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Spatial representation, magnitude and the two stems of cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Thomas Land
Thomas Land*
Affiliation:
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, UK
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that attention to Kant’s philosophy of mathematics sheds light on the doctrine that there are two stems of the cognitive capacity, which are distinct, but equally necessary for cognition. Specifically, I argue for the following four claims: (i) The distinctive structure of outer sensible intuitions must be understood in terms of the concept of magnitude. (ii) The act of sensibly representing a magnitude involves a special act of spontaneity Kant ascribes to a capacity he calls the productive imagination. (iii) Contrary to what is assumed by many commentators, it is not the case that the Two Stems Doctrine implies that a representation is either sensible or spontaneity-dependent, but not both. (iv) Outer sensible intuitions are both sensible and spontaneity-dependent – they are sensible because they exhibit the kind of structure Kant takes to be distinctive of outer sensible intuitions, and they depend on spontaneity because they are cases of sensibly representing a magnitude.

Keywords

intuitionsensibilityconceptspontaneitymagnitudeproductive imaginationspace
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy , December 2014 , pp. 524 - 550
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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