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Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

D. Justin Coates
D. Justin Coates*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA
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Abstract

Following P. F. Strawson, a number of philosophers have argued that if hard incompatibilism is true, then its truth would undermine the justification or value of our relationships with other persons. In this paper, I offer a novel defense of this claim. In particular, I argue that if hard incompatibilism is true, we cannot make sense of: the possibility of promissory obligation, the significance of consent, or the pro tanto wrongness of paternalistic intervention. Because these practices and normative commitments are central to our relationships as we currently conceive of them, it follows that hard incompatibilism has radically revisionary conclusions.

Keywords

Moral responsibilityhard incompatibilismDerk Pereboom
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , March 2019 , pp. 208 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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