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Reason and trust in Reid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Nicholas Wolterstorff*
Affiliation:
Yale Divinity School, Yale University, USA Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, University of Virginia, USA

Abstract

My theme in this essay is the anti-rationalism in Reid's thought. I explore three areas of Reid's thought in which anti-rationalism is a prominent feature: Reid's attack on the Way of Ideas and his own account of how beliefs are formed, in particular, perceptual beliefs, his response to the skeptic, and his understanding of the task of the philosopher.

Type
Epistemology
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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References

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