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Don’t stop believing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jennifer Rose Carr
Jennifer Rose Carr*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign–Urbana, IL, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

It’s been argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality. These arguments come partly in response to certain kinds of counterexamples to Conditionalization, but are mainly motivated by a form of internalism that appears to be in tension with any sort of diachronic coherence requirements. I argue that there are, in fact, fundamentally diachronic norms of rationality. And this is to reject at least a strong version of internalism. But I suggest a replacement for Conditionalization that salvages internalist intuitions, and carves a middle ground between (probabilist versions of) conservatism and evidentialism.

Keywords

Epistemologyconditionalizationdiachronic normsevidentialismevidence
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 744 - 766
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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