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Contiguity and the causal theory of memory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sarah K. Robins
Sarah K. Robins*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering’s requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.

Keywords

Causal theory of memorycausationspatio-temporal contiguitymemory tracesremembering
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , 2017 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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