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Remarks on Relational Theories of Motion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

John Earman
John Earman*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA15260, U.S.A.
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Extract

In a recent article in this journal, Barbara Lariviere offers a very useful distinction between two ways of understanding the claims that Leibniz, or relational theorists in general, might wish to make about the nature of motion and the structure of space and time; viz.,

(L1) There is no real inertial structure to space-time.

and

(L2) There is a real inertial structure to space-time, but it is dynamical rather than absolute.

Citing the authority of Weyl, the author argues that L1 is untenable; indeed, the argument purports to show that if L1 were true, then there would be no coherent basis for a theory of motion, not even a relational theory. My main goal in this note is to point out why this argument is mistaken while at the same time sketching the real reason why the relational conception of motion is untenable. In addition I will offer a few remarks about the relevance of L2 to the absolute-relational controvery.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 1989 , pp. 83 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1989

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