Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T00:45:27.013Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Cholbi
Michael Cholbi*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, CA, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism and irrealism in accounting for moral residue and other crucial phenomenological dimensions of our experience of moral dilemmas.

Keywords

Moral dilemmasregulative idealsmoral phenomenologymoral residueBernard Williams
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 268 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bagnoli, Carla. 2000. “Value in the Guise of Regret.” Philosophical Explorations 3: 169–187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barcan Marcus, Ruth. 1996. “More about Moral Dilemmas.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 23–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Betzler, Monika. 2004. “Sources of Practical Conflict and Reasons for Regret.” In Practical Conflicts, edited by Baumann, Peter and Betzler, Monika, 197–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dahl, Norman O. 1996. “Morality, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Requirements.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 86–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Donagan, Alan. 1996. “Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 11–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Emmet, Dorothy. 1994. The Role of the Unrealisable. New York: St. Martin’s Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gowans, Christopher. 1987. Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gowans, Christopher. 1996. “Moral Theory, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Requirements.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 199–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greenspan, Patricia. 1995. Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Grenberg, Jeanine. 2005. Kant and the Ethics of Humility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herman, Barbara. 1993. “Obligation and Performance.” Chap. 4. in Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Hill, Thomas E. 1996. “Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues: A Kantian Perspective.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 167–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Louden, Robert. 1992. Morality and Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Markovits, Daniel. 2009. “The Architecture of Integrity.” In Reading Bernard Williams, edited by Callcut, Daniel, 110–138. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
McConnell, Terrance. 1996. “Moral Residue and Dilemmas.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 36–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McConnell, Terrance. 2009. “Moral Dilemmas.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/.Google Scholar
Misak, Cheryl. 2004. Truth and the End of Inquiry. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mothersill, Mary. 1996. “The Moral Dilemmas Debate.” In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by Mason, H. E., 66–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pettit, Philip. 1987. “Universalizability without Utilitarianism.” Mind 96: 74–82.Google Scholar
Raz, Joseph. 2004. “Personal Practical Conflicts.” In Practical Conflicts, edited by Baumann, Peter and Betzler, Monika, 172–196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Rorty, Amélie. 1980. “Agent Regret.” In Explaining Emotions, edited by Rorty, Amélie, 489–506. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Ross, W. D. 2002. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schaber, Peter. 2004. “Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts?” In Practical Conflicts, edited by Baumann, Peter and Betzler, Monica, 279–294. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1988. Moral Dilemmas. New York: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Tessman, Lisa. 2015. Moral Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard. 1965. “Ethical Consistency.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 39: 103–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zimmerman, Michael. 1996. The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar