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Butler’s Argument Against Psychological Hedonism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Robert M. Stewart
Robert M. Stewart*
Affiliation:
California State University Chico, Chico, CA, 95929-0730, USA
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Extract

It is widely thought among philosophers that Joseph Butler’s criticism of psychological egoism in his Sermons is, in the words of A.E. Duncan-Jones, ‘the classic refutation of it.’ Indeed, no less a philosopher than David Hume restated and put forth Butler’s central argument against hedonistic egoism — without due credit — as part of his own critique. Yet recent commentators have begun to question Butler’s arguments, albeit usually with sympathy and in the hope of saving what they take to be his insights. I propose to focus on Butler’s main objection to hedonistic psychological egoism, to show how and why it fails to refute plausible forms of the thesis, and briefly to indicate why philosophical attempts to disprove this theory of motivation are misguided. I will assume a basic familiarity with Butler’s psychological theory and ethics, and I must refrain from discussing important related topics, e.g., the ‘friendliness’ of self-love to conscience, benevolence, and particular affections.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , June 1992 , pp. 211 - 221
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1992

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References

1 Butler’s Moral Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1952), 95. Cf. Melden, A.I. Ethical Theories, 2nd ed (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1967), 232Google Scholar. Recent philosophers who have questioned Butler’s arguments include Selby-Bigge, L.A. in his introduction to British Moralists (New York: Dover 1965)Google Scholar, lxiv; Scott-Taggart, M.J. ‘Butler on Disinterested Actions,’ Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1968) 16-28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Frankena, W.K. Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1973), 86Google Scholar.

2 In Hume’s Enquiries, 3rd ed., L.A., Selby-Bigge ed., with revisions by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 1975), 301-2.

3 For a different classification see Broad, C.D. ‘Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives,’ in Ethics and the History of Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press 1952)Google Scholar.

4 All references to Butler’s Sermons, with spelling and punctuation modified, are from The Works of Joseph Butler, J.H. Bernard, ed. (London: Macmillan 1900). I should clarify that in the short exposition of this section I do not mean to imply that Butler equates psychological hedonism with psychological egoism. But the former is the version of the latter with which he is most concerned, as am I here.

5 Jackson, Reginald ‘Bishop Butler’s Refutation of Psychological Hedonism,’ Philosophy 18 (1943) 114-39CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Duncan-Jones, Section 2.3 and p. 98, give useful discussions.

6 See Duncan-Jones, 103, on the distinction between ultimate, sub-ultimate, and subordinate objects of desire.

7 Sidgwick, Henry The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan 1907), 136Google Scholar. Butler, like many other writers, sometimes means by ’self-love’ the desire for some pleasure for oneself, at other times the desire for the greatest amount of pleasure for oneself over the course of one’s life; we should take care to keep these senses distinct.

8 For evidence of this, see my previous quotations. Other related terms used by Butler include ‘faculties,’ ‘principles of action,’ ‘instincts,’ ‘propensions,’ ‘inclinations,’ and ‘love.’ 8 For evidence of this, see my previous quotations. Other related terms used by Butler include ‘faculties,’ ‘principles of action,’ ‘instincts,’ ‘propensions,’ ‘inclinations,’ and ‘love.’

9 Jackson, 117-21. He renders the essential part of the argument as an inference from ‘Whatever pleases must be an object of affection’ to ’something distinct from pleasure is an object of affection,’ with the suppressed premise ’something distinct from pleasure pleases.’

10 J.L. Mackie has raised another relevant point: since Butler admits that feeling pain does not depend on having particular passions, why then does feeling pleasure? See his Hume’s Moral Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul1980), 40.

11 Sidgwick, 44-54, 136; cf. his Outlines of the History of Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1967), 192. However, given that Butler is arguing against hedonism as a theory of motivation, cases of unanticipated pleasure would seem to be irrelevant.

12 Clarke’s egoistic account of benevolence can be found in selections from The Foundation of Morality in Selby-Bigge, ed., British Moralists. For further discussion, see my article, ‘John Clarke and Francis Hutcheson on Self-Love and Moral Motivation,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982) 261-77.

13 In the introduction to his edition of Five Sermons (Indianapolis: Hackett 1983), 6, Stephen Darwall concedes that the conceptual argument is inconclusive. But he refers us to ‘Butler’s second line of attack’ in Sermon I, examples of desires that ‘cannot simply be directed to certain psychological states of the experiencer,’ e.g., ‘desire of esteem from others, indignation against successful vice, desire for revenge, fear of disgrace, covetousness, love, and hate.’ But the egoist can reply that the ultimate object of these passions is pleasure from knowing that others esteem one, ending feelings of displeasure at unpunished wrongs, etc.

14 See Clarke, 223-6.

15 Sidgwick, Methods, 42-3. R.B. Brandt adopts a similar conception of pleasure in which the reference to desire is fully explicit; see A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979), 35 ff.

16 Butler (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul1985), 54-5

17 ‘Butler on Selfishness and Self-Love,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1988) 48-50

18 For recent discussions of related issues see, e.g., Morillo, Caroline R. ‘The Reward Event and Motivation,’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) 169-86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Estlund, David M. ‘Mutual Benevolence and the Theory of Happiness,’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) 187-204CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scaccia, Danny ‘Utilitarianism, Sociobiology, and the Limits of Benevolence,’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) 329-45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

I wish to thank Timothy Bartel, William Frankena, Joel Kupperman, Bernard Peach, D. D. Raphael, Steven Smith, and an anonymous reviewer for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for their helpful comments.