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Charter Rights of Canadian Drug Users: A Constitutional Assessment of the Clay Trial and Ruling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Andrew D. Hathaway
Andrew D. Hathaway
Affiliation:
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 33 Russell Street, Toronto (Ontario)Canada M5S 2S1, [email protected]
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Abstract

In 75 years of cannabis prohibition in Canada, the latter third have been marked by considerable debate as to the propriety of invoking a criminal response to behaviour that is so prevalent and widely tolerated. The movement for reform of the laws prohibiting simple possession and use of the drug has intensified in recent years. Pragmatic adaptations on the part of Canadian legal institutions, aimed at mitigating the social and personal consequences of enforcing these sanctions, are applied routinely though selectively today. Nonetheless, actual policy reform seems far from inevitable, despite the increasing endorsement of factual evidence and widespread support for decriminalization. Given the legal-political impasse characterizing the cannabis controversy today, this paper examines the grounds on which prohibition may be viably opposed on the basis of respect for human rights. These moral grounds and remaining obstacles to legal reform are developed in view of the key contested arguments in R. v. Clay (1997), a landmark constitutional challenge as to the designation of cannabis as a prohibited substance in Canada.

Résumé

La prohibition du cannabis au Canada remonte à 75 ans, et les dernières 25 années ont été marquées par un débat houleux sur la pertinence des sanctions pénales qu'entraîne un comportement si courant et si généralement toléré. Le mouvement en faveur de la décriminalisation de la simple possession et de l'usage récréatif de la marijuana prend de l'ampleur depuis quelques années. Pour atténuer les répercussions sociales et personnelles que peut avoir l'application de ces sanctions, les institutions juridiques canadiennes ont adopté des mesures pragmatiques qu'elles appliquent régulièrement mais de façon sélective. Il n'en demeure pas moins qu'une réforme des politiques est loin d'être assurée malgré des preuves tangibles de plus en plus nombreuses de son bien-fondé et le vaste soutien accordé à la décriminalisation. Étant donné l'impasse politico-juridique où se trouve actuellement la controverse entourant le cannabis, cet article examine les raisons qui pourraient être invoquées pour justifier une opposition à la prohibition en se fondant sur le respect des droits de la personne. Ces motifs moraux et les derniers obstacles à la réforme juridique sont dégagés en tenant compte des principaux arguments contestés dans l'affaire R. c. Clay (1997), qui a créé un précédent en contestant la constitutionnalité de l'interdiction du cannabis au Canada.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , April 2001 , pp. 29 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2001

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References

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2 R. v. Clay (1997), 9 C.R. (5th) 349 (Ont. Gen. Div.), [hereinafter Clay].

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26 Author's interview with Robert Solomon (March 31, 1998).

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43 In closing arguments, McCart notes that new provisions for “alternative measures” other than judicial proceedings in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act suggest “… Parliament is moving away from the harshness of the penalties for possession of marijuana …” Perhaps some day, he continues, they may adopt some of the decriminalization measures currently practised in Australia and some western European nations, “… which I do not believe would meet with much objection from an informed public.” Clay, supra note 2 at 372.

44 See Devlin, supra note 6.

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46 R. v. Clay (2000), 37 C.R. (5th) 170 (Ont. CA.). The Clay appeal ruling was offset by a concurrent decision by the same court concerning the medical use of marijuana: R. v. Parker (2000), 37 C.R. (5th) 97 (Ont. CA.). In the latter case, the Crown appeal of the stay of proceedings granted by the lower court [R. v. Parker (1997), 12 C.R. (5th) 251 (Ont. Prov. Div.)] was dismissed on the grounds that the marijuana prohibition deprived Parker of his right to liberty and security of the person in a manner that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice. For present purposes, the Parker decision is noteworthy insofar as it upheld his right to self-medicate with marijuana as a treatment for epilepsy though the evidence to date remains equivocal as to the drug's efficacy in treating the condition. Thus (contrary to the call for further research to assess marijuana's harms in wider recreational use), limited medicinal use is gaining acceptance in the courts by way of evidence that still falls short of meeting strictly objective or clinical standards of ‘proof.’

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