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Berkeley's Deletions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
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Recently, Jonathan Bennett has said some interesting, but mistaken, things about certain themes in Berkeley's philosophy. His comments are interesting because they direct us to a careful scrutiny of Berkeley's arguments and methodology in the often neglected Draft to the Introduction to the Principles, and mistaken because Bennett misinterprets these arguments and methodology. I would like to correct those mistakes because an understanding of Berkeley's Draft is helpful in interpreting the Introduction, which in turn is important for our understanding of not only his philosophical methodology, but also for an adequate interpretation of some of his substantive philosophical claims. I will argue that Bennett misinterprets Berkeley's deleted comments and arguments concerned with two Lockean themes, classification and understanding, as presented in several passages from the Draft which did not appear in the published Introduction to the Principles. In both cases Bennett's confusion is a failure to grasp Berkeley's strategy and target in his attacks upon Locke and the theses he takes Locke to hold. Read in their unedited form the deleted passages not only indicate that Bennett misinterprets them, but they also are suggestive of some interesting philosophical comments on Berkeley's part.
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- Copyright © The Authors 1976
References
1 Bennett, Jonathan Locke, Berkeley, Hume—Central Themes(Oxford, 1971).Google Scholar
2 Ibid., page 11.
3 Ibid., chapter 2, section 9, pages 47-52.
4 Ibid., page 50.
5 Berkeley, George First Draft of the Introduction to the Principles; Works of George Berkeley, Volume II, ed. Jessop, T.E. (London: Nelson, 1949), pages 126–129.Google Scholar [Henceforth: Draft]
6 Bennett, op. cit., page 50.
7 Draft, page 126-129.
8 George Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles; Works, Volume II, section 11. [Henceforth: Introduction]
9 Draft, page 126.
10 Locke here follows the Cartesian tradition which viewed the use of language as a distinguishing feature between man and animals as well as a criterion of rationality. See for example, Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part Five.
11 Draft, page 127.
12 Ibid., pages 127-128.
13 Ibid., page 126.
14 In this paper I am not interested in the adequacy of these comments against Locke's view of abstraction, or whether Berkeley correctly interprets Locke, but rather, I am concerned with the comments as indicative of Berkeley's focus on the mistaken view of language that led to the thesis of abstraction.
15 Introduction, section 18.
16 For Berkeley's clearest statement of the conditions of significance, see Alciphron VII, section 5, (Works, Vol. III). Also, in this regard, see my paper “Berkeley's linguistic Criterion,” The Personalist, Summer, 1971,esp. section II.
17 Draft, page 128, my emphasis. It is interesting to compare Berkeley's comment with that of a 20th-century writer on the same issue:
The fact with regard to abstract words is that they are applicable to each of a number of things because the things resemble each other more or less, without there being anything common to all of them to set exact boundaries which would mark off correct from incorrect applications of words.
Lazerowitz, Morris “The Existence of Universals,” Mind, Vol. LV, No. 217, January, 1946, page 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18 Berkeley, George Alciphron (1732), Works, Volume III, Appendix, page 334Google Scholar, my emphasis.
19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, No. 66.
20 Draft, pages 135-136, here and in all following quotations from the Melampus passage.
21 In the Draft (page 136) Berkeley introduces his concept of the Solitary Man. In addition there are several references in the Philosophical Commentaries (e.g. entries 566, 592 and 607).
22 Or, as we now say: “the old prejudice that any indicative sentence must describe (be ‘about’) something.” P.F. Strawson, “Truth,” Analysis, Volume IX, page 90. Cf. L. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book (Oxford: 1964), page 1.
23 This is not a good argument. Berkeley's apparent failure to distinguish the ‘is’ of predication from the ‘is’ of identity raises problems. But the fact that he has failed to show the genesis of the erroneous thesis does not lessen the force of his critical comments against LT.
24 Bennett, op. cit., pages 52-58.
25 Draft, page 140, my emphasis.
26 In this regard see Kretzmann's, Norman paper “The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory,” Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXVII, No. 2, April, 1968, pages 175-196.Google Scholar Kretzmann effectively argues for a more sophisticated view of language on the part of Locke than that supposed by Berkeley. As I have indicated, whether or not Berkeley fairly interprets Locke is not my concern in this paper, but rather, whether Bennett has correctly interpreted Berkeley's arguments.
27 I have argued elsewhere (see Footnote 16) that Berkeley does not give a theory of meaning in the sense we would understand it today. Rather, he specifies the conditions of meaningfulness.
26 I do not think it too outrageous to suggest that what Berkeley is getting at here bears a resemblance to a distinction made explicitly by Austin, i.e. Austin's distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘demonstrative’ conventions that are necessary for communication. Austin, J.L. “Truth,” Philosophical Papers(Oxford: 1961), pages 121–122.Google Scholar
29 Recently, D. Berman has argued that Bennett misses the target of Berkeley's attack on the issues of substance and primary/secondary ideas as well. Hermarhena, No. CXIII, Summer, 1972, pages 54-67.
30 Bennett is not alone. Another recent discussion of Berkeley's critique of Locke underplays this aspect as well. See Craig, E.J. “Berkeley on Abstract Ideas,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXVII, 1968, pages 425-437.Google Scholar
31 Bennett, op. cit., chapter II, section 10.
32 Again, d. Austin, op. cit., page 121, when he is discussing what must be the case if there is to be communication:
… the world must exhibit (we must observe) similarities and dissimilarities (there could not be the one without the other): if everything were either absolutely indistinguishable from anything else or completely unlike anything else, there would be nothing to say.
33 For a discussion of the Draft as it relates to the problem of universals, see my paper “Universality without Universals,” The Modern Schoolman, March, 1973, pages 301-310.
34 Bennett, op. cit., page 52.
35 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, page 17ff. In addition, compare the relevant Draft sections with the following comments by Wittgenstein in The Blue Book, page 20.
The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term.