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Suppositions, Presuppositions, Ontology1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ian Hinckfuss
Ian Hinckfuss*
Affiliation:
University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia, 4072
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Extract

It has been widely accepted in the past and it remains accepted in many quarters even now, that an ontologically economical (nominalist or fictionalist) position is to be rejected if the corresponding Platonic or otherwise ontologically prodigal discourse cannot be translated, paraphrased or otherwise ‘reduced’ to discourse exhibiting a more economical ontology. Such an attitude is often accompanied by

  1. (a) the claim that the prodigal ontology explains some important truths

    and

  2. (b) the demand that the nominalist or fictionalist or economicalist provide an alternative explanation for those truths — perhaps in terms of ontologically economical ersatz substitutes for the prodigal entities.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , December 1993 , pp. 595 - 618
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1987

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References

1 Earlier versions of this paper were read to the Philosophy Department at the University of Queensland, to the Australasian Association of Philosophy in Canberra in 1989, and to the Faculty of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge in 1990. I am indebted to all who took part in the subsequent discussions, not least my colleagues at the University of Queensland, and many others, including Jim Mackenzie, Richard Sylvan, David Papineau, Jonathan Harrison, Jeremy Butterfield, Jack Smart, and Graham Nerlich for feedback on these ideas. I am indebted also to an anonymous referee and to the editor of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for some helpful suggestions which were incorporated into the final draft.

2 See Field, H. Science Without Numbers (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980Google Scholar) and Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989).

3 See Hamblin, C.L. Fallacies (London: Methuen 1970)Google Scholar; Mackenzie, J.D. ‘QuestionBegging in Non-Cumulative Systems,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979) 117-33CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ‘How to Stop Talking to Tortoises,’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (1979) 705-17, ‘Why Do We Number Theorems?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1980) 135-49, ‘The Dialectics of Logic,’ Logique et Analyse 94 (1981) 159-77. Other work in this area includes Hamblin, C.L. ‘Mathematical Models of Dialogue,’ Theoria 37 (1971) 130-55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Woods, John and Walton, Douglas ‘Arresting Circles in Formal Dialogues,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1978) 73-90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Walton, Douglas N. Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies (New York: University Press of America 1984)Google Scholar.

4 ‘Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems,’ Wojtasiewicz, O. trans., Studia Logica 24 (1969) 143-57, at 149Google Scholar

5 Strawson, P. Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen 1952), 182Google Scholar

6 Aubrey Townsend, ‘Truth Values, Semantic Value and Bivalence,’ paper read at the annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (1989)

7 kartunnen, L. ‘Presupposition and Linguistic Content,’ Theoretical Linguistics 1 (1974) 181-94Google Scholar. I am indebted to Miguel De Castro for bringing these examples to my attention.

8 See Locke’s, John Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Nidditch, Peter H. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975)Google Scholar; Bentham, Jeremy Fictions, Ogden, C.K. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1951)Google Scholar; Vaihinger, Hans The Philosophy of ‘As If,’ Ogden, C.K. trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1935)Google Scholar. I am indebted to Richard Sylvan (née Routley) for bringing some of these writings to my attention.

9 See Mackie, J.L. and Kneebone, G.T. ‘Proof,’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary 40 (1966) 23-46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Field, Hartry Science Without Numbers; Routley, Richard Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (Canberra: Philosophy Department RSSS, Australian National University 1980)Google Scholar; Aune, Bruce ‘Action and Ontology; Philosophical Studies 54 (1988) 195-213CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object (New York: Wiley 1960), 237Google Scholar

11 Alston, W.P. ‘Ontological Commitment,’ Philosophical Studies 9 (1958) 8-17CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 Lewis, David On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986), 3Google Scholar

13 See Hughes, G.E. and Cresswell, M.J. An Introduction to Modal Logic (London: Methuen 1968Google Scholar), Appendix 1 for a discussion of systems of natural deduction involving modalities, and in particular, the development of a such a system which is complete with respect to the standard semantics for S5.

14 See Aaron, R.I. The Theory of Universals (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1952)Google Scholar; Price, H.H. Thinking and Experience (London: Hutchinson 1953)Google Scholar; Armstrong, David Universals and Scientific Realism (New York: Cambridge University Press 1978)Google Scholar.

15 See Hinckfuss, I.C. ‘Entailment, Relevance and Formal Dialogue,’ Australian Logic Teacher’s Journal 7 (1983) 29-38Google Scholar.

16 Quine, W.V.O. From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1953), 77Google Scholar

17 Carnap, Rudolf Logical Foundations of Probability (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1950Google Scholar, Ch. 1

18 See Stem, Cindy ‘The Prospects for Elimination of Event-Talk,’ Philosophical Studies 54 (1988) 43-62Google Scholar; Clark, Romane ‘Concerning the Logic of Predicate Modifiers,’ Nous 4 (1970) 311-35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Horgan, Terence ‘The Case Against Events,’ The Philosophical Review 87 (1978) 28-47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.