Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T13:28:47.506Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Children’s rights and the non-identity problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Erik Magnusson Open the ORCID record for Erik Magnusson [Opens in a new window]
Erik Magnusson*
Affiliation:
Department of Law, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it in the contemporary literature: (1) the identifiability objection; (2) the non-existence objection; (3) the waiving of rights objection, (4) the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and (5) the unfairness objection.

Keywords

Children’s rightsnon-identity problemrights-based solutionsprocreative ethicsbirthright claim
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 5 , August 2019 , pp. 580 - 605
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Archard, David. 2004. “Wrongful Life.” Philosophy, 79 (309): 403–420.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bayles, Michael. 1976. “Harm to the Unconceived.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 5 (3): 292–304.Google ScholarPubMed
Bayne, Tim. 2010. “In Defense of Genethical Parity.” In Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children, edited by Archard, David and Benatar, David, 31–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beckerman, Wilfred, and Pasek, Joanna. 2001. Justice, Posterity, and the Environment: Environmental Ethics for a New Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boonin, David. 2014. The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brighouse, Harry, and Swift, Adam. 2014. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Brock, Dan W., 1995. “Genetic Harms and the Non-Identity Problem.” Bioethics, 9 (3/4): 269–275.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Cohen, Cynthia B., 1997. “The Morality of Knowingly Conceiving Children with Serious Conditions: An Expanded ‘Wrongful Life’ Standard.” In Contingent Future Persons: On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, or Not, in the Future, edited by Fotion, Nick and Heller, Jan C., 27–40. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De George, Richard T., 1981. “The Environment, Rights, and Future Generations.” In Responsibilities to Future Generations, edited by Partridge, Ernest, 157–166. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
DeGrazia, David. 2012. Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, and Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elliott, Robert. 1989. “The Rights of Future People.” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 6 (2): 59–69.Google Scholar
Feinberg, Joel. 1984. Harm to Others, Vol. 1 of the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Feinberg, Joel. 1992. “Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming.” In Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays, 3–36. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Hare, Caspar. 2007. “Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of Persons Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?” Ethics, 117 (3): 498–523.10.1086/512172CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harman, Elizabeth. 2004. “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?” Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 89–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heyd, David. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heyd, David. 2009. “The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem.” In Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics, and the Nonidentity Problem, edited by Roberts, Melinda A. and Wasserman, David T., 3–25. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurley, Paul, and Weinberg, Rivka. 2015. “Whose Problem is Non-Identity?” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 12 (6): 699–730.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kavka, Gregory S., 1982. “The Paradox of Future Individuals.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11 (2): 93–112.Google Scholar
Kumar, Rahul. 2003. “Who Can Be Wronged?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31 (2): 99–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macklin, Ruth. 1981. “Can Future Generations Correctly Be Said to Have Rights?” In Responsibilities to Future Generations, edited by Partridge, Ernest, 151–157. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
Marsh, Jason. 2014. “Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89 (2): 436–466.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mill, John Stuart. 1991. On Liberty and Other Essays. Ed. Gray, John. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 1986. “Comments.” Ethics, 96 (4): 832–872.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Reiman, Jeffrey. 2007. “Being Fair to Future People: The Non-Identity Problem in the Original Position.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (1): 69–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roberts, Melinda. 1998. Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Schwartz, Thomas. 1978. “Obligations to Posterity.” In Obligations to Future Generations, edited by Barry, Brian and Sikora, R. I., 3–13. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
Shiffrin, Seana V., 1999. “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm.” Legal Theory, 5: 117–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smolkin, Doran. 1999. “Toward a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem.” Journal of Social Philosophy, 30 (1): 194–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinbock, Bonnie. 1986. “The Logical Case for ‘Wrongful Life’.” The Hastings Center Report, 16 (2): 15–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinbock, Bonnie. 2009. “Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions.” In Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics, and the Non-Identity Problem, edited by Roberts, Melinda A. and Wasserman, David T., 155–178. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
Tooley, Michael. 1998. “Value, Obligation, and the Asymmetry Question.” Bioethics, 12 (2): 111–124.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
UN General Assembly. 1989. “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” United Nations Treaty Series, 1577: 3.Google Scholar
Velleman, J. David. 2008. “Persons in Prospect.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 36 (3): 221–244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wasserman, David. 2005. “The Non-Identity Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective Parents.” Ethics, 116 (1): 132–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wasserman, David. 2015. “Part II: Pro-Natalism.” In Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce?, edited by Wasserman, David and Benatar, David, 133–264. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Woodward, James. 1986. “The Non-Identity Problem.” Ethics, 96 (4): 804–831.10.1086/292801CrossRefGoogle Scholar