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Spousal Abuse, Children and the Courts: The Case For Social Rather Than Legal Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Linda Neilson
Linda Neilson
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, University of New Brunswick
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Abstract

This article explores arguments for and against proposals for statutory changes that would require Canadian judges to consider partner or “spousal” abuse when making decisions about child custody and access, in terms of the likely implications for women. The author discusses, in historic context, the relationships of social change to the evolution of social ideology and professional “knowledge” about gender and family and the influences of these on the evolution of family law, in order to demonstrate that legal changes alone are unlikely to produce positive benefits for abused women and their children. Moreover, an analysis of the legal discourse of judges as reported in the Canadian Reports on Family Law between 1983 and 1996 suggests the need for caution. Instead of judicial sensitivity to the special vulnerabilities of women in abusive situations, the case law indicates that judges are applying an “objective” incidents-based approach to assessments of abuse. Because this approach ignores the special vulnerabilities of women and makes it appear that abuse is symmetrical by gender, women may be disadvantaged if judges are required to deny or limit abuser's access to, or custody of, their children. The author concludes that, if what is intended is the protection of abused women and children, the solution lies less in giving more power to judges than in promoting social change through collective action, the evolution of professional “knowledge” that ultimately will find reflection in law, and the allocation of tangible resources for the benefit of abused women and their children.

Résumé

Dans cet article, l'auteure pèse le pour et le contre de certaines modifications à la loi qui obligeraient les juges canadiens, au moment de l'octroi des droits de garde et d'accès, à tenir compte des actes de violence du conjoint ou du conjoint de fait. Elle expose les incidences de telles modifications pour les femmes victimes de violence conjugale. Tentant de démontrer que les modifications à la loi ne peuvent à elles seules améliorer la situation des femmes battues et de leurs enfants, l'auteure fait un survol historique des changements sociaux et de l'évolution du «savoir» professionnel concernant les différences entre les sexes et la notion de famille, et l'impact plus général de cette évolution sur celle du droit de la famille. Or, une analyse du discours judiciaire tel qu'il ressort de la jurisprudence rapportée dans les recueils de droit de la famille entre les années 1983 et 1996 incite à la prudence. En effet, plutôt que de dévoiler une certaine sensibilité judiciaire aux problèmes vécus par les femmes victimes de violence conjugale, la jurisprudence révèle au contraire que les juges abordent la violence conjugale de façon très pragmatique. Cette approche occultant la situation particulière des femmes victimes de violence et envisageant la violence comme phénomène le plus souvent symétrique chez les sexes, les femmes sont défavorisées lorsque les juges limitent ou refusent les droits de garde ou d'accès au père. L'auteure conclut que, si le but des modifications proposées est de protéger les femmes victimes de violence conjugale et leurs enfants, il est davantage souhaitable d'encourager les changements sociaux par l'action collective, le développement du «savoir» professionnel—développement qui, tôt ou tard, trouverait écho dans la loi—et l'octroi effectif de ressources matérielles et financières destinées aux victimes et leurs enfants.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , Spring/printemps 1997 , pp. 101 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 1997

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72. It is perhaps interesting to note that, in addition to discriminating against women who choose to pursue careers, this dominant social conceptualization—that women should exercise power in the private domain, leaving the public domain to men—also discriminated against men who did not fit the typical “heterosexual, father, wage-earner” conceptualization of “man” current at the time. See Collier, supra note 43 for an interesting discussion of how law has characterized masculinity.

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82. See Glendon, supra note 42; Ursel, supra note 42 at 292.

83. I. Théry, “The Interest of the Child and the Regulation of the Post-Divorce Family” in Smart, supra note 71 at 80 suggests that law reflects a reconceptualized family—from a collective unit—to one composed of individual rights. I have taken the liberty of adding the word “responsibilities” because, as we shall see, the extended definition of “family”—a consequence of the normalization of divorce—extended individual responsibilities, not to the collective, but to individual “family” members.

84. Ibid. See also Glendon, supra note 42 at 43.

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88. Collier, supra note 43 at 177–78, 180; Lamb & Sagi, ibid.; C. Smart, “Power and the Politics of Child Custody” in Smart, supra note 71 1.

89. Boyd, supra note 71 at 138; Smart, ibid. at 10.

90. These provisions have affected mothers in theory, if not in practice. There is some debate about whether or not these statutory amendments have had an appreciable effect on the extent to which women are awarded or denied custody of children. See, for example, Pulkingham, J., “Private Troubles, Private Solutions: Poverty Among Divorced Women and the Politics of Support Enforcement and Child Custody Determinations” (1994) 9:2Canadian Journal of Law and Society 73 at 90–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Generally, it appears that, while new social and professional assumptions about gender and the family were embedded in law, social and legal practices of the majority of families did not change. Despite the fact that the statutory provisions and judicial discourse became gender-neutral, children have continued to reside primarily with mothers after family separation and divorce. Department of Justice, supra note 73; Glendon, supra note 42; Warshak, R., The Custody Revolution (New York: Poseidon, 1992)Google Scholar; Pulkingham, ibid. The practical outcome of custody and access disputes is not the only issue however. As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of family law cases are settled in negotiation processes. When thinking about women's power, then, the best indicator of women's power may be less the extent to which women are awarded custody than the extent to which women's bargaining power in family matters generally has or is being eroded as a result of the erosion of the legal assumption that women will prima facie acquire custody of children. It is possible that women have lost negotiating power while retaining, in practice, social responsibility for children.

91. For example Ahrons, C., “The Continuing Coparental Relationship Between Divorced Spouses” (1981) 51:3American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 415CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Bruch, C. S., “Parenting At and After Divorce: A Search for New Models” (1981) 79:1–4Mich. L. Rev. 708CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Grief, J. B., “Fathers, Children and Joint Custody” (1979) 49:2American Journal of Orthophsychiatry 311CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hess, R. D. & Camara, K., “Post-Divorce Family Relationships as Mediating Factors on the Consequences of Divorce for Children” (1979) 35:4Journal of Social Issues 79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hetherington, A., Cox, E. & Cox, R., “Divorced fathers” (1976) 25 Family Coordinator 417CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Isaacs, M. B., “The Visitation Schedule and Child Adjustment: A Three-Year Study” (1988) 27 Family Process 251CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. See also one of the most influential books of the time, Wallerstein, J. & Kelly, J., Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope With Divorce (London: Grant McIntyre, 1980)Google Scholar.

92. See ibid. See also Barnes, G., Working With Families (London: MacMillan Education, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burnham, J. & Queenie, H., “Systemic Family Therapy: The Milan Approach” in Street, E. & Dryden, W., eds., Marital Therapy in Britain (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1988) 8Google Scholar; Campbell, D. et al. , Working With The Milan Method: Twenty Questions (London: Institute of Family Therapy, 1983)Google Scholar; Gadlin, H. & Oulette, P., “Mediation Milanese: An Application of Systemic Therapy to Family Mediation” (1986–1987) 14–15 Mediation Quarterly 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Manor, O., Social Work in Action: A Handbook for Social Workers (London: Tavistock, 1984)Google Scholar; Minuchin, S., Families and Family Therapy (London: Tavistock, 1974)Google Scholar; Satir, V., Helping Families to Change (New York: Aaronson, 1975)Google Scholar; A. Vetere, “Family Therapy Research” in Street & Dryden, eds., ibid.

93. See, for example, Abarbanel, A., “Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint Custody” (1979) 4:2American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 320CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bowman, M. E. & Ahrons, C. R., “Impact of Legal Custody on Father's Parenting Post Divorce” (1985) 47 Journal of Marriage and the Family 481CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ilfeld, F., Ilfeld, H. & Alexander, J. Jr., “Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation” (1982) 139:1American Journal of Psychiatry 62Google Scholar; Jackson, M. B., Hovespian, V. & Ferrick, G., “Common Problems in The Mediation of Child Custody Disputes” (1984) 22:2Conciliation Courts Review 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kelly, J., ”Examining Resistance to Joint Custody” in Folberg, J., ed., Joint Custody and Shared Parenting (New York: Guilford, 1991)Google Scholar; Luepnitz, D., Child Custody: A Study of Families After Divorce (Lexington: Lexington, 1982)Google Scholar; E. Maccoby, C. Depner & R. Mnookin, supra note 12; Shiller, V., “Loyalty Conflicts and Family Relationships in Latency Age Boys: A Comparison of Joint and Maternal Custody” (1986) 9:4Journal of Divorce 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the joint custody studies listed in note 93.

94. “From Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality?”, supra note 41.

95. M. J. Mossman, “Family Law and Social Welfare in Canada” in J. Banfield, ed., Readings in Law and Society, supra note 21, 364 at 365.

96. Boyd, S., “Potentialities and Perils of the Primary Caregiver Presumption” (1990–1991) 1:30Canadian Family Law Quarterly 1 at 3–4Google Scholar.

97. An examination of Canada's divorce rates for the period 1921 to 1979 discloses a divorce rate that increased from 6.4 (per 100,000 population) to a rate of 243.4 by 1978. See Statistics Canada, Divorce: Law and the Family in Canada (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1983)Google Scholar. See also Glendon, supra note 42.

98. Duster, T., The Legislation of Morality (New York: Free Press, 1962) at 245Google Scholar.

99. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, this perspective permeated the mediation and mental health literature. See Ahier, B., Conciliation, Divorce and the Probation Services (Norwich: Social Work Monographs, 1986) at 19Google Scholar; Barnes, G., Working With Families (London: MacMillan Education, 1984) at 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brown, N. & Samis, M., “The Application of Structural Family Therapy in Developing the Binuclear Family” (1986) 14–15 Mediation Quarterly 67Google Scholar; Folberg, J., “Mediation of Child Custody Disputes” (1985) 19 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 415Google Scholar; Goldberg, I. & Goldberg, H., Family Therapy (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1985) at 42Google Scholar; Haynes, J., “A Conceptual Model of the Process of Family Mediation: Implications for Training” (1984) 2 Family Studies Yearbook 507Google Scholar; Irving, H. & Benjamin, M., Family Mediation: Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Toronto: Carswell 1987) at 60Google Scholar; Kaplan, S., “The Development and Operation of the Northwest Mediation Service” (1984) 6 Mediation Quarterly 75Google Scholar; Koopman, E., ”Family Mediation: A Development Perspective on the Field” in Sandole, D. & Sandole-Staroste, I., eds., Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications (London: Frances Pinter, 1987) 119 at 121Google Scholar; Maida, P., ”Components of Bowen's Family Theory and Divorce Mediation” (1986) Mediation Quarterly 57Google Scholar; Robinson, M. & Parkinson, L., “A Family System's Approach to Conciliation in Separation and Divorce” (1985) 7 Journal of Family Therapy 357CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steir, S. & Hamilton, N., “Teaching Divorce Mediation: Creating a Better Fit Between Family Systems and the Legal System” (1984) 48 Albany L. Rev. 741Google Scholar; White, S. & Mika, K., “Family Divorce and Separation: Theory and Research” (1983) Marriage and Family Review 187Google Scholar.

100. Ibid.

101. L'Heureux-Dubé J. in Young v. Young, supra note 66.

102. Glendon, supra note 42; Statistics Canada, supra note 97 at 251–58.

103. Rhode, S., “Feminist Perspectives on Legal Ideology” in Mitchel, J. & Oakley, A., eds., What Is Feminism (New York: Pantheon, 1986)Google Scholar; Littleton, C., “Equality and Feminist Legal Theory” (1987) 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1043Google Scholar; “Overview,” supra note 33.

104. Department of Justice, supra note 14 at 10–12.

105. E. Mensch, “The History of Mainstream Legal Thought” in D. Kairys, ed., supra note 30 at 13; “Overview”, supra note 33; Naffine, supra note 86.

106. See, for example, Nett, E., “Family Study in Canada During Sociology's Shifts from RC to PC to DC” (1996) 33:1Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 24Google Scholar; Richardson, supra note 43.

107. See, for example, Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice (1996) 6:3CIAJ NewsletterGoogle Scholar.

108. Richardson, supra note 43 at 37.

109. See, for example, Buchanan, C., Maccoby, E. & Dornbusch, S., “Caught Between Parents: Adolescents' Experience in Divorced Homes” (1991) 26 Child Development 1008CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cahn, supra note 10; Carlson, B. E., “Adolescent Observers of Marital Violence” (1990) 5:4Journal of Violence 285CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davis, L. & Carlson, B., ”Observation of Spouse Abuse: What Happens to the Children?” (1987) 2:3Journal of Interpersonal Violence 278CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Emery, R., “Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and Divorce” (1982) 92:2Psychological Bulletin 310CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Fantuzzo, J. & Lindquist, C., “The Effects of Observing Conjugal Violence on Children: A Review and Analysis of Research Methodology” (1989) 4:1Journal of Family Violence 77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Forstrom-Cohen, B. & Rosenbaum, A., “The Effects of Parental Marital Violence on Young Adults: An Exploratory Investigation” (1985) 47 Journal of Marriage and the Family 467CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jaffe, P. et al. , “Similarities in Behavioral and Social Maladjustment Among Child Victims and Witnesses to Family Violence” (1985) 56 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 142CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnston, Gonzalez & Campbell, supra note 11; Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 10; Shaw, D. & Emery, R., ”Parental Conflict and Other Correlates of the Adjustment of School-Age Children Whose Parents Have Separated” (1987) 15:2Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 269CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Shepard, M., “Child Visiting and Domestic Abuse” (1992) 71 Child Welfare 357Google Scholar.

110. Compare for example, the views of Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 10; M. Pagelow, supra note 10 at 347–63 with those expressed in Maccoby, E. et al. Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody (Stanford: Harvard University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Straus, R. & Alda, E., “Supervised Child Access: The Evolution of a Social Science” (1992) 32:2Family and Conciliation Courts Review at 235Google Scholar.

111. For an informative discussion of the debate, see Dobash, R. P. et al. , “The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence” (1992) 39 Social Problems 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

112. Straus & Gelles, supra note 6; Straus, M. & Gelles, R., eds., Physical Violence in American Families: Risk Factors and Adaptations to Violence in 8, 145 Families (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1990)Google Scholar.

113. For example, Dobash et al., supra note 111.

114. See supra note 6.

115. Ibid.

116. Supra note 6.

117. Sopp-Gilson, S., “Children From Violent Homes” (1980) 23:10Journal, Ontario's Association of Children's Aid Societies 1Google Scholar; “Women and Children at Risk,” supra note 13; Saunders, supra note 13.

118. Saunders, ibid. at 152, reports that slightly more than one third of battered women report battering their children. See also “Women and Children at Risk,” ibid.

119. Department of Justice, supra note 14.

120. Davis, Cretney & Collins, supra note 74; Ingleby, supra note 74.

121. ibid. See also Clark, L., “Wife Battery and Determinations of Custody and Access: A Comparison of U.S. and Canadian Findings” (1990) 22:3Ottawa L. Rev. 694Google Scholar.

122. Supra notes 74 and 77.

123. Ibid. There is a need for still more research on the relationships between formal law and the legal practices of parties, lawyers, and mediators.

124. From and including vol. 30 of the second series, to and including (1996) 17 F.L.R. (4th) series.

125. Clark, supra 121, found only 14 cases between 1980 and 1990 indexed to spousal violence or abuse and a custody and access dispute in the Canadian Reports on Family Law series. We did not rely on indexing or headnotes but scanned the family law cases in their entirety. Consequently, we uncovered 113 cases that discussed both partner abuse and child issues during the same period.

126. Lynch v. Lynch (1995), 12 R.F.L. (4th) 367 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).

127. Aviles v. Aviles (1988), 17 R.F.L. (3d) 393 (Sask. Q.B.) at 394.

128. Ellis, supra note 6.

129. Depner, C. E., Cannata, K. & Simon, M. B., “Building a Uniform Statistical Reporting System: A Snapshot Study of California Family Court Services” (1992) 30 Family and Conciliation Court Review 185CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newmark, L., Harrell, A. & Salem, P., Domestic Violence and Empowerment in Custody and Visitation Cases: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Domestic Abuse (Maddison, Wis.: Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, 1994)Google Scholar.

130. In fact, Judith Begley, then a second-year University of New Brunswick law-school student, worked ably and meticulously to collect the major portion of the case-law data discussed in this section.

131. Several years ago, New Brunswick revamped its civil legal aid service. One of the changes was to hire a number of lawyers on a contract basis to provide legal services free of charge to victims of domestic abuse. Those lawyers are commonly referred to as family court solicitors.

132. See also Clark, supra note 121 at 694; Davis, Cretney & Collins, supra note 74.

133. See also Clark, ibid. at 694. In New Brunswick, in affiliation with the Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for Family Violence Research at the University of New Brunswick, we have formed a multidisciplinary research team composed of sociologists, lawyers, psychologists, and social workers to explore these pretrial negotiation processes and also the implications for family members of legal decisions made in these circumstances.

134. See supra note 74.

135. Brigante v. Brigante (1991), 32 R.F.L. (3d) 299 (Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct.) at 302.

136. Richardson v. Gardner, supra note 66.

137. McColl v. McColl (1995), 13 R.F.L. (4th) 449 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).

138. Savidant v. MacLeod (1992), 40 R.F.L. (3d) 443 (P.E.I. S.C.A.D.) at 445.

139. Savidant v. MacLeod (1991), 32 R.F.L. (3d) 266 (P.E.I. S.C.T.D.) at 266–67.

140. Murphy, J., “Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform” (1993) 21:4Hofstra L. Rev. 1243Google Scholar.

141. Cerget v. Cerget (1995), 7 R.F.L.. (4th) 322 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.))at 326.

142. T. (R.A.) v. T. (I. R. D. J.) (1990), 28 R.F.L. (3d) 79 (N.S. Fam. Ct.) at 83.

143. Bendle v. Bendle (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 120 (Ont Prov. Ct. (Fam. Div.)) at 123.

144. In addition to the cases quoted below, see ibid.; Despatie v. Larouche (1984), 36 R.F.L. (2d) 30 (Que. Sup. C); Dupont v. Dupont (1993), 47 R.F.L. (3d) 273; Richardson v. Gardner, supra note 66 at 306.

145. Cain v. Cain (1983), 33 R.F.L. (2d) 353 (Sask. Q.B.) at 358.

146. See also Langer, R., “Male Domestic Abuse: The Continuing Contrast Between Women's Experiences and Judicial Responses” (1995) 10:1C.J.L.S. 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

147. In addition to W. (K.M.) v. W. (D.D.) (1993), 47 R.F.L. (3d) 378 (Ont. Ct. (Prov. Div.)), see also Bendle v. Bendle, supra note 143; Sort v. Poppelwell (1988), 13 R.F.L. (3d) 192 (Sask. Q.B.); Cain v. Cain, supra note 145; Duller v. Duller (1989), 18 R.F.L. (3d) (Ont. H.C.J.) (3d) 53; Dupont v. Dupont, supra note 144; Ellen v. Ellen (1982), 30 R.F.L. (2d) 257 (Sask. Q.B.); Metz v. Metz (1991), 35 R.F.L. (3d) 437 (Sask. Q.B.); Nouveau-Brunswick v.F(C) (1995), 14 R.F.L. (4th) 392 (N.B. C.A.); Richardson v. Gardner, supra note 66; Abdo v. Abdo (1993), 50 R.F.L. (3d) 171 (N.S. S.C. A.D.). These cases were heard at the Supreme Court, not at the Court of Appeal level. When a court of appeal overrules a lower court after it has treated a mother (or anyone for that matter) unfairly, it revises the law to the advantage of those who apply to the court in the future but this does little to remedy the harm already done.

148. W. (K.M) v. W. (D.D.) ibid. at 386.

149. Sort v. Poppelwell, supra note 147.

150. Brigante v. Brigante, supra note 135; Filipe v. Filipe (1995) 14 R.F.L. (4th) 378 (B.C. S.C.). The judge discounted the mother's evidence of abuse in the Brigante case. But see also Jarrett v. Jarrett (1995), 10 R.F.L. (4th) 24 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); MacGuyver v. Richards (1995), 11 F.L.R. (4th) 432 (Ont. C.A.).

151. Filipe v. Filipe, ibid. at 381.

152. Ibid. at 381.

153. See for example Timmins, L., ed., Listening to the Thunder (Vancouver: Women's Research Centre, 1995)Google Scholar.

154. Rahe, R. H., McKean, J. D. & Arthur, R. J., “A Longitudinal Study of Life Changes and Illness Patterns” (1967) 10 Journal of Psychosomatic Research 355CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

155. Cases denying abusers access to their children did not differ markedly from cases awarding access.

156. See also Barrett v. Barrett (1989), 18 R.F.L. (3d) 186 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.); Brigante v. Brigante, supra note 135; Burk v. Burk (1991), 34 R.F.L. (3d) 27 (Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct.); Ellert v. Ellen, supra note 147; Fanning v. Fanning (1990), 24 R.F.L. (3d) 135 (N.S. S.C.T.D.); Foggo v. Foggo (1984), 40 R.F.L. (2d) 129 (Ont. H.C.J.); Fullarton v. Fullarton (1994), 7 R.F.L. (4th) 272 (N.B. Q.B. (Fam. Div.)); Howe v. Howe (1988), 16 R.F.L. (3d) 387 (N.B. Q.B. (Fam. Div.)); Reid v. Reid (1985), 45 R.F.L. (2d) 173 (B.C. S.C.); Whiffen v. Buckoltz (1987), 7 R.F.L. (3d) 77 9 (B.C. S.C.). Some of the cases were resolved by judicial order after a contested hearing; others were judicial endorsements of agreements reached. I have not distinguished between them because it is my belief that the legal system bears some responsibility for the consequences in both case.

157. Barrett v. Barrett, ibid. at 197.

158. Fanning v. Fanning, supra note 156 at 138.

159. Young v. Young (1989), 19 R.F.L. (3d) 227 (Ont. H.C.J.). The father was granted liberal access.

160. Cairns v. Cairns (1994), 3 R.F.L. (4th) 397 (N.B. Q.B. (Fam. Div.)); Savidant v. MacLeod, supra note 139; Whiffen v. Buckoltz, supra note 156; C. (R.M.) v. C (J. R. ) (1995), 12 R.F.L. (4th) 440 (B.C. S.C.); Deane v. Deane (1995), 14 R.F.L. (4th) 55 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).

161. C. (R. M.) v. C. (J. R.), ibid.

162. Cases in which the award of custody or access was unclear were excluded, resulting in 42 pre-Divorce Act, 1985 and 93 post-Divorce Act, 1985 cases discussed here.

163. Metz v. Metz, supra note 147.

164. Abdo v. Abdo, supra note 147 at 188. See also Dolgopol v. Dolgopol (1995), 10 R.F.L. (4th) 368 (Sask. Q.B.).

165. Supra note 156; Scono v. Scono (1984), 41 R.F.L. (2d) 57 (Ont. H.C.J.); T.W.D. v. Y.M.D. (1989), 20 R.F.L. (3d) 183 (N.S. S.C.T.D.). The fact that this consideration does not appear in the discourse does not mean, necessarily, that it was not considered. It is more likely than not that if one were to interview judges, privately, after deciding family law cases, it would be found that there are many matters judges take into account when deciding cases that are never articulated in a formal manner.

166. For example, section 16(9) of the Divorce Act, 1985 states that, in making a custody and access order a court “shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child.”

167. I doubt that anyone who works in the legal system escapes the dominance of legal rules entirely. Upon reflection, I think that it is likely that I accepted legal rules in a similar manner when I practised law in the 1980s.

168. See also Beck v. Balsillie (1994), 2 R.F.L. (4th) 91 (N.W.T. S.C.). D. (D.L) v. W. (R.J.) (1995), 10 R.F.L. (4th) 130 (Sask. Q.B.).

169. Sherry v. Sherry (1994), 1 R.F.L. (4th) 146 at 155 9P.E.I. S.C.T.D.).

170. See also.Boyd, S., “(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law and Oppression” (1994) 9:1C.J.L.S. 39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Judges are expressing concern that requirements to consider conduct would simply encourage litigation. See, for example, F. (T.R.) v. S. (P.K.) (1994), 1 R.F.L. (4th) 134 (Alta Q.B.) at 140.

171. See also Langer, supra note 146.

172. Cretney, S., Principles of Family Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) 331–32Google Scholar; “From Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality,” supra note 41; Glendon, supra note 42; Statistics Canada, supra note 97 at 251–58; Shanley, supra note 47 at 39–40; Young v. Young, supra note 166.

173. A statutory bias in favour of women has the potential to create other sorts of injustices in individual cases. See for example Scullion v. Scullion (1995), 12 R.F.L. (4th) 421 (N.B. Q.B. (Fam. Div.)).

174. For example Galanter, supra note 37; Brooke, supra note 19.

175. Galanter, ibid at 268.

176. Despite the new provisions of the Divorce Act, 1986 endorsing maximum contact and directing judges not to consider parental conduct in awarding custody and access, the reported cases indicate that this did not result in children being left with abusers more often. See also Clark, supra note 121; also Pulkingham, supra note 90 at 90–91. Prior to the implementation of the Divorce Act, 1986, in 23.8% of the cases examined, joint or sole custody of children was awarded to, or left with, an abusive parent (usually the father). After the implementation of the Divorce Act, that figure dropped to 16.1%. Similarly, awards of access to abusers in the reported cases decreased slightly and denials of access to abusers increased slightly (59.5% of the cases awarded abusers access to their children prior to the Divorce Act, 55.9% after; 16.7% of the cases denied abusers access to their children prior to the Divorce Act, 28% after. While it is not possible to claim that these figures are significant, since there is no way of knowing how representative they are, they do suggest that the statutory changes did not markedly affect judicial practice. Others have noted a similar phenomenon with respect to changes to child custody law, generally. See Clark and Pulkingham, ibid.

177. For references to the psychological literature on this point, see supra note 11.

178. Divorce Act, 1985, supra note 80, s. 16(10).

179. Young v. Young, supra note 159 at 235.

180. It should not be assumed, when reading my arguments here, that I am suggesting that professional “knowledge” is more just than law. Quite the contrary, since my argument has been that both law and professional knowledge evolve from social change produced by the power dynamics of the social order. If this is correct, dominant professional knowledge will only be as “just” or “correct” as the social order is just or correct. My intention is not to make moral assertions, but simply to explore the connections between the social order, professional knowledge and law in the context of women abuse cases when there are dependent children to consider whether the statutory changes being suggested are likely to benefit women. I do not know whether or not the current professional “knowledge” about the effects of partner abuse on children is “just” or “correct” since my understandings of “correct” and “just” are just as much coloured by time, place and society as anyone else's.

181. Tremble v. Hill (1987), 7 R.F.L. (3d) 85 (Ont. Unif. Fam.Ct.) at 88.

182. Alexander v. Creary (1995), 14 R.F.L. (4th) 311 (Ont. Ct. (Prov. Div.)).

183. Cairns v. Cairns, supra note 160 at 401. Here also we find the court referring to professional “expertise” in order to justify the decision.

184. Abdo v. Abdo, supra note 147 at 188.

185. (1995) 15 R.F.L. (4th) 90 (B.C. S.C.) at 92.

186. Ibid. at 93.

187. Supra note 16.

188. See also Maccoby, Depner & Mnookin, supra note 121.

189. Boyd, supra note 170; Snider, L., “Feminism, Punishment, and the Potential For Empowerment” (1994) 9:1C.J.L.S. 75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Valverde, M. et al. ed., Wife Assault and the Canadian Criminal Justice System (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1995)Google Scholar.

190. This only will work to the advantage of women when professional knowledge favours the interests of women.

191. J. Bakan, “Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)” in Banfield, ed., supra note 21 177; D. Majury, “Equality and Discrimination According to the Supreme Court” in Banfield, ed., supra note 21, 184. See also supra note 22.

192. Galanter, supra note 37.

193. Snider, supra note 189

194. Rosen, P., The Supreme Court and Social Science (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972)Google Scholar; B. Wilson, “Judicial Decision-Making and the Charter” in Banfield, ed., supra note 21, 204.

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