Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T03:00:06.388Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Putnam, Context, and Ontotogy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Steven Gross
Steven Gross*
Affiliation:
University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia, PA19104-6304USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

When a debate seems intractable, with little agreement as to how one might proceed towards a resolution, it is understandable that philosophers should consider whether something might be amiss with the debate itself. Famously in the last Century, philosophers of various stripes explored in various ways the possibility that at least certain philosophical debates are in some manner deficient in sense. Such moves are no longer so much in vogue. For one thing, the particular ways they have been made have themselves undergone much critical scrutiny, so that many philosophers now feel that there is, for example, a Quinean response to Carnap, a Gricean reply to Austin, and a diluting proliferation of Wittgenstein interpretations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , December 2004 , pp. 507 - 553
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Atlas, J. 1989. Philosophy without Ambiguity: A Logico-Linguistic Essay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Austin, J. L. 1956. ‘A Plea for Excuses.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57.Google Scholar
Bach, K. 1987. Thought and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bach, K. 2000. ‘Quantification, Qualification and Context: A Reply to Stanley and Szabó.' Mind & Language 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boolos, G. 1974. ‘Reply to Charles Parsons’ “Sets and Classes.'” Cited as first printed in his Logic, Logic, and Logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998..Google Scholar
Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. 1997. ‘On an Alleged Connection between Indirect Quotation and Semantic Theory.’ Mind and Language 13.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. 1950. ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4.Google Scholar
Cartwright, R. 1994. ‘Speaking of Everything.’ Nous 28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D. 1969. ‘On Saying That.’ Synthese 19.Google Scholar
Diamond, C. 1988. ‘Throwing Away the Latter: How to Read the Tractatus.’ Philosophy 63.Google Scholar
Dreben, B. 1992. ‘Putnam, Quineand the Facts.’ Philosophical Topics 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ebbs, G. 1992. ‘Realism and Rational Inquiry.’ Philosophical Topics 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ebbs, G. 1997. Rule-Following and Realism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Field, H. 1989. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 2000. ‘A Science of Tuesdays.’ London Review of Books 22.14: 20–1.Google Scholar
Glanzberg, M. 1996. The Paradox of the Liar and the Problem of Context. Harvard University, unpublished dissertation.Google Scholar
Grice, H. P. 1967. ‘Logic and Conversation’ (The William James Lectures). First printed in their entirety in his Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1989..Google Scholar
Gross, S. 1998. Essays on Linguistic Context-Sensitivity and its Philosophical Significance. Harvard University, dissertation. Published in the series ‘Studies in Philosophy: Outstanding Dissertations.’ London: Routledge 2001.Google Scholar
Gross, S. 2002. ‘Is Context-Sensitivity Eliminable? Some Remarks.’ The Dialogue (Yearbook of Philosophical Hermeneutics: The Legitimacy of Truth, Proceedings of the Third Meeting, Italian-American Philosophy)2.Google Scholar
Gross, S. 2005. ‘Context-Sensitive Truth-Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence.' Mind & Language 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, B. and C., Wright. 1997. ‘Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism.’ In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Hale, B. and Wright, C. eds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Hellman, G. 1989. Mathematics Without Numbers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Horn, L. 1989. A Natural History of Negation. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1781/87. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith. London: Macmillan 1929.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1993. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. 1977. ‘Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larson, R. and G., Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McGee, V. 2000. ‘Everything.’ In Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, Sher, G. and Tieszen, R. eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McMichael, A. 1988. ‘Creative Ontology and Absolute Truth.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moser, P. 1990. ‘A Dilemma for Internal Realism.’ Philosophical Studies 59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parsons, C. 1974. ‘The Liar Paradox.’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 3. Reprinted (with 'Postscript) in his Mathematics in Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parsons, C. 1982. ‘Objects and Logic.’ The Monist 65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, J. 1979. ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical.’ Nous 13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pustejovsky, J. 1995. The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1956. ‘Mathematics and the Existence of Abstract Entities.’ Philosophical Studies 7 81–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1967a. ‘Mathematics Without Foundations.’ Journal of Philosophy 63.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1967b. ‘The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic.’ In R. Schoenman, ed., Bertrand Russell, Philosopher of the Century. London: Allen & Unwin. Cited as reprinted in H. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter, and Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975/9..Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1971. Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper and Row. Cited as reprinted in H. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter, and Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975/9.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1974. ‘The “Corroboration” of Theories.’ In The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Schilpp, P.A. ed. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1975a. ‘Introduction: Science as Approximation to Truth.’ In his Mathematics, Matter, and Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975/9..Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1975b. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning.“’ Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 215–71. Cited as reprinted in his Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1983. ‘Equivalence.’ In his Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1987a. The Many Faces of Realism. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1987b. ‘Truth and Convention.’ Dialectica 4169-77. Cited as reprinted in his Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1990..Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1989. ‘Model Theory and the “Factuality” of Semantics.’ In Reflections on Chomsky, George, A. ed. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1990a. ‘A Defense of Internal Realism.’ In his Realism with a Human Face. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1990b. ‘Realism with a Human Face.’ In his Realism with a Human Face. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1991. ‘Replies and Comments.’ Erkenntnis 34: 401–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1992. ‘Replies.’ Philosophical Topics 20: 347–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1993. ‘On the Slogan “Epistemology Naturalized.'” In On Quine, P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited as reprinted under the title ‘Rethinking Mathematical Necessity’ in H. Putnam, Words and Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1994..Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1994a. ‘Comments and Replies.’ In Reading Putnam, Clark, P. and Hale, B. eds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1994b. ‘Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity.’ In his Words and Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1995a. ‘Pragmatism.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1995b. Pragmatism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1998a. ‘Floyd, Wittgenstein, and Loneliness.’ In Loneliness, Rouner, L. ed. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1998b. ‘Strawson and Skepticism.’ In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, Hahn, L.E. ed. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1999. The Three-Fold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 2000. ‘Paradox Revisted.’ In Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, Sher, G. and Tieszen, R. eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V.O. 1951. ‘On Carnap's Views on Ontology.’ Philosophical Studies 2 65–72. Cited as reprinted in his The Ways of Paradox, and Other Essays, rev. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V.O. 1975. ‘On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World.’ Erkenntnis 9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V.O. 1981. ‘Things and their Place in Theories.’ In his Theories and Things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, H. 1938. Experience and Prediction. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1908. ‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.’ American Journal of Mathematics 30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, R. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, R. 1997. ‘Reference and Necessity.’ In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Hale, B. and Wright, C. eds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Stanley, J. and Szabó, Z.. 2000. ‘On Quantifier Domain Restriction.’ Mind & Language 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stein, H. 1992. ‘Was Carnap Entirely Wrong, After All?’ Synthese 92.Google Scholar
Travis, C. 1985. ‘On What is Strictly Speaking True.’ The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Travis, C. 1989. The Uses of Sense: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Travis, C. 1991. ‘Annals of Analysis.’ Mind 100.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, B. 1995. ‘“World” Is Not a Count Noun.’ Nous 29.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 1999. ‘The Number of Things’ (abstract), Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 73.Google Scholar
White, M. 1956. Toward Reunion in Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, M. 1981. ‘The Double Standard in Ontology.’ Philosophical Studies 39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 1929. Conversation notes of Waismann for December 30, 1929. Cited as in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, Murray, M. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press 1978.Google Scholar
Yablo, S. 1998. ‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society 72.Google Scholar
Ziff, P. 1960. Semantic Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Zwicky, A. and Sadock, J.. 1975. ‘Ambiguity Tests and How to Fail Them.’ Syntax and Semantics 4.Google Scholar