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The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration as Supererogatory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Hagit Benbaji  and
David Heyd
Hagit Benbaji
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel91905
David Heyd
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel91905
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Extract

'May one be pardon’ d and retain the offence?’ asks King Claudius in his tormented monologue in Hamlet. Forgiveness appears incompatible with the retention of the offence, both in the sense of enjoying its consequences (Claudius's arrogation of the Queen and the Kingdom of Denmark) and in the sense of the subsistence of the attitude which underlay the offensive act (his cold-heartedness and ambition). There are, however, views which allow for, even admire, an attitude of forgiveness towards people who have ‘retained’ their offense in some way. This idea of forgiveness is harder to justify, since no change (like repentance) has taken place in the agent. We suggest that the concept of toleration can serve as an illuminating clue in such an analysis. The tolerant attitude involves a certain kind of reconciliation with people who not only have done something wrong in the past, but insist on sticking to their objectionable conduct in the present and the future. Tolerance, in other words, is not conditioned by repentance or by commitment to behavioral transformation; it is a kind of unconditional ‘forgiveness’ in advance.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , December 2001 , pp. 567 - 586
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2001

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References

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12 See Govier for a comprehensive discussion of unforgivability, referring to Martin Golding and to Jean Hampton.

13 We fully adopt Trudy Govier's formulation of this inseparability condition of the unforgivable in Govier, 69.

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