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The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Elizabeth Anderson
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Extract

Much contemporary egalitarian theorizing is broadly divided between luck egalitarians, such as G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer, and relational egalitarians, such as John Rawls, Samuel Scheffler, Josh Cohen, and me. The two camps disagree about how to conceive of equality: as an equal distribution of non-relational goods among individuals, or as a kind of social relation between persons - an equality of authority, status, or standing (Anderson 1999).

This disagreement generates a second, about when unequal distributions of non-relational goods are unjust. Luck egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it is accidental: when it is caused by morally arbitrary factors such as circumstances of birth. Relational egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it disadvantages people: when it reflects, embodies, or causes inequality of authority, status, or standing.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 36: Justice and Equality , 2010 , pp. 1 - 23
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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