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Disposition And Occurrence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Hung Hin-Chung
Hung Hin-Chung*
Affiliation:
University of Waikato
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Extract

Can ‘disposition’ be understood as a contrast term, the contrast being ‘occurrence'? Put it another way: do ‘dispositional predicate’ and ‘occurrent predicate’ form a contrast pair? I shall show that if ‘occurrent’ is taken as simply meaning ‘non-dispositional', then ‘occurrent’ has no applications (i.e., no predicates are occurrent (Sec. 2). However, if ‘occurrent’ is given an independent meaning so that predicates like ‘break', ‘bend', ‘disintegrate’ etc. are occurrent predicates, then it is not the contrast of ‘dispositional'. Its contrast is rather what I shall call ‘remainant’ (Sec. 3).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , September 1975 , pp. 123 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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