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Reasons for emotion and moral motivation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Reid Blackman
Reid Blackman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA
*
Reid Blackman [email protected]
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Abstract

Internalism about normative reasons is the view that an agent’s normative reasons depend on her motivational constitution. On the assumption that there are reasons for emotion I argue that (a) externalism about reasons for emotion entails that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated and (b) internalism about reasons for emotion is implausible. If the arguments are sound we can conclude that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated. Resisting this conclusion requires either justifying internalism about reasons for emotion in a way hitherto unarticulated or giving up on reasons for emotion altogether.

Keywords

Reasonsemotioninternalismexternalismmoral motivation
Type
Original Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 6 , September 2019 , pp. 805 - 827
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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