Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 March 2014
This article addresses the teaching of legal research methods and doctrinal analysis within a legal studies program. I argue that learning about legal research and doctrinal analysis is an important element of legal education outside professional law schools. I start by considering the ongoing debate concerning the role of legal education both inside and outside professional law schools. I then describe the way in which the research methods courses offered by the Department of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University attempt to reconcile the tension between “law” and legal studies. In particular, I focus on how the second-year research methods course introduces students to “traditional” legal research and doctrinal analysis within a legal studies context by deploying a number of pedagogical strategies. In so doing, the course provides students with an important foundation that allows them to embrace the multiple roles of legal education outside professional law schools.
Cet article examine le rôle de l’enseignement des méthodes de recherche juridique et de l’analyse des doctrines au sein d’un programme d’études juridiques. Je soutiens que la recherche juridique et l’analyse doctrinale représentent des éléments importants d’une formation juridique à l’extérieur des écoles professionnelles de droit. Premièrement, j’examine le débat en cours sur le rôle de l’éducation juridique à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur des écoles professionnelles de droit. Par la suite, je démontre comment les cours de recherche juridique offerts par le Département d’études juridiques de l’Université Carleton tentent de concilier la tension entre le « droit » et les études juridiques. En particulier, j’examine comment le cours de deuxième année sur les méthodes de recherche juridique présente aux élèves la recherche juridique « traditionnelle » ainsi que l’analyse doctrinale dans le cadre d’études juridiques en adoptant certaines stratégies pédagogiques. Le cours fournit ainsi une base importante permettant aux élèves de profiter des rôles multiples de l’éducation juridique à l’extérieur des écoles professionnelles de droit.
1 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Law and Learning/Le droit et le savoir: Report of the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa: SSHRC Council, 1983). [Hereafter: Arthurs Report]Google Scholar
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5 See, for example, the authors identified in notes 7, 8, 10 and 11.
6 Arthurs Report, 158 (emphasis added).
7 Goodman, Douglas J. and Silbey, Susan S., “Defending Liberal Education From the Law,” in Law in the Liberal Arts, ed. Sarat, Austin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 17–40Google Scholar. See also, McRae, D. M., “The Law School and the University: A Law Course for Undergraduates,” University of Toronto Law Journal 21 (1971): 536.Google Scholar
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12 Brettel Dawson, T., “Legal Research in a Social Science Setting: The Problem of Method,” Dalhousie Law Journal 4 (1992): 463.Google Scholar
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15 Many authors identify a number of these justifications. See, for example, McRae, “The Law School and the University,” 533–35; Arzt, “Too Important,” 137; Bybee, “The Liberal Arts, Legal Scholarship, and the Democratic Critique of Judicial Power,” in Sarat, Law in the Liberal Arts, 55–56; and Austin Sarat, “Situating Legal Scholarship in the Liberal Arts: An Introduction,” in Sarat, Law in the Liberal Arts, 4–5.
16 Carleton University Undergraduate Calendar, 2013–2014: http://calendar.carleton.ca/undergrad/courses/LAWS/.
17 Ibid.
18 Macdonald, “Still ‘Law’ and Still ‘Learning,’” 8–9.
19 The University of Ontario Institute of Technology also requires students to complete two methods courses, including one course in legal research methods. See: https://shared.uoit.ca/shared/department/registrar/current-students/documents/13-14_UOIT-Academic-Calendar-2013-2014_final_web.pdf (at 270–72). The Algoma University BA in Law and Justice also includes a course in legal research methods, but it is not a required course. See: http://www.algomau.ca/media/styleassets/pdf/academiccalendar2013/2013-14_academic_calendar_full.pdf#page=119 (at 120–125). In contrast, the University of Waterloo BA in Legal Studies requires completion of both a research methods course and a social statistics course, but not a legal research methods course. See: http://ugradcalendar.uwaterloo.ca/page/ARTS-Four-Year-General-Legal-Studies.
20 See, for example, the Memorial University BA in Law and Society: http://www.mun.ca/regoff/calendar/sectionNo=ARTS-2005#ARTS-4437.
21 See, for example, the University of Calgary BA in Law and Society: http://www.ucalgary.ca/pubs/calendar/current/arts-4-43-2.html
22 See, for example the York University BA in Law and Society: http://www.yorku.ca/laps/sosc/laso/degree_options.html.
23 In so doing, we have built on the strong foundation developed by Professor Dawson, who designed the first iteration of this course in 1988. See Dawson, “The Problem of Method,” 445–72.
24 Austin Sarat, “Crossing Boundaries: From Disciplinary Perspectives to an Integrated Conception of Legal Scholarship,” in Sarat, Law in the Liberal Arts, 90. In the Canadian context, D. M. McRae warned of the way in which the purposes of an undergraduate course in law would be undermined if it became “no more than a recruiting course for law school.” See McRae, “Law School and the University,” 537.
25 Sargent, Neil, “The Possibilities and Perils of Legal Studies” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 6 (1991)Google Scholar: 4. Faculty members of the legal studies program at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst described the importance of separating the study of law from the “hidden curriculum of socialization into the profession…” See D’Errico, Arons, and Rifkin, “Humanistic Legal Studies,” 21.
26 Professor Dawson described the pitfalls of such a course in pithier terms, stating: “In teaching research methods in legal studies, the aim must be to produce neither (positivist) legal scholars nor (legal) sociologists—and certainly not positivist legal sociologists!” Dawson, “The Problem of Method,” 451. D. M. McRae provided a similar, though less pithy, explanation, writing:
The task is not, as in the law school, to turn out skilled or at least reasonably competent legal craftsmen; rather it is to introduce and to provide insight into the rationale and techniques of a major social institution. Thus, for example, the close analysis of legal decisions associated with the case method of teaching may be useful in giving some ideas of the lawyer’s approach to legal problems and their solution, but it can hardly be justified as the sole method of instruction in an undergraduate law course.
McRae, “Law School and the University,” 540.
27 Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33 (Can).
28 Bala, Nicholas, “Controversy Over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships,” Queen’s Law Journal 29 (2003): 41–102.Google Scholar
29 Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, SC 2000, c 12 (Can).
30 Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33 (Can).
31 Young, Claire and Boyd, Susan, “Losing the Feminist Voice? Debates on the Legal Recognition of Same Sex Partnerships in Canada,” Feminist Legal Studies 14 (2006): 213–40.Google Scholar
32 Ibid., 214.
33 Nicol, Nancy and Smith, Miriam, “Legal Struggles and Political Resistance: Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the USA,” Sexualities 11 (2008): 667–87.Google Scholar
34 Ibid., 668.
35 Ibid.
36 We have found a lecture delivered by professor Marilyn Waring at the Aukland University of Technology to be particularly instructive for students in this regard. The lecture can be viewed online at: http://www.aut.ac.nz/about-aut/old---do-not-link-to/news--and--information/lectures.
37 Bill C-38, An Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Legal Capacity for Marriage for Civil Purposes, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (Received Royal Assent 20 July 2005).
38 House of Commons Debates, 38th Parl, 1st Sess, No. 58 (16 February 2005) at 3574–3577 (Rt Hon Paul Martin) and 3578–3585 (Hon Stephen Harper).
39 Arthurs Report, 140. The Arthurs Report stated:
… [T]he scholarly enterprise of law can flourish neither divorced from the profession, nor in its close embrace, nor in hand-to-hand combat with it. Its best prospect for growth and development is therefore to take up a position within the law faculties as a distinct and separate endeavor, with its own goals, standards and basis of legitimacy. Only such a stance will at once stimulate energies, promote sensible interdisciplinary cooperation and provide a free and equal basis for exchange between scholars and practitioners.