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Action explanation and its presuppositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Lilian O’Brien
Lilian O’Brien*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
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Abstract

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.

Keywords

Rationalizing action explanationreasons explanationcausalismDavidson’s challenge
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 123 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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Footnotes

The author will be at the discipline of Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki from Autumn 2018.

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