Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T12:10:31.519Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Epistemicism and modality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri*
Affiliation:
CSMN, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson's Vagueness (1994) give a definiteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I will find to be more plausible than the other.

Keywords

VaguenessmodalityepistemicismTimothy Williamson
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 803 - 835
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Caie, M. 2012. “Vagueness and Semantic Indiscriminability.” Philosophical Studies 160: 365–377. 10.1007/s11098-011-9723-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, D. 2012. Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cresswell, M. 1990. Entities and Indices. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 10.1007/978-94-009-2139-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, M., and Humberstone, L.. 1980. “Two Notions of Necessity.” Philosophical Studies 38: 1–30. 10.1007/BF00354523CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fritz, P. 2016. “Appendix to Juhani Yli-Vakkuri's ‘Epistemicism and Modality’.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, this volume.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawthorne, J. 2006. “Epistemicism and Semantic Plasticity.” In Metaphysical Essays, 185–210. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, D. 1977. “Demonstratives.” Mimeograph, Department of Philosophy, UCLA. Published in J. Almog et al., eds., Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Page references to the latter.Google Scholar
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kearns, S., and Magidor, O.. 2008. “Epistemicism About Vagueness and Meta-linguistic Safety.” Philosophical Perspectives 22: 277–304. 10.1111/phpe.2008.22.issue-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kearns, S., and Magidor, O.. 2012. “Semantic Sovereignty.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 322–350. 10.1111/phpr.2012.85.issue-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Litland, J. and Yli-Vakkuri, J. 2016. “Vagueness and Modality.” Philosophical Perspectives.Google Scholar
Magidor, O. Forthcoming. “Epistemicism, Distribution, and the Argument from Vagueness.” Noûs.Google Scholar
Shapiro, S. 2007. Vagueness in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sorensen, R. 1988. Blindspots. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 1994. Vagueness. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 1999. “On the Structure of Higher-order Vagueness.” Mind 108: 127–143. 10.1093/mind/108.429.127CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. 2003. “Vagueness in Reality.” In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D., 690–716. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Yli-Vakkuri, J. 2013. “Propositions and Compositionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 27: 526–563. 10.1111/phpe.2013.27.issue-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar