Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T20:58:31.414Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

What Legal Culture for the Twenty-First Century?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Jean-Guy Belley
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
Nicholas Kasirer
Affiliation:
Centre for Private and Comparative LawMcGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

Abstract

In history of legal ideas of the last generation in Canada, legal pluralism deserves an important place. There is a Quebec genre in the legal literature on pluralism that, for reasons one might well suspect, is less well-known elsewhere. The scholarship of Professor Jean-Guy Belley, one of the leading figures in the field, is deserving of a wider readership among non francophones. A translation on one of his most important papers, published at a critical moment in his personal development as a scholar, is presented here in the hope of introducing his work to new readers.

Résumé

L'histoire des idées juridiques de la dernière génération au Canada devra faire une place importante au pluralisme juridique. Il existe un genre québécois dans la littérature juridique sur le pluralisme qui est, pour des raisons que l'on peut soupçonner, moins bien connu à l'extérieur du pays. Les travaux du professeur Jean-Guy Belley, un des maîtres dans la matière, méritent une meilleure diffusion auprès des non francophones. On offre ici une traduction d'un de ses grands textes, publié à un momentclé dans son développement personnel comme chercheur, en vue de présenter ses idées à un nouveau lectorat.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Douglas, M., How Institutions Think (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

2 Dubet, F., “Vraisemblance: entre les sociologues et les acteurs,” L'Année sociologique 44 (1994): 83107Google Scholar.

3 Murphy, W.T., The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 8–36, 77108Google Scholar.

4 Bourdieu, P., “La force du droit. Eléments pour une sociologie du champ juridique,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 64 (1986): 332CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Finkielkraut, A., L'humanité perdue. Essai sur le XXe siécle (Paris: Seuil, 1996)Google Scholar; Hobsbawm, E.J., Les enjeux du XXe siécle. Entretiens avec Antonia Polito (Brussels: Éditions complétes, 2000)Google Scholar.

6 Gauchet, M., Le désenchantement du monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1989)Google Scholar.

7 Giddens, A., “Risk and Responsibility,” Modern Law Review 62 (1999): 110CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Luhmann, N., The Differentiation of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

9 Teubner, G., “The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,” Cardozo Law Review 13 (1992): 1443–62Google Scholar. See also Coutu, M., “Le pluralisme juridique chez Gunther Teubner: la nouvelle guerre des dieux ?Canadian Journal of Law and Society 12 (1997): 93113CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Teubner, G., Droit et réfléxivité. L'autoréférence en droit et dans l'organization, trans. Boucquey, N. and Maier, G. (Diegem-Paris: Story-scientia/LGDJ, 1994), 398Google Scholar; see also Teuber, G., “How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of Law,” Law and Society Review 23 (1989): 727–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Wilke, H., “Diriger la société par le droit,” Archives de philosophic du droit 3 (1986): 182214Google Scholar.

12 Touraine, A., Pourrions-nous vivre ensemble ? Égaux et différents (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 3993Google Scholar.

13 See in particular the special issue titled Lumières—Révolution—Postmodernisme, Droit et société (1989): 313–86Google Scholar.

14 Giddens, A., The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

15 For a theoretical analysis of the potential of game theory offered by the legal system, see Kerchove, M. van de and Ost, F., Le droit ou les paradoxes du jeu (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992)Google Scholar. For empirical studies showing the unequal ability of legal actors to participate in the game of law by taking advantage of the freedom and diversity afforded them, see, e.g., Galanter, M., “Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,” Law and Society Review 9 (1974): 95160CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kritzer, H.M. and Silbey, S.S., eds., Do the ‘Haves’ Still Come Out Ahead? special issue of Law and Society Review 33 (1999): 7951124Google Scholar; Belley, J.-G., “Stratégic du fort et tactique du faible en matière contractuelle: une étude de cas,” Cahiers de Droit 37 (1996): 3750CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Belley, J.-G., “Une philosophic de l'aspiration juridique: l'art de bien se contraindre,” Archives de philosophic du droit 44 (2000): 337–50Google Scholar.

16 On the ideology of “corporate liberalism” and the decisive role played by legal institutions in its triumph through the twentieth century see Bowman, S.R., The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought: Law, Power and Ideology (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), 134, 125–83Google Scholar. On the metaphor of the “corporate person,” see Greschner, D., “The Supreme Court, Federalism and Metaphors of Moderation,” Canadian Bar Review 79 (2000): 4756, 51Google Scholar.

17 Fromm, E., Escape from Freedom (1941; reprint, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969)Google Scholar.

18 Lipovetky, G., L'empire de l'éphémère. La mode et son destin dans les sociétés modernes (Paris: Gallimard, 1987)Google Scholar; Lipovetky, G., L'ère du vide. Essais sur l'individualisme contemporain (Paris: Gallimard, 1983)Google Scholar. More generally, see Côté, J.-F., ed., Individualisme et individualité (Sillery, QC: Septentrion, 1995)Google Scholar.

19 Friedman, L.M., The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority and Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

20 Presthus, R., The Organizational Society (New York: Random House, 1962)Google Scholar.

21 Marcuse, H., L'homme unidimensionnel. Essai sur l'idéologie de la société industrielle avancée, trans. Wittig, M. (Paris: Minuit, 1977), 145Google Scholar.

22 Belley, J.-G., “Gouvernance et démocratic dans la société neuronale,” in La démocratie à l'épreuve de la gouvernance, ed. Andrew, C. and Cardinal, L. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2001), 153Google Scholar.

23 Bergson, H., Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932; reprint, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969), 1103Google Scholar.

24 Fuller, L.L., The Morality of Law (1964; reprint, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 332Google Scholar.

25 Galanter, M., “Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States,” in The Sociology of the Professions, ed. Dingwall, R. and Lewis, P., 152–75 (London: Macmillan, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dezalay, Y., “Multinationales de l'expertise et dépérissement de l'État,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 96/97 (1993): 320CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26 Because organizations' strategic behaviour extends to the world stage, lawyers increasingly exercise their creative talents in a transnational legal setting, such that they themselves may be considered the veritable engines of an integrated comparative law: see Glenn, H.P., “Vers un droit compare integre ?” Revue Internationale de droit comparé (1999): 841–52Google Scholar.

27 There is a notaries' version and a lawyers' version for the adequate elaboration of this second-degree legal order. See Lapeyre, A., “L'ordre contractuel et les techniques des contrats,” Jurisclasseur periodique (1967), Doctrine 2108Google Scholar; Suchman, M.C. and Cahill, M.L., “The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley,” Law and Social Inquiry 21 (1996): 679712CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There is also a more narrow economists' version, as well as another, more ethical in orientation, for the professional practice to be developed in view of satisfying the requirements an d challenges of productivity for this practice of law. See Gilson, R.J., “Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,” Yale Law Journal 94 (1984): 239323CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ashford, R., “Socio-economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?” Wisconsin Law Review (1997): 611–23Google Scholar; Carle, S.D., “Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the 1908 Canons,” Law and Social Inquiry 24 (1999): 143CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Canto-Sperber, M., “Ethique,” in Le savoir grec. Dictionnaire critique, ed. Brunchwig, J. and Lloyd, G. with Pellerin, P., 133–60 (Paris: Flammarion, 1996)Google Scholar.

29 Ricoeur, P., “Liberté,” in Encyclopaedia Universalis, version 5 (1999), consulted onlineGoogle Scholar.

30 Dan-Cohen, M., Rights, Persons and Organizations. A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Teubner, G., “Enterprise Corporation: New Industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ of the Legal Person,” American Journal of Comparative Law 36 (1986): 130–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 In addition to Bowman, The Modern Corporation, see Stone, C.D., Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York: Harper & Row, 1975)Google Scholar; Hopt, K.J. and Teubner, G., eds., Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wheeler, S., “Towards a Feminization of the Corporation,” Current Legal Problems 52 (1999): 313–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wilson, G., “Business, State and Community: ‘Responsible Risk Takers’ New Labour and the Governance of Corporate Businesses,” Journal of Law and Society 27 (2000): 151–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 On the contemporary legal system conceived of as the “conscience of society,” see Murphy, , The Oldest Social Science, 186210Google Scholar.

33 For a defence and an illustration of a new conception of republican democracy in which the control of abuse of corporate power is assured by weak sanctions and moral suasion, see Braithwaite, J., “On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a Republican Separation of Powers,” University of Toronto Law Journal 47 (1997): 305–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.