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Expert Deference about the Epistemic and Its Metaepistemological Significance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2020

Michele Palmira Open the ORCID record for Michele Palmira [Opens in a new window]
Michele Palmira*
Affiliation:
University of Barcelona/LOGOS Research Group & BIAP
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one’s judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.

Keywords

Epistemologyexpert deferenceepistemic judgementsepistemic parityunderstandingobjectivityrealism
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , May 2020 , pp. 524 - 538
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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