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Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Nathan Ballantyne
Nathan Ballantyne*
Affiliation:
Fordham University, Bronx, NY10458, USA
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Extract

Two common theses in contemporary epistemology are that ‘knowledge excludes luck’ and that knowledge depends on ‘purely epistemic’ factors. In this essay, I shall argue as follows: given some plausible assumptions, ‘anti-luck epistemology,’ which is committed to the fi rst thesis, implies the falsity of the second thesis. That is, I will argue that anti-luck epistemology leads to what has been called ‘pragmatic encroachment’ on knowledge. Anti-luck epistemologists hoping to resist encroachment must accept a controversial thesis about true belief or a dubious claim about luck and value and interests.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 485 - 503
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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