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Can the Eleatic Principle be Justified?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mark Colyvan
Mark Colyvan*
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania, GPO Box 252C, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia7001
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Extract

The Eleatic Principle or causal criterion is a causal test that entities must pass in order to gain admission to some philosophers’ ontology. This principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world. The idea of such a test is rather important in modem ontology, since it is neither without intuitive appeal nor without influential supporters. Its supporters have included David Armstrong (1978, Vol2, 5), Brian Ellis (1990, 22) and Hartry Field (1989, 68) to name but a few.

Clearly though, if such a principle is to be anything more than just a statement of a certain version of physicalism, it must be argued for. In this paper I will look at the arguments that have been put forward for the principle and suggest some problems for each of these.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , September 1998 , pp. 313 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1998

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