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The ethics of intergenerational relationships

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Janna Thompson
Janna Thompson*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

According to the relational approach we have obligations to members of future generations not because of their interests or properties but because, and only because, they are our descendants or successors. Common accounts of relational duties do not explain how we can have obligations to people who do not yet exist. In this defence of the relational approach I examine three sources of intergenerational obligations: the concern of parents for their children, including their future children; the desire of community members to pass on a heritage to their descendants; and the relationship of citizens in an intergenerational polity.

Keywords

Intergenerational ethicsintergenerational justiceparental obligationsnon-identitypartialityheritage
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 2-3: Special issue: Ethics and Future Generations , 2017 , pp. 313 - 326
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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