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The Psychosocial Courtroom: Towards a New Theory of Argumentation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Barbara Watson
Barbara Watson
Affiliation:
LL.B. candidate (1996), Osgoode Hall Law School
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Abstract

This paper argues for a psychosocial theory of courtroom argumentation. Its central thesis is the deconstruction of the deceptive shifts of courtroom dynamics between the veneer of logical propriety and the emotional prescription buried below. Selected observations on the androcentric bias of the sciences, on linguistic convention as gendered historical ambition, and on alternatives to the dominant logical mode of reasoning and argumentation constitute Part I. Part II critically analyzes selected cases for courtroom alternatives. In an effort to reclaim non-linguistic discourse, Part III synthesizes the emotional mode of argumentation and reasoning with feminist spheres of relevance and reasonableness. The conclusion: that such a synthesis may combine with the rational to present a model for our legal system

Résumé

Le présent article prône une théorie psychosociale de la plaidoirie. La thèse de l'auteure repose sur l'analyse des ruses utilisées aux fins de l'argumentation, ruses qui, sous l'apparence de la logique, cachent les aspects émotifs de l'argumentation. Dans la première partie, elle fait l'analyse des arguments tendancieux de l'androcentrisme scientifique, des conventions linguistiques reflétant la domination séculaire des hommes, et présente d'autres modes d'argumentation juridique s'écartant du raisonnement logique traditionnel. Dans la deuxième partie, elle fait l'analyse critique de certains procès, y suggérant une autre forme d'argumentation. Visant à mettre en valeur le discours non-verbal, la troisième partie se veut une synthèse des aspects émotifs de l'argumentation et du raisonnement davantage en accord avec la logique et le raisonnement féministes. Rien ne s'oppose à ce qu'une telle théorie s'insère dans l'argumentation rationnelle afin de proposer un nouveau modèle de plaidoirie.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , Spring/printemps 1996 , pp. 99 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 1996

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Footnotes

*

I owe a debt of gratitude to Mary Jane Mossman for her support, patience, encouragement and editorial expertise. I would also like to thank Susan Ehrlich and Michael Gilbert for the time they took to discuss the social science aspects of the paper, and two anonymous reviewers of this Journal for their comments.

References

** Part II was written as a 1994 “Law, Gender, Equality” student paper.

1. Dawson, B., “Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of the Primary Witness: The Construction of Relevance” (1987–1988) 2 CJWL 310.Google Scholar Dawson notes, at 310, that “feminism has finally begun to achieve a major … ‘paradigm’ shift in legal studies.”

2. Gilbert, M., “Multi-Modal Argumentation” (1994) 24:2 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 159 at 161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Lest this modifier engender criticism, let me declare the importance of this gender reference to Part II. In most cases, I do not advocate informing people of gender; such language is usually sexist—defined as different linguistic treatment of women and men, less favourable to women, based on gender. See King, R., Talking Gender (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991) at 3.Google Scholar

4. In part, it briefly explores the family and community norms of the aboriginal “native circle” concept. See Part III for this “courtroom” style, developed by Stuart, J. in R. v. Moses (1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Y. Terr. Ct.) [hereinafter Moses], which seeks to maintain community values while ensuring legal enforceability. It has been followed in many locations. Foregrounding unconventional courtroom communication allowed Stuart J. to redefine relevance. But see infra note 124 for some analyses of this concept in different contexts.

5. Bordo, S., “Anorexia Nervosa: Psychopathology As the Crystallization of Culture” (1985) 17:2 The Philosophical Forum 73 at 77–78.Google Scholar

6. Flax, J., “Women Do Theory” (1979) 5:1 Quest 20 at 20.Google Scholar

7. Irigaray, L., This Sex Which Is Not One (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) at 74.Google Scholar

8. Ibid. at 76.

9. Bordo, supra note 5 at 77.

10. Gilbert, M., “Feminism, Argumentation and Coalescence” (1994) 16:2 Informal Logic 95 at 103CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter “Feminism”] on the “notion of exclusive disjunction … for example, right or wrong.”

11. I acknowledge the fiction of “pure gender.” Because of space constraints, this paper initially veers little from my Western white perspective, but later evolves into an attempt to revalue historically denied gender-impacting variables. See especially the account regarding Mrs. G., infra note 140 and accompanying text.

12. Bordo, supra note 5 at 78.

13. Flax, J., “Mother-Daughter Relationships: Psychodynamics, Politics and Philosophy” in Eisenstein, H. & Jardine, A., eds., The Future of Difference (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985) 20 at 26.Google Scholar

14. Ibid. at 29.

15. Mader, S., Inquiry Into Life (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown, 1991) at 404.Google Scholar

16. Ibid. at 185.

17. Carson, R. & Butcher, J., Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1992)Google Scholar: see c. 4, 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 19 passim.

18. Ibid. See pp. 121–22, 147–50, 269–73, 382–83 and c. 12 passim.

19. Duran, J., Toward a Feminist Epistemology (Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991) at 74.Google Scholar

20. Ibid. at 76.

21. With faucet on and drain open to corresponding pressures, the water level in a sink remains constant. Nonsexist discourse behaves similarly: the addition of new forms (as old drain away) does not alter the tenacity of “linguistic encoding of social distinctions … clearly of ideological importance to the speech community.” See Ehrlich, S. & King, R., “Feminist Meanings and the (De)Politicization of the Lexicon” (1994) 23 Language in Society 59 at 64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22. King, supra note 3 at 72. See also C. Boyle, Book Review of Injunctions and Specific Performance by R.J. Sharpe and The Law of Damages by Waddams, S.M. (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 427 at 430Google Scholar, cited by Graycar, R. & Morgan, J., The Hidden Gender of Law (Annandale: Federation Press, 1990) at 19.Google Scholar Graycar and Morgan, with their reference to Boyle, are cited in Mossman, M. J., ed., Readings on Law, Gender, Equality (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1993–1994) at 2.Google Scholar See also Pearlman, L., “Through Jewish Lesbian Eyes: Rethinking Clara Brett Martin” (1992) 5 C.J.W.L. 317 Google Scholar at note 33 in Mossman, ibid. at 74.

23. McConnell-Ginet, S., “The Sexual (Re)Production of Meaning” in Frank, F. & Treichler, P., eds., Language, Gender and Professional Writing (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1989) 35 at 38.Google Scholar

24. I am using singular “they” in order to excise sexism from the language (but see Ehrlich & King, supra note 21 at 60). Singular “they” was condemned and replaced with “he” in Lord Brougham's Act, 1850 (Imp.), 13 & 14 Viet., c. 21: see Mossman, M.J., “Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes” (1986) 3 Australian Journal of Law and Society 30 at 42Google Scholar [hereinafter Feminism and Legal Method]. An appeal to history in an attempt to support generic “he” thus speaks only to a particular point in time, a period which previewed the legal ambition to be explored in Part II. For example, 1846 saw the incorporation of the Barristers' Society of New Brunswick (In Re Mabel P. French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359, Barker J. [hereinafter French a ]); 1849 provided that of the Bar of the province of Quebec (Dame Langstaff v. The Bar of the Province of Quebec, [1915] 47 R.J.Q. 131 at 136 [hereinafter Langstaff]); interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1867 to the advantage of women gave much trouble to the judiciary (see generally infra Part II).

25. See infra notes 77 and 113 and accompanying texts.

26. McConnell-Ginet, supra note 23.

27. Fedorick, J. Asham, “Mother Tongue: Aboriginal Culture and Languages” (1989) 10:2–3 Canadian Woman Studies 69 at 70.Google Scholar

28. See, generally Crawford, M. & English, L., “Generic Versus Specific Inclusions of Women in Language: Effects on Recall” (1984) 13 Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 373.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Female and male subjects, given 8 minutes to study essays which varied across two other dimensions (language: generic “he” or neutral “he or she”; and description of profession: law or psychology), were tested on recall of the entire essay 48 hours later. There was statistical significance, determinative of female advancement, to main effect results for language only. Males showed better recall for generic language, while females demonstrated better recall for neutral language (note that the neutral chosen, “he or she”, front-weighted towards the male pronoun, is standard in our society). These effects worked subliminally as later debriefing revealed that subjects could not remember which pronoun version they had read. [Emphasis added.]

29. Gilbert, “Multi-Modal Argumentation,” supra note 2 at 163.

30. Gilbert, “Feminism,” supra note 10 at 6. Gilbert points out that this occurs “if the [critical-logical] mode of arguing/communicating … disadvantage[] women” [italics in original]. As my experience of this is conclusive rather than merely conceivable, I have taken the liberty of removing “if;” I expect Gilbert might find my position arguable.

31. Gilbert, “Multi-Modal Argumentation,” supra note 2 at 164. The kisceral “derives from the Japanese word ‘;ki’ which signifies energy, life-force, connectedness” (at 173). Gilbert notes that “making [the kisceral] category into something … very extraordinary … is … up to the individual arguer” (at 173). I would add that ‘ki’ is a martial arts term denoting the mental set accessed when women or men expend extraordinary effort.

32. For the purposes of this paper, the first two modes will be examined in more detail than the third or fourth.

33. Gilbert, “Feminism”, supra note 10 at 6. See also, infra note 146 and accompanying text: my interview with Stuart J., who introduced the “native circle” approach in Moses, elicited support of this.

34. Varey, C. & Kahneman, D., “Experiences Extended Across Time: Evaluation of Moments and Episodes” (1992) 5 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35. Edwards et al v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (J.C.P.C.) [hereinafter Persons Case].

36. Finley, L., “Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning” (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 886 at 890Google Scholar in Mossman, supra note 22 at 175.

37. Thornton, M., “The Public/Private Dichotomy: Gendered and Discriminatory” (1991) 18:4 Journal of Law and Society 448.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38. In Re Mabel Penery French (1912), 17 B.C.R. 1 (C.A.) [hereinafter French b].

39. French a, supra note 24.

40. Langstaff, supra note 24.

41. Ibid. at 131.

42. Bordo, supra note 5 at 77–78.

43. Wilson J., B., “Will Women Judges Really Make A Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 at 508Google Scholar, citing Hoyt, J.K., The Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations, rev'd ed. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1896) at 330 Google Scholar in Mossman, supra note 22 at 213.

44. Ibid. at 519 and 522.

45. Carson & Butcher, supra note 17 at 30ff.

46. Persons Case, supra note 35 (Lord Sankey).

47. O'Donovan, K., Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985) at 7 Google Scholar, in Mossman, supra note 22 at 182.

48. Thornton, supra note 37 at 450.

49. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (U.S.S.C. 1872) [hereinafter Bradwell] in Mossman, supra note 22 at 35.

50. See generally Mossman, supra note 24; Bordo, supra note 5; Flax, Women Do Theory, supra note 6; Duran, supra note 19; Flax, “Mother-Daughter Relationships”, supra note 13. See also Mossman, M. J., “‘Otherness’ and the Law School; A Comment on Teaching Gender Equality” (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 213 at 216Google Scholar [hereinafter ‘Otherness’ and the Law School].

51. See also Thurton, supra note 37 at 452 on sociobiology.

52. See Langstaff, supra note 24.

53. Ibid. at 141.

54. Supra note 38 at 3.

55. Bebb v. The Law Society (1914), 34 C.L.T. 620 at 628 (C.A.) [hereinafter Bebb].

56. See French a,b and Langstaff, supra notes 24 & 38.

57. See the Persons Case, supra note 35.

58. See Mossman, supra note 24 at 38.

59. Ibid. at 45.

60. Ibid. at 32.

61. Ehrlich points out that, of American Sign Language terms signed at the head, unmarked male terms, and brain and cognitive terms, are usually signed above the ear; female and emotional terms near the mouth. S. Ehrlich, “Sexism in Other Languages,” Lecture, York University, Downsview, Ontario (1 February 1993).

62. The unmarked term in a duality, the male, is interpreted as not-female (minus interpretation) or as “human” (zero interpretation); the marked, female, term is lower in status. See Ehrlich & King, supra note 21 at note 4 and accompanying text. See also Boyle, supra note 22 on legal texts using “a phallocentric world view [which] equates ‘human’ with … ‘male’”; Finley, supra note 36 at 887–89 on gratuitous signifiers of female deviance (e.g. working mother) and on women's (as non-standard) issues, on contractual (as opposed to social) views of surrogacy (as opposed to birth mothers).

63. A woman's language developed by linguist Elgin, S. Haden in Native Tongue (New York: Day Books, 1984).Google Scholar See also Pearlman, supra note 22 at note 33, on the need for a woman's language.

64. Finley, supra note 36 at 888.

65. The term “semantic derogation” is borrowed from Schulz, M., “The Semantic Derogation of Women” in Thorne, B. & Henley, N., eds., Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance (Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 1975) 64 Google Scholar and refers to the evolution (from dignifying to degrading) often undergone by connotations of terminology regarding females.

66. Ehrlich & King, supra note 21 at 62–63.

67. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

68. Supra note 38 at 1.

69. Supra note 24 at 139.

70. King, supra note 3 at 23. See also Pearlman, supra note 22.

71. Supra note 38 at 4.

72. The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary, 1991 ed., (New York: Oxford U.P., 1991) [hereinafter O.E.D.]. 1 acknowledge this appeal to authority. For a different use of this, see Frenchb, supra note 38.

73. Finley, supra note 36 at 886–87.

74. Thornton, supra note 37 at 450.

75. Finley, supra note 36 at note 1, citing Nye, A., “Woman Clothed With the Sun: Julia Kristeva and the Escape From/To Language” (1987) 12 Signs 664 at 671.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76. Supra note 24 at 145.

77. Finley, supra note 36 at 890. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.

78. Langstaff, supra note 24 at 137.

79. Boyle, supra note 22. See also King, supra note 3 at 16; Ehrlich & King, supra note 21 at 61.

80. Langstaff, supra note 24 at 137.

81. interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1897, c.1, ss.10(13) and 10(14).

82. Frenchb, supra note 38 at 2.

83. Ibid.

84. Boyle, supra note 22.

85. Persons Case, supra note 35 at 143.

86. Boyle, See C., “Sexual Assault and the Feminist Judge” (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 93 Google Scholar, in Mossman, supra note 22 at 130. See also Mossman, M. J., “Gender Equality and Legal Aid Services: A Research Agenda for Institutional Change” (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 30 Google Scholar [hereinafter Gender Equality] in Mossman, supra note 22 at 251.

87. See Dawson, supra note 1 at 331 on gender, and Finley, supra note 36 at 889–90 on law.

88. This is a policy-based doctrine which mandates adherence to precedent, in courts of equal or lower level within jurisdiction, in future cases where the facts are substantially the same as those in the precedent-setting case. (See previous sentence on substantiality of fact interpretation; see Moses, infra note 107, Part III, on introduction of unconventional determinative facts).

89. Mossman, “Otherness and the Law School”, supra note 50 at 214.

90. Langstaff, supra note 24 at 137.

91. Ibid. at 139.

92. Ibid. at 139–40.

93. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

94. Dawson, B., “The Significance of Legal Personhood” in Dawson, B., ed., Women, Law and Social Change (North York: Captus Press, 1990) 76 Google Scholar, in Mossman, supra note 22 at 22, on a 1925 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council regarding a Hindu idol. Thus, four years prior to the Persons Case, the J.C.P.C. failed to address the issue of legal personhood for women. Dawson notes that the Persons Case decision may have been somewhat consequent on the fact that the J.C.P.C. had been influenced by custom in 1925.

95. Boyle, supra note 22 at 433.

96. Eberts, M., “New Facts for Old: Observations on the Judicial Process” in Devlin, R., ed., Feminist Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 110 at 112Google Scholar, in Mossman, supra note 22 at 103.

97. Gilbert, “Multi-Modal Argumentation,” sapra note 2 at 169.

98. In re Duke of Somerset (1887), 34 Ch.D. 465 (Ch.D.) [hereinafter Duke].

99. Ibid. at 466.

100. Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method, supra note 24 at 35.

101. Ibid. at 44–45.

102. Langstaff, supra note 24 at 139. To me, this epitomizes gender dynamics. Many times have I observed the smile on the face of the traditional male who learns I am a nurse slowly become rigid at the mention of my former alternative vocation— teaching martial arts. On the one hand, what these men fail to realize is that these arts, with which they identify males, embody a philosophy of non-violence which many consider feminist. On the other lies its opposite, the issue of military violence.

103. Gilbert, Multi-Modal Argumentation, supra note 2 at 171.

104. Ibid. at 173.

105. Ibid.

106. Finley, supra note 36 at 908.

107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. But see infra note 124 for critique of the “native circle” concept introduced in Moses.

108. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0–2.

109. Finley, supra note 36 at 890.

110. Ehrlich & King, supra note 21 at 65, 68.

111. See, generally, Conklin, W., “Teaching Critically Within a Modern Legal Genre” (1993) 8:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

112. Ibid. at 38.

113. Ibid. at 39. See also, supra note 25 and accompanying text. Primary discourses, notes Conklin, have an immediate unmediated relation to reality.

114. Mossman, supra note 24 at 45.

115. ibid. at 40.

116. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

117. Frenchb, supra note 38 at 6.

118. Bebb, supra note 55 at 634.

119. Langstaff, supra note 24 at 138.

120. Franklin, U., “The Sandbox and the Tools” in Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada (Ottawa: The Society, 1990) 43 at 44Google Scholar in Mossman, supra note 22 at 85.

121. This is a phrase from psychology which signifies the wide range of ways in which people live their lives.

122. Conklin, supra note 111 at 46.

123. Gilbert, Feminism, supra note 10 at 100.

124. Franklin, supra note 120. This paper cannot contemplate a major analysis of the many aspects of the “native circle” concept. However, this concept, in part along with judicial entitlement, has been analyzed in a number of different contexts. See, for example, Stuart J., B., “Objectives of Circle Sentencing” (Presentation to Québec Congress, 1993) [unpublished]Google Scholar and Stuart J., B., “Community-Based Justice Initiatives: An Overview” (Presentation at SPIDR Conference, Toronto, October 1993) [unpublished]Google Scholar for an analysis of the objectives and parameters which he established with regard to the “native circle” concept. See, also, Department of Justice Canada, “Request for Proposal—Circle Sentencing” (Ottawa: Justice Canada, 1994)Google Scholar on a research project to interrogate the implications of circles on the criminal justice system and on non-aboriginal Canadians; this project also seeks to determine the circle's impact on community and family power relations. See, especially, M. Crnkovich, “Report on the Sentencing Circle in Kangiqsujuaq” (14 June 1993) prepared for Pauktuutit and the Department of Justice [unpublished] for an analysis of the maintenance of these power relations, within the circle, to the detriment of the female victim of woman assault in a “battered wife” case. Crnkovich notes the necessity of establishing and maintaining support for such women if the sentencing circle method is to be employed for their batterers. Her analysis incorporates judicial entitlement to define power. See also R. v. Cheekinew (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 143 at 149–50 (Sask. Q.B.) wherein Grotsky J. sets out minimal parameters for determining the advisability of employing the sentencing circle method. These do not include assessment of victim impact. Crnkovich's analysis suggests that they should be expanded to encompass this assessment. Note that Stuart J. does address the necessity for victim support in general.

125. See supra note 88 and accompanying text with regard to stare decisis.

126. Gilbert, Feminism, supra note 10 at 112.

127. Eberts, supra note 96 at 113.

128. Gilbert, Feminism, supra note 10 at 109.

129. Ibid. at 112.

130. Ibid. at 96.

131. Ibid. at 100.

132. Ibid. at 98. [Italics in original].

133. Ibid.

134. Ehrlich & King, supra note 21 at 60.

135. Conklin, supra note 111 at 46–47. But see Crnkovich, supra note 124 for an analysis of woman assault which supports Conklin's assertion and conclusion.

136. Razack, S., “Issues of Difference in Constitutional Reform: Saying Goodbye to the Universal Woman” in Schneiderman, D., ed., Conversations Among Friends—Entre Amies: Women and Constitutional Reform (Edmonton: Centre for Constitutional Studies, 1991) 39.Google Scholar See Razack's article for an analysis of the social construction of the “universal woman” as normative.

137. Finley, supra note 36 at 907.

138. Mossman, Gender Equality, supra note 86 at 50.

139. Supra note 96 at 112.

140. White, L., “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.” in Fineman, M. & Thomadsen, N., eds., At the Boundaries of Law (New York: Routledge, 1991) 40 Google Scholar in Mossman, supra note 22 at 91.

141. Ibid. at 41.

142. Ibid. at 50–51.

143. Conklin, supra note 111 at 136.

144. White, supra note 140 at 45.

145. Ibid.

146. Telephone Interview with B. Stuart J. (23 February 1994) Whitehorse, Y.T.

147. Fine, S., “Justice Without Passing Judgment” The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 March 1994) A5.Google Scholar

148. Moses, supra note 4 at 350.

149. Supra note 146.

150. Ehrlich & King, supra note 21.

151. Conklin, supra note 111 at 43.

152. Fine, supra note 147. But see Crnkovich, supra note 124: judicial entitlement must be employed to facilitate the community to take full responsibility for victims as well as perpetrators. This may be particularly difficult to accomplish in cases involving women and children victims of violence.