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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
According to its proponents, eliminative materialism is a promising alternative to the problem-beset identity theory. A popular materialist strategy for handling thoughts, sensations, beliefs, and intentions has been to identify such mental states with physical states. The identity theorist, however, must confront difficult questions concerning identity criteria, essential properties and category mistakes. The eliminative theorist wants to bypass these problems by maintaining that we will someday discover that mental entities simply do not exist. If there are no mental entities, then we need not worry about determining their essential properties or determining the conditions under which they would be identical with physical entities. ‘Category mistake’ objections, which might apply to an identity thesis, would clearly be irrelevant.
As formulated by its chief proponent, Richard Rorty, the eliminative theory is suspiciously straightforward. Indeed, a closer look at its underpinnings reveals a highly questionable assumption. I will propose a reformulation of eliminative materialism which avoids this assumption.
1 See “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories,” Modern Materialism, O'Connor, John ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), 145-74;Google Scholar and “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” Journal of Philosophy 57 (1970), 399-424.
2 Richard Rorty, “Mind-Body Identity Privacy and Categories,” p. 148, note 6.
3 Richard Rorty, “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” p. 423.
4 This proposed reduction of the social sciences to psychology, psychology to biology, and biology to physics is discussed in Oppenheim, Paul and Putnam, Hilary “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,” in MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, Feigl, H. Scriven, M. and Maxwell, G. eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), 3-35.Google Scholar
5 Hempel, C.G. Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall, 1966), pp. 101-10.Google Scholar
6 Putnam, Hilary “The Nature of Mental States,” in Materialism and theMind-Body Problem, Rosenthal, David M. , ed. (Englewood Cliffs; PrenticeHall, 1971), 150-61.Google Scholar
7 This argument is like that given by Goldberg, Bruce “The Correspondence Hypothesis,” Philosophical Review 77 (1968), 438-54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 For a discussion of the functionalist position, see Dennett, D.C. Contentand Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).Google Scholar
9 Feyerabend, P.K. “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. III, Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G. eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p. 29.Google Scholar
10 Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” p. 46.
11 Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).Google Scholar
12 Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” p. 92.
13 Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), especially pp. 124Google Scholar, 161, 182, 214, 271-72.
14 I have received helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper from Annette Baier, Joseph Camp, and Thomas Wartenberg.