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Lit from Within: First-Person Thought and Illusions of Transcendence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2020

Léa Salje
Léa Salje*
Affiliation:
University of Leeds, Leeds
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Philosophical treatments of the self in a range of different traditions have positioned it outside the realm of ordinary worldly objects. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this seemingly widespread and persistent temptation to mystify the self is that the epistemic properties of I-thought are apt to give rise to an illusion of transcendence about their objects—that is, about ourselves.

Keywords

The selffirst-person thoughtde secognitive illusionstranscendence of the self
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 6 , August 2020 , pp. 735 - 749
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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