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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
1 All page-references not otherwise marked are to Wollheim's book.
2 Professor Wollheim has been kind enough to read a draft of this Notice. His comments have forced me to clarify some of my criticisms, though not to modify nearly as many of them as he will think I should have modified. I am very grateful to him, especially given the extent of our disagreements. I have also benefitted from the comments of this Journal's referee.
3 Wollheim's is not the only contemporary work on Freud by a philosopher which lacks precision. The same is true of some of Richard Rorty's recent work, too, for example, ‘Freud and Moral Reflection,’ the 1984 Weigert Lecture (forthcoming in a collection of papers on Psychiatry and the Humanities).
4 Wollheim gives the man's name as Ernst Lehrs (139). He doesn't say why. Ernst Lanzer is the name in Freud's process notes, now in the Freud Archives in the Library of Congress (P. Swales, private communication).
5 Wollheim is aware, of course, that philosophers of mind have based theories on these continuities (see p. 12 for an example). The difficulty is that he does not seem fully to understand how-or why.
6 The limitations on what we can safely infer from exercises in introspective imagination and the temptations to infer more than that, temptations which are characteristic of (no, which are) philosophy of mind since 1641, are actually very complicated. I have discussed the matter more thoroughly in a paper to which I will also refer later, ‘Imagination, Possibility and Personal Identity,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975) 185-98. One place where Wittgenstein attacks the trustworthiness of the imagination (or thought-experiments of one kind) is in remark 390 of his Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1963). I examine the conditions that an appeal to the imagination must meet to establish a possibility in the paper just mentioned (197).
7 Wollheim says a number of remarkable things about death. I often didn't understand what he meant and didn't see much support for what I did understand, however, so I will say nothing further about this topic.
8 See Williams, Bernard ‘The Self and the Future,’ reprinted in his Problems of the Self(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1973) 46–63Google Scholar. I discuss his work further in a ‘Critical Notice,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975) 627-39 (with J.W. Leyden). Wollheim says that this sort of thought-experiment ‘presupposes relational theory’ (22). How remarkable! Philosophers such as Roderick Chisholm have thought exactly the opposite, that such thought-experiments establish that personal identity is strict and absolute and has nothing to do with continuities or the absence thereof (except of course for the continuity of the absolute self, the pure ego itself). See, for example, Roderick Chisholm, The Loose and Popular and Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity,’ in Care, Norman S. and Grimm, Robert M. eds., Perception and Personal Identity (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press 1969) 107–25Google Scholar.
9 This sort of awareness of self uses what I call non-ascriptive reference to self (cf. ‘Imagination, Possibility and Personal Identity,’ 188). Sydney Shoemaker has called a closely comparable phenomenon reference without identification (‘Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,’ Journal of Philosophy (1968) 555-67, 65 at 558). For the arguments that it exists and how it vitiates appeals to introspective imagination, see those articles and also some articles by Hector-Neri Casteñeda, especially ‘“He”: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness,’ Ratio 8 (1966) 130-57. Wittgenstein began it all in the Blue Book.
10 As simple an analysis as, ‘Conscious states are those on which we can report solely by having them,’ is proof against all his objections (cf. p. 47). An interesting discussion of this issue can be found in an article by Kim, Jaegwon ‘Materialism and the Criteria of the Mental,’ Synthese 22 (1971) 323–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (Wollheim's treatment of Freud's views on consciousness is also flawed, but I will take that up later.)
11 The example from remembering is Wollheim's (101). Sydney Shoemaker discusses a closely related notion, witnessing, in ‘Persons and Their Pasts,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970) 269-85.
12 The interested might look at Dennett, Daniel ‘Two Approaches to Mental Images,’ in his Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books 1978) 174–89Google Scholar. He gives an extensive bibliography, which is now a bit out of date.
13 Wollheim first developed this theory of the imagination in ‘Identification and Imagination,’ in his Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books 1974) 172-95. (Versions of it appeard in other places, too.) The key distinctions were also developed by myself in ‘Imagination, Possibility and Personal Identity,’ interestingly enough at about the same time though independently. I think I provide the basis for a clearer account of the ways in which one can imagine experiences ‘from the inside’ with and without imagining oneself as the subject of them. This article is the source of my comments here.
14 See Shoemaker's ‘Persons and Their Pasts,’ and Parfit, Derek ‘Personal Identity,’ Philosophical Review 80 (1970) 3–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 Parfit, 15
16 If memory is defined in terms of identity, then if it is used to define identity, we are caught in a circle. Cf. Butler, Joseph ‘Of Personal Identity,’ a dissertation added to The Analogy of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1897)Google Scholar. Many other philosophers have followed Butler in this view of how the concept of memory is defined, including some still alive.
17 Or archaic overarching image, as he also refers to it (143). In ‘Identification and Imagination’ he introduces the idea of what he called a Master Thought to perform a similar function.
18 The idea that hysterical symptoms are unintelligible occurs throughout his pre-1900 writings. Cf. for an unlikely example Sigmund Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology 1895], in James Strachey, trans. and general ed., The Standard Edition of tire Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis 1953-1974) Vol. I, 348. Hereafter references to Freud will be inserted in the text using this style: abbreviation of title, year of authorship, volume number in the Standard Edition, page number. The following abbreviations will be used: PSP for Project for a Scientific Psychology, GP for Group Psychology and the Analysis of tire Ego, E&I for The Ego and The ld, ISA for Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, and C&D for Civilization and Its Discontents.)
19 As Wollheim is aware, Freud thought the Rat Man had sexualized his memories (141). Freud spoke of the bodily ego only once, where he said it was ‘the projection of a surface (E&l [1923]. SE XIX, 26-7).
20 E&l is usually taken as the place where this theory is first developed. Chapter VII of the Interpretation of Dreams [1900], SE V, 557-8, suggests that the new development was at least partly rediscovery.
21 As Wollheim has pointed out to me, there are some occurrences of the term in pre-1900 letters and drafts of Freud's where it has a broader meaning. Probably in this early period it covered both what Freud came to mean exclusively by it (parental intercourse) and what Wollheim says he meant by it (childhood seduction). (Cf. SE I, 244-9.)
22 Freud did not in fact use the term ‘anaclitic’ very often; the General Index lists only ten occurrences in the whole of his psychological works. The best-known is in ‘Narcissism: An Introduction,’ [1914], SE XIV, 87ff. He used the term there to refer to a bond of ‘love’ (if you like) that is built upon and so parallels the satisfaction of another drive, in the way for example that oral sensuality might grow out of using the mouth to gratify hunger.
23 Kleinian splitting, I mean. Right at the end of his life, he developed his own notion of splitting, of the ego, but this was an adult phenomenon and quite different in other ways, too. (‘The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence’ (1938], SE XXIII, 271-8; cf. also An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, same year and volume, 201-4.) See my ‘Splitting and Repression in Freud's Work’ and, on the extraordinarily complicated business of Freud's changing views on aggression and destructiveness, my ‘Death, Eros, Sadism and Sleep,’ both forthcoming.
24 These issues are well discussed in Schafer, Roy ‘The Loving and Beloved Super-Ego in Freud's Structural Theory,’ Psychoanalytical Study of the Child 15 (1960) 163–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and in Marschall, Barbara The Evolution of The Concept of the Super-Ego (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 1986)Google Scholar.
25 See ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’ ([1914], SE XII, 147-156), one of the most interesting papers on psychoanalytic psychotherapy which Freud wrote.
26 Wollheim has defended his practice on the grounds that providing detailed references is part of a recent and unwelcome innovation, philosophy becoming an academic specialty rather than a general concern. Perhaps; but the cost in precision and intelligibility for more serious and knowledgeable readers of not giving them is very high. For those who particularly missed references to back up the psychoanalytic attributions in the book, many of the more important ones can be found in Wollheim's, ‘The Bodily Ego,’ in Wollheim, R. and Hopkins, J. eds., Philosophical Essays on Freud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The account of his quasi-spatial view of introjection, etc., there is also clearer.