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Guidance and Belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

David Hunter
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Extract

There is a difference between those things one does that manifest agency and those things that merely happen to one or that are the effects of one's agency. My typing these words manifests my agency – is an action of mine – whereas growing older is merely happening to me and making sounds as I type is but an effect of my action. Actions are sometimes but not always done for reasons and are characteristically but perhaps not invariably known by the agent without observation or inference. I'm typing in order to get my paper done on time, and I don't need to look to know that this is what I am doing, though I wouldn't know without hearing it that I am making noises as I type. In this paper I will offer an account of these facts about action. The account starts from the idea that an agent performing an action guides what she is doing.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 35: Belief and Agency , 2009 , pp. 63 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2009

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