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Transparency and reflection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Matthew Boyle
Matthew Boyle*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
*
Matthew Boyle [email protected]Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago
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Abstract

Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge.

Keywords

Transparencyself-knowledgeJean-Paul Sartrereflectionprivileged accessbeliefintention
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 7 , November 2019 , pp. 1012 - 1039
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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