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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Benjamin Jarvis
Benjamin Jarvis*
Affiliation:
Queen's University Belfast, BelfastBT7 1PA, UK
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Extract

Consider the following ‘principles’:

(Norm of Belief Schema) Necessarily, a belief of <p> is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if p (at that scenario) — where ‘p’ has the aforementioned content <p>.

(Generalized Norm of Belief) Necessarily, for all propositions <p>, a belief of p> is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if <p> is true (at that scenario).

Both ‘principles’ appear to capture the aim(s) of belief. (NBS) particularizes the aims to beliefs of distinct content-types. (GNB) generalizes these aims of beliefs as truth. Properly understood, the instances of (NBS) appear to be at least approximately true as does (GNB). Of course, one might harbor concerns about whether these are mere appearances or whether these ‘principles’ are properly formulated. Putting such concerns aside, one might naturally wonder how these two ‘principles’ (or their proper reformulations) are fundamentally related. More specifically, are the instances of (NBS) explanatorily basic if they are true?

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue 3-4 , December 2012 , pp. 209 - 233
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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Footnotes

1

In researching and writing this paper, I particularly benefitted from exchanges with Douglas Edwards, Hartry Field, Richard Heck, Christopher Hill, Paul Horwich, Michael Lynch, Katherine Rubin, Joshua Schechter, and two anonymous referees. A portion of this paper was presented at University College Dublin on October 8, 2010; I am grateful to that audience.

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