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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
A good historian often can assess the relative likelihood of competing historical claims more reliably on implicit grounds - intuitively, if you like - than in any other available way. This idea has been a persistent theme of Verstehen-theorists. It is, in essence, the old saw that there is no substitute for the brewmaster's nose, adapted to the art of producing historical brew. If true, it augments the importance of the historian relative to that of his arguments, and thereby gives him a dignity that he might otherwise lack. And some have thought that it marks an important methodological difference between historical studies and the natural sciences. It is, in its way, a humane idea. But is it true?
1 See, for example, Abel, T. ‘The Operation Called Verstehen,’ American Journal of Sociology, 54 (1948) 211–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar (reprinted in Feigl, H. and Brodbeck, M. (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts 1953) 677–87Google Scholar); Nagel, Ernest The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1961) 482–4;Google Scholar Hempel, C.R. ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation,’ Philosophy of Science, 15 (1948) 135–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar (reprinted, with some changes, in Hempel, C.R. Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press 1965) 245–95Google Scholar); Rudner, Richard Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1966). 73;Google Scholar). Evra, Van ‘On Scriven on “Verstehen”,’ Theory and Decision, 2 (1971) 377–81;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Abel, T. ‘Verstehen I and Verstehen II,’ Theory and Decision, 6 (1975) 99–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Page numbers noted parenthetically in the present paper are to the Feigl and Brodbeck reprinting.
3 In what follows, ‘Matthew,’ ‘Mark,’ etc., refer respectively to the several gospels, ‘St. Matthew,’ ‘St. Mark,’ etc., to their authors.
4 Farmer's, W.R. The Synoptic Problem (New York: Macmillan 1964)Google Scholar contains a fascinating history of the debate over the Synoptic Problem.
5 Abbott's argument is quoted in Farmer, 75.
6 Farmer, 77
7 Streeter, B.H. The Four Gospels (New York: Macmillan 1924), 163Google Scholar
8 Styler, G.M. ‘Excursus IV: The Priority of Mark,’ in Moule, C.F.D. (ed.), The Birth of the New Testament (London: Adams and Charles Black 1966), 230Google Scholar
9 Streeter, 158
10 Kümmel, W.G. Introduction To The New Testament, 14th edition, (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press 1966), 50Google Scholar
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 47
13 Ibid.
14 Styler, 229
15 Cp. the related argument in Cohen, H. ‘Das Verstehen and Historical Knowledge,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (1973) 299–306.Google Scholar
16 Cp. the related argument in Van Evra.
17 Scriven, M. ‘Verstehen Again,’ Theory and Decision, 1 (1971) 382–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also, Nozick, Robert Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1981), 636–7.Google Scholar
18 Berlin, I. ‘The Concept of Scientific History,’ reprinted in Dray, W. (ed.), Philosophical Analysis and History (New York: Harper and Row 1966), 50Google Scholar
19 Dan Hausman, Inge Lembeck, Harper Pryor and the referees of this journal commented helpfully on an earlier draft of this paper. A grant from the University of Maryland also helped.