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Geach's ‘Refutation’ of Austin Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Avner Baz
Avner Baz*
Affiliation:
Tufts University, Medford, MA02155, USA
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Extract

A characteristic move of what is known as ‘ordinary language philosophy’ (OLP), as exemplified by J.L. Austin's discussion of knowledge in ‘Other Minds,’ is to appeal to the ordinary and normal use(s) of some philosophically troublesome word(s), with the professed aim of alleviating this or that philosophical difficulty or dispelling this or that philosophical confusion. This characteristic move has been criticized widely on the grounds that it rests on a conflation of ‘meaning’ and ‘use’; and that criticism has been quite successful in its effect: OLP is widely held nowadays within the mainstream of analytic philosophy to have somehow been refuted or otherwise seriously discredited. However, that the words in question do indeed have something referable to as ‘their meaning,’ which is not only conceptually distinguishable from their ordinary and normal uses, but also theoretically separable from these uses, in a way that renders misguided the ordinary language philosopher's characteristic appeal and validates the traditional concerns OLP set itself out to dispel, has for the most part merely been presupposed and insisted on, as opposed to argued for, by detractors of OLP.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 41 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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