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Does Justification Aim at Truth?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Peter J. Graham
Peter J. Graham*
Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA92521, USA
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Extract

Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer ‘Yes’; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In ‘The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism’ they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. ‘Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding’ of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no ‘connection to the truth.’ A ‘truth-aimed … epistemology is not entitled to carry the day’ (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).

Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is ‘out of step with a very common view on the part of epistemologists, both internalist and externalist alike’ (C&P 2004, 136), as nearly all ‘epistemologists have claimed that truth and falsity play a crucial role in distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs [for] believing truths is the ultimate aim of human rational cognition’ (C&P 2004, 125; cf. Audi 1988).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 51 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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