, Debra Satz, Sarah Hannan, Jon Quong, Colin Macleod, Brian McElwee, Rob Reich, Hillel Steiner, Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, Dean Redfearn, Serena Olsaretti, Kristi Olsen and Audrey Cahill. I am also grateful to several audiences where this paper was presented including the 2011 MANCEPT workshop on ‘Liberalism and the Family’; the Centre for Ethics Law and Public Affairs, University of Warwick; the 2012 Association of Legal and Social Philosophy Conference, University of Warwick; the Ideals and Reality in Social Ethics Conference 2012, University of Wales, Newport; the Post-doc Workshop at the Centre for Ethics in Society, Stanford University. In addition, I am grateful to anonymous reviewers for their detailed and helpful feedback.