No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
What are the philosophically significant grammatical constructions in which the term ‘good’ is used? It is not possible, I think, to base the philosophical analysis of a concept such as goodness on linguistic considerations alone; but an adequate analysis must be able to give an account of the principal uses of the term, and noting usage can be very helpful in providing a starting-point for philosophy. There are three constructions in which ‘good’ is typically used: (1) ‘Good for X,’ (2) ‘A good X,’ and (3) ‘Good at Фing’ or ‘To Ф well.’ In (1) and (2) X is the name of a substance; in the case of (1) either of an individual or of a kind (for example, ‘good for John,’ ‘good for men’), and in the case of (2) of a kind ('a good man’). In (3) Ф is the name of an activity ('good at hunting,’ ‘to teach well’).
1 ‘A good teacher is one who is good at teaching’ - radical disputes about what sort of teacher is a good teacher characteristically turn on a dispute concerning the function of a teacher: to instil basic skills, to enlarge the imagination, to promote social consciousness.
2 Vendler, Zeno ‘The Grammar of goodness,’ The Philosophical Review, 72 (1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 The parts of a machine may in this respect be considered to be intermediate between tools and parts of organisms: machines are made by men to serve human purposes, but the function of a part of a machine is not given directly by a human purpose but rather by the contribution which it makes to the operation of the machine.
4 Foot, P.R. ‘Goodness and Choice,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. vol. 35 (1961),Google Scholar reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell1978).
5 See Kenny, A.J.P. Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford: Blackwell 1975) 48.Google Scholar
6 See Wilkes, K.V. ‘The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics,' Mind, 87 (1978).Google Scholar
7 Wright, Larry ‘Functions,’ The Philosophical Review, 82 (1973);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Teleological Explanations (Los Angeles and London: California University Press 1976)
8 Robinson, R. Definition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1950) 155Google Scholar
9 Deviant examples: there are some cases of ‘good X’ which do not conform to the account presented, for example, ‘good loser, patient, sunset, poodle (in a dog show), wheather.’ For these cases too the grammatical relationships of section I do not invariably hold. The reason for the difference between these and the standard cases is that in these cases there is no activity for an end in the X, but an X is called good insofar as it is conducive to the end of some human activity or, in the first two cases, some activity of the man who is an X. Weather does not act for an end, but good weather allows men to fulfil certain of their purposes; a good loser is not a man who is good (successful) at losing, but rather one who is able to accept defeat as part of competition. Again, when we talk of a man as having a ‘bad appendix’ we do not mean that his appendix is failing to perform its function (for it has no function), rather we mean that inflammation in his appendix threatens to affect the health and so the performance of their function of other parts of his body.
10 Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention (Oxford: Blackwell 1957)Google Scholar
11 That this is the correct answer to give to the questions concerning animals can only be established by empirical investigation of animal behaviour. It is the answer which would be given by biologists who hold the theory of gene selection: a gene is successful in evolutionary terms if it belongs to individuals who are able to achieve the ends of survival and reproduction. See Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976);Google Scholar see also Mackie, J.L. ‘The Law of the Jungle,’ Philosophy, 53 (1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 Metaphysics, 982b22
13 I am grateful to Nigel Dower and lan Fowlie for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.