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Adhering to Inherence: A New Look at the Old Steps in Berkeley's March to Idealism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Alan Hausman
Alan Hausman*
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
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Extract

When Keats identified truth and beauty, he surely intended mere extensionality. I myself have never had much trouble with either half of the equivalence. Others have considerable difficulty. A case in point is the Watson-Allaire-Cummins interpretation of Berkeley's idealism, which I shall refer to henceforth as the inherence account (IA). That account is put forward to answer an extremely perplexing question in the history of philosophy: Why did Berkeley embrace idealism, i.e., why did he hold that esse est percipi, that to be is to be perceived, indeed that what is perceived must be perceived in order to exist? In essence, the IA answers these questions very simply and elegantly: perceived qualities are, for Berkeley, qualities of the mind in the same sense that, in the tradition of substance metaphysics, blue is a quality of a blue flower; just as the blue of the flower is inseparable from it, so the perceived blue is inseparable from the mind that perceives it.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 1984 , pp. 421 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1984

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References

1 Allaire, Edwin B. ‘Berkeley's Idealism,’ Theoria 29 (1963): 229-44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reprinted in Iowa Publications in Philosophy, 1, Essays in Ontology (The Hague: Nijhoff 1963), 92-105. Page references herein are to the latter. Cummins, Philip D. ‘Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIV (1963), 202-14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Watson, Richard A. ‘Berkeley in a Cartesian Context,’ Revue Intemationale de Philosophie, 65 (1963), 381-94.Google Scholar Watson's original ideas were in his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Iowa, completed in 1961. In private correspondence, Watson claims that the original idea for the IA probably came from my colleague, Professor Robert G. Turnbull, in his classes at Iowa in the 1950's. The term ‘inherence account’ is due to George Pappas - see note 2.

2 For early support see Watson, Richard A. in his The Downfall of Cartesianism (The Hague: Nijhoff 1966), 111-18Google Scholar, and the present author in ‘Solipsism and Berkeley's Alleged Realism,’ Revue lnternationale de Philosophie, 85-86 (1968), 403-12. Detractors include Muehlmann, Robert ‘Berkeley's Ontology and the Epistemology of Idealism,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, VIII (1978), 89–111CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oaklander, L. Nathan ‘The Inherence Interpretation of Berkeley: A Critique,’ The Modern Schoolman, 54 (1977), 261-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bracken, Harry M. ‘Substance in Berkeley,’ in New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy, ed. Steinkraus, Warren E. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1966), 85–97Google Scholar, and ‘Some Problems of Substance Among the Cartesians,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964), 129-37. Cummins deserts the ship in ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ Nous, IX (1975), 55-72. An excellent review and critique of the IA is by Pappas, George S. in his ‘Ideas, Minds, and Berkeley,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 17 (1980), 181-94.Google Scholar

3 This is too glib, of course. For those who made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the 17th century, it may just be the point that secondary qualities are not qualities of anything, e.g., for Malebranche, colors are not qualities of anything, except that as sensations they are modifications of mental substance. This cannot ultimately by Berkeley's line, as I shall discuss more fully later in this paper, since such an argument would leave us without ordinary objects. For some insightful comments, see Cummins, ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ 67.

4 George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, Luce, A.A. and Jessop, T.W. eds., 9 vols. (London: Nelson and Co. 1948), II, 80-1.Google Scholar All references to Berkeley will be cited as Works, followed by volume number and page number.

5 See the detractors cited in note 2.

6 Bennett, Jonathan Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971)Google Scholar, 139ff. Bennett's analysis of Berkeley was first developed in ‘Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1965), 1-17; this paper will be very important to the view expressed in the present essay. A very interesting reply to Bennett's paper is by Ayers, Michael R.: ‘Substance, Reality, and the Great, Dead Philosophers,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1970), 38–49.Google Scholar

7 Allaire, 92.

8 For a discussion of how to do history of philosophy, see Ayers, 38.

9 The most original new view on this subject, which I shall not review here because it is not presented in enough detail, is Pappas,’ in the aforementioned ‘Ideas, Minds, and Berkeley.’ The gist of his idea involves the notion of performatories, à Iá Hintikka, based on section 23 of the Principles, where Berkeley gives his inconceivability argument.

10 Allaire, 95ff. Muehlmann, in ‘Berkeley's Ontology and the Epistemology of Idealism,’ is very sensitive to this order. See 97ff. For the opposing view see Pappas, ‘Ideas, Minds, and Berkeley,’ 191ff.

11 I am not suggesting that Berkeley did not assume it, i.e., that he argued for it directly, but only that the critics, in citing textual support against the lA, owe us an explanation for esse est percipi, and that it is going to be difficult for them to find textual support in the Principles for any interpretation. See Cummins, Philip D. ‘Berkeley's Likeness Principle,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, 4 (1966), 63-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted in Locke and Berkeley: A Collection of Critical Essays, Martin, C. B. and Armstrong, D.M. eds. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1968), 353-63.Google Scholar References will be to the latter work; p. 359 is especially relevant to the present point, but the entire paper is very important to my interpretation of Berkeley.

12 Cummins, in ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ certainly seems to take the line, inspired by Reid, that Berkeley's arguments in the Dialogues do underlie those of the Principles. He does not discuss the significance of section 15, however. Muehlmann also gives an epistemological interpretation of esse est percipi, again based on the Dialogues and, to some extent, the attack in the Principles on abstract ideas. Both admit, though, that there is scant argument for Berkeley's idealism in the Principles proper.

13 Perhaps Berkeley ought to have said what Chisholm says, but can it be seriously maintained that he did? See Reinaldo Elugardo, ‘An Alleged Incoherence in Berkeley's Philosophy,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume IV, 177-89. Elugardo's work is a critique of Pitcher's, George ‘Minds and Ideas in Berkeley,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1969), 198–207.Google Scholar If I understand this debate correctly, it is similar to the ‘disagreement’ between Moore and Allaire. Moore thinks Berkeley's error is in predicating blue of the sensation; Allaire thinks it is predicating blue of the mind. Elugardo thinks that blue is adverbial upon the sensation; Pitcher, that it is adverbial upon the mind that senses. However, I think Pitcher and Elugardo do have an interesting insight, even if they draw from it mistaken implications: the key issue here is whether, e.g., blue, is a quality for Berkeley. I discuss this later in the paper.

14 Ayers, ‘Substance, Reality, and the Great Dead Philosophers,’ 40-2, 47ffGoogle Scholar

15 Cummins, in ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ 69, is one of the very few to question what seems like an obvious relationship between sensations and minds.

16 Ayers, 47ff. See also the very clear discussion by Pappas, 188ff.

17 Works, II, 61 (section 49 of the Principles). See also p. 72 of the same volume (section 73 of the Principles) where Berkeley alludes to qualities not being able to exist by themselves, i.e., they need to be qualities of something. See Allaire, 101ff.

18 Perhaps it is such problems that inspire Muehlmann to claim that Berkeley really does not have substantial minds in the Principles; see 99ff. His claim that it does not follow from the fact that Berkeley uses the term ‘substance’ to refer to minds that he is committed to substantial minds in the ontological sense, I find just annoying. A healthy antidote to such unnerving speculation is found in Ayers.

19 Berkeley, George Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Adams, R.A. ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1979)Google Scholar, xx of the editor's introduction.

20 One might argue here that this was the common 17th century view - that nothing but ideas could be perceived. Surely, though, if this is the doctrine, it depends upon arguments either like those from the new science, which Berkeley cannot consistently accept, or arguments like those in the Dialogues.

21 Cummins, ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ 66ff., sees that the Cartesians do not treat the secondary qualities as predicable of anything, but does not see the problems that engenders for Berkeley, after the latter has argued that the primaries and secondaries are in the same ontological boat.

22 Pappas, 193-4

23 This argument is hinted at, but not explicitly stated in Cummins, ‘Berkeley's Likeness Principle,’ 359ff. It is, if I understand him correctly, also in Allaire, 97. I shall argue later that Berkeley's abhorrence for matter is partly based on its bareness, that it has no qualities by definition, partly on the fact that it can have no qualities, since all its alleged qualities are ‘in’ the mind. For the present argument see especially sections 7, 9, and, most important, 73 of the Principles (Works, II, 43ff., and 72-3).

24 Pappas, 193. He has a very different interpretation of the notion of ‘depend’ than I shall now discuss. See 193ff. of his paper, and note 9.

25 See Cummins, ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ 69. I do not think, however, that such a position commits one to a so-called adverbial analysis as pushed by either Elugardo or Pitcher. See note 13.

26 Allaire, 97

27 Ibid., 97ff. Actually, Allaire is not very explicit about the relativity arguments; he simply argues that Berkeley does not wish to rest idealism on the claim that sensed qualities are ideas. Cummins, in ‘Berkeley's Likeness Principle,’ tries to restore such arguments into the picture but, as I shall soon argue, fails. Muehlmann takes an opposite stance from Allaire.

28 Bennett, ‘Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities,’ 1ff

29 See especially sections 11, 17, 67, 68, and 73 of the Principles (Works, II, 45-6, 47-8, 70-1, 72-3).

30 Bennett, ‘Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities,’ 4

31 Ibid., 7

32 Ibid., 4. The passage from Berkeley is Principles, section 37 (Works, II, 56).

33 Cummins, in ‘Berkeley's Ideas of Sense,’ clearly sees the strand involving sensations, but does not clearly see its connection to the IA - in fact, he seems to believe the two are antithetical; see 57, where he speaks of the ontological and epistemological interpretations in the context of describing ‘conflicting’ analyses of esse est percipi. In ‘Berkeley's Likeness Principle,’ Cummins tries to restore Berkeley's arguments in the Dialogues for the claim that ‘what is presented cannot occur u.1perceived’ (358) to a place in the attack against matter. If my present argument is correct, the attack on matter can be seen independently of the Dialogues. What Cummins is trying to do, however, is worth doing, namely, to show how some of the arguments of the Dialogues can be incorporated into the lA without invoking a theory of ideas which trivializes esse est percipi.