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Confidence in Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jonathan E. Adler
Jonathan E. Adler*
Affiliation:
Brooklyn College and the Graduate School CUNY Brooklyn, NY11210USA
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Extract

When someone presents an argument on a charged topic and it is (credibly) alleged that the arguer has a strong personal interest and investment in the conclusion, the allegation, directed to the reception or evaluation of the argument, typically gives rise to two seemingly conflicting reactions:

I. The allegation is an unwarranted diversion (a species of argumentum ad hominem or genetie fallacy). The prejudices or biases of the arguer are irrelevant to the cogency of the argument. ('Cogency’ is used broadly to refer both to correct support relations, validity, in the case of deductive arguments, and to the soundness, warrant, and relevance of the premises.) In particular, it is a distraction from the crucial judgment of whether the argument is cogent to press the question of whether the arguer truly holds his conclusion on the grounds that he offers, or whether he believes it on some illicit or suspect basis (prejudice, ideology, self-interest, wishful thinking, bias).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , June 2006 , pp. 225 - 257
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2006

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References

1 I am grateful for the comments of Catherine Elgin, Iakovos Vasiliou, and this journal's referees.

2 More precisely, this would be an abusive, rather than a circumstantial or tu quoque, form. For comprehensive discussion see Walton, D. Ad Hominem Arguments (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press 1998).Google Scholar

3 For discussion within a ‘veristic’ understanding see Goldman, A.I. Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 For the sake of brevity, I do not explicitly treat of crucial epistemic aims like presenting arguments to others with the aim of trying to improve those argument, and I ignore complexities introduced by criteria for good or bad arguments that go beyond cogency, e.g., begging the question.

5 For some Support, see Pronin, E. Puccio, C. and Ross, L. ‘Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives’, in Heuristics and Biases Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. and Kahneman, D. eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) 636–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 See Gardner, H. The Unschooled Mind (New York: Basic Books 1991), Chs. 8–9.Google Scholar

7 For a foundational discussion of explicitness, without though application to argumentation, see Brandom, R. Making it Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1994).Google Scholar

8 Among many writings on this subject, see, for example, Fishkin, J. Voice ofthe People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997).Google Scholar

9 On warrants in argument, see Toulmin, S. The Ilses of Argument (Cambridge University Press 1958), eh. 3;Google Scholar see also Hitchcock, D. ‘Does the Traditional Treatment of Enthymemes Rest on a Mistake?’ Argumentation 12 (1998) 83–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Kornblith, H. ‘Distrusting Reason’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy: New Directions in Philosophy 23 (Oxford: Blackwell 1999) 181–96, at 193.Google Scholar

11 The central notion of relevance in the pragmatics of Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. Relevance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1986)Google Scholar depends upon a least effort principle.

12 Adler, J. ‘Fallacies and Alternative Interpretations’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1994) 271–82;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Wright, L. ‘Argument and Deliberation: A Plea for Understanding’, The Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995) 565–85;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Adler, J. Beliefs Own Ethics (Cambridge: The MIT Press 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, eh. 3, sections 5-9

13 For example, Santas, G.X. Socrates (London: Routledge 1979), 10–29.Google Scholar

14 See, for example, Davidson, D. ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheine’ and 'Thought and Talk’ Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984), 183–98; 155-70,Google Scholar respectively; and Dennett, D.C. ‘True Believers’ in The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1987), 13–35.Google Scholar

15 See Barkow, J. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. eds., The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992).Google Scholar

16 Kornblith, ‘Distrusting Reason'.

17 Actually, Kornblith does not rely on an argument’, argumentation distinction.He is focused on argument as an individual effort, whereas argumentation, as noted already, is paradigmatically with another.

18 Although Andrew's greater intelligence may render distortion easier for him, Kornblith is on weak empirical grounds to assume that it will dispose him more to distortion, rather than merely equip him. Stanovich finds that those of greater intellectual ability as determined by, primarily, IQ tests or SAT scores are more likely to judge the quality of arguments independently of prior belief s and that these judgments are associated with such intellectual virtues as open-mindedness. See Stanovich, K.E. Who is Rational? (Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum 1999), 162–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 For criticism of the studies on this basis, even granted findings of ‘belief-conservatism’, see Hogarth, R.M. ‘Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics’ in Arkes, H.R. and Hammond, K.R. edsv Judgment and Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986) 680–704.Google Scholar

20 See Kuhn, D. The Sküls of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 Kuhn, D. Flaton, R. and Weinstock, M. ‘How Well Do Jurors Reason? Competence Dimensions of Individual Variation in a Juror Reasoning Task’ Psychological Science 5 (1994) 289–396CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 Brem, S.K. and Rips, L.J. ‘Explanation and Evidence in Informal Argumenf Cognitive Science 24 (2000) 573–604CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 On ('cold’) non-conscious defenses of seif, and their cultural Variation, see Heine, S.J Lehman, D.R. Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. ‘Is There aUniversal Need for Positive Self-Regard?’ Psychological Review 106 (1999) 766–94.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

24 See S.A. Sloman, ‘Two Systems of Reasoning’, in Heuristics and Biases, 379-96; Evans, J. and Over, D. Rationality and Reasoning (Hove, UK: Psychology Press 1996);Google Scholar and K. Stanovich, Who is Rational? chs. 5-6.

25 See Stanovich, Who is Rational? chs. 2 and 5.

26 Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. ‘On the Study of Statistical Intuitions’ in Kahneman, D. Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. eds., Judgment linder Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) 493–508,CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 495. Stanovich provides many examples in the interest of establishing the ‘understanding/acceptance' principle that as Standard normative axioms are better understood, the more they would be accepted. (61-3). See also Pronin, Puccio, and Ross, ‘Understanding Misunderstanding’, which, though broadly supportive of the skeptic, show how various simple interventions undermine biasing and polarization (e.g., 652-3). For earlier results along the same lines, applied to ‘hindsight biases’, see Arkes, H.R. Faust, D.., Guilmette, T.J. and Hart, K. ‘Eliminating the Hindsight Bias’, Journal of Applied Psychology 73 (1988) 305–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 A number of philosophers and psychologists have f orcef ully argued for a non-skeptical reading of this data, most notably Cohen, L.J. ‘Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1981) 317–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 Compare here to Kornblith's ‘Distrusting Reason’ (194) reference to Nagel, T. Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), 212Google Scholar

29 See Bach, K. ‘An Analysis of Self-Deception’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1981) 351–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 See Janis, I.L. Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1982).Google Scholar

31 Nisbett, R. and Ross, L. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall 1980)Google Scholar

32 Dawes, R. Everyday Irrationality (Colorado: Westview Press 2001), 140Google Scholar

33 See discussions of the ‘availability’ heuristic in Nisbett and Ross 1980; D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky; and Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman. Kornblith (192-3) recognizes that the plausibility of the skeptic's thesis, depends on whether ‘there is a Single major source of distortion and rationalization that is very widespread.’ What Kornblith does not observe is just how extraordinarily narrow a ränge of issues this would impact, even if we grant the problematic assumption that class interests, etc. will distort reasoning.

Similarly, for the slightly different cases of reason-having as to an agent's action. You see Jim enter the ice cream störe, and you take it that the reason he entered is to purchase ice cream. You do not ask ‘why’ because the reason is so obvious. These cases are the overwhelmingly dominant ones compared to cases in which you are mistaken (Jim went in to use the lavatory) or puzzled ('Why did Jim go in to the ice cream störe, when he is on a diet?’)

34 Elster, J. in Sour Grapes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983)Google Scholar holds that 'There is no reason to suppose that beliefs shaped by interests tend to serve those interests.’ He continues: ‘On quite general grounds, distorted beliefs cannot be expected, any more than illusionary beliefs, to be very helpful in goal achievement' (156).

35 Gibbard, A. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1990), 78.Google Scholar

36 Consensus plays a different role in democratic deliberation than in cognitive inquiries (aimed at truth). In democratic deliberation a shared decision is crucial, so that compromise is available and typical, and democratic deliberation usually takes place under pressure to reach a decision by a deadline. Neither holds, or not nearly to the same extent, in cognitive inquiries, which is our focus.

37 A comprehensive article on the subject finds mixed results: T. Mendelberg, ‘The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence’ Research in Micropolis Volume 6, M.D. Carpini, L. Huddy, and R.Y. Shapiro, eds. (Elsevier Press, forthcoming) or http://www.deliberative-democracy.net/randpmeeting’, mendelberg_del_citizen.pdf. But the issues are under intense study, and recent results are encouraging (see especially Fishkin on the ‘deliberative opinion poll’), as I learned from helpful e-mail correspondence with Peter Levine (The Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy). The positive results indicate def inite changes in opinion under controlled conditions of deliberation. However, the research does not extend to whether the predictability of people's opinion from their background decreases with deliberation.

38 This difference is overlooked in Goldman's discussion, 152-3.

39 This is not to deny room for dispute. The actual conclusions of the study will be expressed much more circumspectly (e.g. a positive correlation was found…). Still, to the extent that the source is cited, the value of information about the arguer (for the assessment of the argument's cogency) diminishes.

40 For development of the underlying Claims see Adler Beliefs Own Ethics, Ch. 10.

41 For a fairly up to date Statement see Habermas's, J. collection On the Pragmatics of Communication (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1998).Google Scholar For a different approach to specifying ideal conditions for argumentation see Eemeren, F.H. van and Grootendorst, R. Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris Publications 1983).Google Scholar

42 See Sunstein, C.R. Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2003)Google Scholar, chs. 2, 6, and 7.

43 For reflection on this theme in Aristotle, see Garver, E. AristoÜe's Rhetoric: An Act of Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994),Google Scholar chs. 5 and 7.

44 Garver goes too far this way, as does A. Brinton, ‘A Rhetorical View of the ad hominem’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1985) 50-63.

45 The Dual Aims view nicely accommodates Cora Diamond's condemnation of the tradition that takes argument as the only form of legitimate persuasion or conviction. (Diamond, C. ‘Anythingbut Argument?’ in her The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press 1991) 291–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar) What about, she insists, the power of literature or appeals to the heart or emotions? The Dual Aims view can accommodate such power and appeals as fitting with the first of the two aims — of altering the agent's degree of confidence in the argument presented or of the arguer presenting it. The Dual Aims view can also allow that this alteration is rational or reason-based, a claim about which Diamond is curiously silent. Nevertheless, unless such alterations can be ultimately cashed out as explicit reasons — capable of serving as premises — they cannot play a role in argument-support, a claim that Diamond does not deny, if only because she does not address it.

46 Inwagen, P. van ‘It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence’ in his The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1998) 29–44Google Scholar

47 van Inwagen, 34

48 van Inwagen's initial example is free will. However, it is highly disputable that we have a comprehensive grasp of all the relevant facts (and distinetions), as continued discussion, since his article, has shown.

49 A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, ‘Moral Conflict and Political Consensus’ Ethics 101 (1990) 64-88, at 70. They also note that Citizens will search for common ground.

50 Similarly for the way G.A. Cohen poses an analogous problem:

It should give us pause that we would not have beliefs that are central to our lives-beliefs-for example, about important matters of politics and religion-if we had not been brought up as we in f act were. It is an accident of birth and upbringing that we have them, rather than beliefs sharply rival to them, and (here's the rub) we shall frequently have to admit, if we are reflective and honest, that we consequently do not believe as we do because our grounds for our beliefs are superior to those which others have for their rival beliefs. (Cohen, G.A. If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rieh? [Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000], 9)Google Scholar

As Cohen presents the problem it ‘should give us pause’ as individual believers, rather than as a challenge to the value of argumentation. The theme is developed in his ‘Paradoxes of Conviction’ (unpublished).

51 On the division of epistemic labor, and the role of impure motives in sustaining it, see Kitcher, P. ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’, The Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) 5–22;CrossRefGoogle Scholar on the facts, depth, and naturalness of plurality in cultures like our own, see Rawls, J. Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993)Google Scholar, Lecture II sections 1-3; Lecture IV sections 1-4.

52 Along these lines, I would challenge the ‘Principle of Epistemic Impartiality’ defended in David Christensen's ‘Diachronie Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality' The Philosophical Review 109 (2000) 349-71. Its plausibility resides, I believe, in imposing the false, even as ideal, Standard of perfect reasoners.

53 I have touched earlier on the value of argumentation itself for this purpose: explicitization and the social nature of argument proceed fairly independently of the arguer's own judgments, and so provide constraints on his own biases.

54 See Lewis, David ‘Mill and Milquetoast’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1989) 152–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55 Newman, Jay Fanatics and Hypocrites (Buffalo: Prometheus Books 1986)Google Scholar views fanaticism as an ‘excessive’ strength of belief, which, though valuable, fails to draw on the distinction between first-order and second-order reasons (beliefs). See Adler, Beliefs Own Ethics, eh. 11.Google Scholar