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Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), Structures of Secrecy, and Ministerial Authorization after September 11 *

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 June 2014

Kevin Walby
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, University of Victoria, PO Box 3050 STN CSC, Victoria, BC V8W 3P5

Abstract

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2012

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Footnotes

*

We thank Jeffrey Monaghan and the reviewers for their comments.

References

1 Brodeur, Jean-Paul, “The Globalization of Security and Intelligence Agencies: A Report on the Canadian Intelligence Community,” in Democracy, Law, and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, ed. Brodeur, Jean-Paul, Gill, Peter, and Tollborg, Dennis (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003)Google Scholar.

2 Frost, Mike and Gratton, Michel, Spyworld: How CSE Spies on Canadians and the World (Toronto: Seal Books, 1995)Google Scholar.

3 See generally Bell, Colleen, “Surveillance Strategies and Populations at Risk: Biopolitical Governance in Canada's National Security Policy,” Security Dialogue 37, 2 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Rudner, Martin, “Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism,” Intelligence and National Security 22, 4 (2007), 482CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Lamer, Antonio, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 2003-2004 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004)Google Scholar.

6 National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 273.68.

7 See, e.g., Lefebvre, Stephane, “Canada's Legal Framework for Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, 2 (2010), 247–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Penney, Steven, “National Security Surveillance in an Age of Terror: Statutory Powers & Charter Limits,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 48, 2 (2010), 247–86Google Scholar; Brodeur, , “The Globalization of Security and Intelligence Agencies,” 210–64Google Scholar; and see also Gill, Peter, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: Routledge, 1994)Google Scholar.

8 Lamer, Antonio, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005), 8Google Scholar.

9 Ericson, Richard, Crime in an Insecure World (London: Polity, 2007)Google Scholar.

10 See, e.g., Jensen, Kurt, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-1951 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008)Google Scholar; Wark, Wesley, “Learning to Live with Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 18, 4 (2003), 114CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rudner, Martin, “Canada's Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization,” Intelligence and National Security 16, 1 (2001), 97128CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Brodeur, Jean-Paul and Leman-Langlois, Stephane, “Surveillance Fiction or Higher Policing?” in The New Politics of Visibility and Surveillance, ed. Haggerty, Kevin and Ericson, Richard V. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

12 Vesting authority in CSEC officials is of potential concern given the differences that Roach notes between evidence in criminal law enforcement and information in intelligence as well as the blurring of evidence and intelligence post-9/11. Evidence pertains to past events, while intelligence is collected on the basis of perceived future threats. Evidence becomes a matter of the public record, while intelligence remains an official secret. The other concern here is that in the post-9/11 context, where intelligence-led policing has become the norm, pre-emptive intelligence might be changing policing, too. See, e.g., Roach, Kent, “The Eroding Distinction Between Intelligence and Evidence in Terrorism Investigations,” in Counter-Terrorism and Beyond, ed. McGarrity, N., Lynch, A., and Williams, G. (Abington: Routledge, 2010), 4868Google Scholar; Murphy, Christopher, “‘Securitizing’ Canadian Policing: A New Policing Paradigm for the Post 9/11 Security State?Canadian Journal of Sociology 32, 4 (2007), 449–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brodeur, , “The Globalization of Security and Intelligence Agencies,” 210–64Google Scholar.

13 See generally Frost and Gratton, Spy world.

14 See Forcese, Craig, “Canada's National Security ‘Complex’: Assessing the Secrecy Rules,” IRPP Choices 15, 5 (2009)Google Scholar.

15 See Weller, Geoffrey, “Assessing Canadian Intelligence Literature: 1980-2000,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, 1 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 See Rempel, Roy, “Canada's Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, 4 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 See Leigh, Ian, “Legal Access to Security Files: the Canadian Experience,” Intelligence and National Security 12, 2 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Weston, Greg, “They Spy with Their Little Eyes, Even Though They Say They Aren't,” Ottawa Citizen (11 15, 1995), A2Google Scholar.

19 Auditing the Spies,” Ottawa Citizen (11 27, 1996), A14Google Scholar.

20 Wark, Wesley, “We Must Review CSE's Performance, Not Legality,” Globe and Mail (07 29, 2002), A15Google Scholar.

21 May, Kathryn and Bronskill, Jim, “Secretive Communications Security Establishment goes Public with Massive Recruitment Drive,” The Gazette [Montreal] (05 13, 2002), A13Google Scholar.

22 Walkom, T., “Who Oversees our Spies?Toronto Star (02 14, 2004), F03Google Scholar.

23 Bell, Stewart, “Listening in on the Enemy: Canada's Master Eavesdroppers,” National Post (04 15, 2006), A1Google Scholar.

24 Macleod, Ian, Seymour, Andrew, and Hurley, Meghan, “Parliament Hill Alleged Terror Goal,” National Post (08 28, 2010), A4Google Scholar.

25 Bronskill, Jim, “Canada's Eavesdropping Agency Gets a little Quieter,” Vancouver Sun (07 26, 2012), B2Google Scholar.

26 Gottschalk, Michael, “Police identify ‘Anonymous’ Threat,” Montreal Gazette (08 28, 2012), B13Google Scholar.

27 See Davies, Philip, “Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: Conceptualizing the Intelligence Community,” Public Policy and Administration 25, 1 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Bisson, Claude, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 1997- 1998 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998), n.pGoogle Scholar.

29 Bisson, Claude, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 1998-1999 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1999), n.pGoogle Scholar.

30 Bisson, Claude, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 1999-2000 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2000), 6Google Scholar.

31 Ibid., n.p.

32 Bisson, CSEC Annual Report, 1998-1999, n.p.

33 Bisson, , CSEC Annual Report, 1999-2000, 3Google Scholar.

34 Ibid., 10.

35 Bisson, Claude, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 2001-2002 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2002), 23Google Scholar.

36 Lamer, , CSEC Annual Report, 2003-2004, 7Google Scholar.

37 Ibid., 9.

38 Lamer, Antonio, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005), 8Google Scholar.

39 See Decary, Robert, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 2009-2010 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2010)Google Scholar.

40 See Charters, David, “Canadian Military Intelligence in Afghanistan,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25, 3 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41 Another question is whether their practices are in line with international law and the laws of countries in which CSEC intercepts private communications.

42 All Department of National Defence material cited in this section was produced through request #A-2009-01100.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 See generally Pozen, David, “Deep Secrecy,” Stanford Law Review 62, 2 (2010)Google Scholar.

48 See Forcese, “Canada's National Security ‘Complex’.”

49 See Frost and Gratton, Spyworld.

50 Ibid., 227.

51 Brodeur, , “The Globalization of Security and Intelligence Agencies,” 210–64Google Scholar.

52 Pozen, , “Deep Secrecy,” 309Google Scholar.

54 Ericson, , Crime in an Insecure World, 24Google Scholar.

55 National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 273.68(d).

56 Lamer, Antonio, Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Annual Report, 2005-2006 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006), 10Google Scholar.

57 The Supreme Court of Canada ruling on Afghan detainees, which states that section 7 and section 8 do not apply to “non-Canadians,” is relevant for understanding what Canadian agencies can do outside Canada.

58 Also see Forcese, Craig, National Security Law: Canadian Practice in International Perspective (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008)Google Scholar.

59 See Penney, “National Security Surveillance in an Age of Terror”; also see Rempel, “Canada's Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence.”