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The Autonomy and Permeability of Law: The Case of the Canadian Prohibition of Cannabis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Nicolas Carrier
Nicolas Carrier
Affiliation:
Université de Lille-1, Département de sociologie,Université de Rouen, [email protected]
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Abstract

Niklas Luhmann's sociology proposes that law is an autonomous social system, which cannot be determined from the outside. In this theoretical framework, law's relations with its environment are mainly grasped with the concepts of autopoiesis and deparadoxification, and through the corresponding paradox of openness through closure. It provides a framework to explore intersystemic relations which refuses a vertical, linear domination of law by other discursive formations. This paper takes (some dimensions of) the 2003 re-validation of the constitutionality of the prohibition of cannabis by the Supreme Court of Canada as a pretext to theoretically clarify and empirically explore this framework. In the case presented here, law notably gives precedence to some biomedical objects over the liberal doctrine. It may well do the exact opposite in future operations. Sociology is condemned to be surprised by the creativity that law displays in autonomously maintaining and transforming itself.

Résumé

La sociologie de Niklas Luhmann suggère de concevoir le droit comme un système social autonome, ne pouvant être déterminé de l'extérieur. Dans un tel cadre théorique, les relations du droit avec son environnement sont saisies à l'aide des concepts d'autopoïèse et de déparadoxification, ainsi que par le biais du paradoxe de l'ouverture par la fermeture. La théorie propose une façon d'analyser les relations intersystémiques qui refuse une domination verticale et linéaire du droit par d'autres formations discursives. Cet article utilise (quelques dimensions) de la re-validation de la constitutionnalité de la prohibition du cannabis par la Cour Suprême du Canada comme prétexte pour clarifier théoriquement et explorer empiriquement un tel cadre. Dans le cas étudié, le juridique choisit notamment d'accorder plus d'importance à des objets biomédicaux qu'à la doctrine libérate. Il pourra faire exactement le contraire dans ses prochaines opérations. La sociologie est condamnée à être surprise par la créativité que déploie le juridique en se maintenant et se transformant de façon autonome.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , April 2007 , pp. 123 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2007

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