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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2014
This paper deals with a crucial problem in feminist theory and in law, namely the issue of the “Woman/Women” category. Does the presence of a single man invalidate the label and remove the issues from the field of equality between the sexes? Moreover, in order to avail oneself successfully of the non-discrimination provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, does one necessarily have to prove prejudice towards all women, or seek a remedy likely to improve the situation of all women? Is the category “Woman” necessarily universal and all-embracing? To answer these questions, the author deals with the relationship between women and men and concludes that this relationship is not one of absolute binary opposition, but rather of secular domination. The author then analyzes the category of Women in relation to society as a whole where women are often subsumed into minorities, absorbed into the family or collapsed into “Universal” Woman. Fully recognizing the arbitrary and artificial character as well as the deceptive and reductionist aspects of categories per se, the author observes nonetheless that the law obliges us to keep the category of “Woman” for as long as women will not have collectively attained an economic, legal, political, symbolic, etc. status equal to that of men collectively.
Dans cet article, l'auteure analyse un problème crucial en théories féministes et en droit, soit la question de la catégorie «Femme/s». Y a-t-il une catégorie «Femme/s»? Cette catégorie est-elle exclusive, si Men que la présence d'un seul homme, par exemple, invalide l'étiquette et écarte la question du domaine de l'égalité des sexes? De plus, pour faire valoir avec succès les dispositions de non-discrimination de la Charte, faut-il nécessairement démontrer un préjudice à l'endroit de toutes les femmes sans exception? En d'autres termes, la catégorie «Femme/s» est-elle nécessairement universelle et totalisante? Pour répondre à ces questions, l'auteure aborde les rapports Femme/Homme pour conclure à l'absence d'une opposition binaire absolue, mais l'existence d'une domination séculaire. L'auteure analyse ensuite la relation Femme/Société, où les femmes sont trop souvent assimilées aux minorités, ravalées dans la famille ou réduites a la «Femme Universelle». Dénonçant le caractère arbitraire et artificiel ainsi que les aspects déformants et réducteurs du processus de catégorisation, l'auteure constate que le droit force le maintien de la categorie «Femme/s» jusqu'à ce que l'ensemble des femmes atteignent le même statut économique, juridique, politique, social, symbolique, etc., que l'ensemble des hommes.
1. The term “category” is here understood to mean “the class within which objects of the same nature are placed” or “a set of persons having common traits” (Le Nouveau Petit Robert, 1993) [our translation]. Here is an amusing anecdote. What is the common characteristic shared by a Vice-president of the United States, an inventor, a warrior, a ganster and a film director, namely Al Gore, Alexander Graham Bell, Alexander the Great, Al Capone and Alfred Hitchock? All these men were subjects of the Arts & Entertainment Network show Biography during their “You Can Call Me Al” week of June 23 to 27, 1997 (the title is taken from a song by Paul Simon). This is a somewhat preposterous example of the ease with which categories of any kind and nature can be created.
2. Janzen and Govereau v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
3. However, in the present stratified labour market, those with the power to harass sexually will predominantly be male and those facing the greatest risk of harassment will tend to be female. “[T]he sexual harassment is used in a sexist society to […]“underscore women's difference from, and by implication, inferiority with respect to the dominant male group” and to “remind women of their inferior ascribed status”. Ibid., at 1285. [Our italics, sources omitted]
4. Ibid. at 1284. The fact that some men may sometimes experience similar or even identical situations was not conclusive, for two reasons: Firstly, men are not generally treated as sex objects, and do not systematically find themselves in subordinate positions. Sexual harassment of men is not justified either, but it is neither systemic nor common. Secondly, to the extent that women live in a world designed by and for men, where they have few employment opportunities and their low salaries only rarely enable them to achieve financial independence, women as a category occupy a position of subordination, of systemic inferiority. In the Janzen case, the possibility that a man might find himself in the same position as a woman was not a determining factor, any more than the fact that not all women were affected.
5. Bliss v. Canada (A.G.), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
6. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
7. This reversal is all the more astonishing as it is signed by the Chief Justice at the time, Dickson C.J., the only justice who had already been sitting on the Supreme Court in 1979 and had supported the earlier decision.
8. Thibaudeau v. The Queen (M.N.R.), [1994] 2 F.C. 180, p. 205, rev'd [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 [hereinafter referred to as Thibaudeau]. As we know, in the Federal Court of Appeal, Hugessen J.A. found that the provision that was challenged was discriminatory, and accepted as an analogous ground that of “separated parents having custody of a child.” Pratte J.A. agreed with these grounds, while Létourneau J.A. dissented on another point. The Thibaudeau decision was subsequently reversed by a majority of justices of the Supreme Court.
9. Symes v. Canada, [1991] 3 F.C. 507 (F.C.A), aff'd [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [hereinafter Symes].
10. The representation of Woman that a society produces for itself will to a large extent determine her relationship to herself, to society as a whole and to men.
11. See introductory note.
12. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Egan]
13. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 [hereinafter Miron].
14. Thibaudeau, supra note 8 at 627.
15. See, e.g., the opinion of McLachlin J. in Miron, who adopts a two-step analysis (at 485), while Gonthier J., dissenting (at 435 ff.), presents his opinion in three steps. L'Heureux-Dubé J. follows also three stages (at 466 ff.), albeit different, and arrives at the same result as McLachlin J. to form a weak five to four majority.
16. The body of research as a whole will be considered in a subsequent publication.
17. Iyer, N., “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity”, (1994) 19 Queen's Law Journal 179–207 at 190–91Google Scholar.
18. Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
19. In Thibaudeau, supra note 8, e.g., as soon as the Supreme Court chooses “separated or divorced custodial parents” as the ground for discrimination, the group that must be used for comparison purposes becomes custodial parents who are neither divorced nor separated. It inevitably follows that the analysis will refuse to examine the impact of the system on custodial parents, compared to non-custodial parents. See the discussion below.
20. For our purposes, we shall limit our examination of the Woman/Man relationship to the usual biological definitions, while recognizing that in this field, a myriad of possibilities have remained unexplored to this date. See the discussion below.
21. “The false premise is the assumption of two closed categories into which all human beings can be classified on an either/or basis and the attaching to these of qualities of femininity or masculinity. Whilst it is true that the great majority of people can be so classified biologically, there are nevertheless a minority who cannot be. Social and psychological behavioural traits are socially constructed and the ‘differences within each sex far outweigh the differences between the sexes’.” See Donovan, K. O., “Transsexual Troubles: The Discrepancy Between Legal and Social Categories” in Edwards, S., ed., Gender, Sex and the Law, (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985) 9 at 18Google Scholar.
22. On this subject generally, see Laqueur, T., Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.
23. Ibid. at 4-17.
24. Thibaudeau, supra note 8.
25. Hugessen J.A. continues: “Accordingly, it seems to me that one cannot logically say that an otherwise neutral rule discriminates on the basis of sex simply because it affects more members of one sex than of the other. Nor do I think that is what Iacobucci J. suggests in Symes when he talks of a law having “disproportionately” adverse effects upon women or of women being “more likely” to suffer from it than men. The focus, surely, is not on numbers but on the nature of the effect; on quality rather than quantity. If legislation which adversely affects women has the same adverse effect upon men, even though their numbers may be smaller or the likelihood of their suffering be less, it cannot logically be said that the ground of discrimination is sex. This does not mean, of course, that there is no Charter breach, for in such circumstances it is very likely that another ground of discrimination will be in play.” Ibid at 205. [note omitted]
26. Petit Robert, supra note 1.
27. A number of feminists maintain that dichotomous thinking has a patriarchal character, since it establishes hierarchies and offers conceptual support to social and ideological structures that serve to maintain the privileged positions of certain men within the social order. In a masterly work on epistemology, the feminist philosopher Lorraine Code redefines knowledge as inextricably composed of objective and subjective elements in its very nature, in its possibility of realization and in its epistemological justification. To do this, Code criticizes dichotomous thinking because it is purely formal, without reference to the external world, and simplistic in its forced choice between A and non-A. See Code, L., What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), at 27 ffGoogle Scholar. Postmodern theory agrees with feminist theory on this point. See Tong, R., Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1989) at 219 ffGoogle Scholar.
28. According to the so-called “two spheres” doctrine, men and women are equal in their respective field of activity, that of woman being largely confined to the home (hence the idea of the “queen of the home”). These two spheres correspond very closely to the public/private dichotomy, “used in law to define the sphere of personal independence (‘private life’), the sphere of rights and freedoms, an area which in principle eludes the control of the liberal state.” On this subject see generally Boivin, M., “Les acquis du féminisme en droit: reconceptualisation de la représentation des femmes et de leur place dans la société canadienne” (1995) 36 Les Cahiers de droit 28 at 32–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter “Les acquis du féminisme en droit”].
29. Ibid. at 40.
30. Feminist slogan attributed to the American Betty Friedan. See Friedan, B., La femme mystifiée (Paris: Denoël-Gonthier, 1964)Google Scholar.
31. See discussion below. The students at the Polytechnique school were not killed because they were women “and potentially feminists” but because Marc Lépine was insane. This is true even though Lépine had, in his pocket, a list of his victims who were all women and specifically declared that he wanted to kill women who were taking the place of men. Regarding the attack of December 6, 1989, see also Guillaumin, C., “Folie et norme sociale” in Sexe, race et pratique du pouvoir, l'idée de Nature (Paris: Côté-femmes éditions, 1992) at 143–49Google Scholar; also published in (1990) 22 Sociologie et Sociétés at 1Google Scholar.
32. This is what is known in feminist circles as vengeance-equality. It is not a recent phenomenon. Women have always had to suffer these so-called egalitarian measures, in cases where the inconsistency of the legal system should have caused it to collapse under the weight of ridicule and absurdity. During the French Revolution, for example, whose guiding principle was “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, Olympe de Gouges, in her Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne argued that as women were forced to climb the scaffold, they should necessarily also be given the right to vote. The burden of law should be compensated by rights for women. See Article X of the Déclaration des droits de la femme (1791) by Gouze, MarieGoogle Scholar, called Olympe de Gouges. See Sarde, M., Regards sur les Françaises: Xe siècle-XXe siècle (Paris: Stock, 1983) at 527Google Scholar.
33. Susan B. Anthony, who voted illegally, was sentenced to pay a $100 fine. United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Cas. 829 (Circuit Court, N.D. New York, 1873).
34. See in particular R. v. Bain, (1992) 51 O.A.C. 161, p. 216 (S.C.C.), where Gonthier J., citing Sherratt, notes that the “fundamental characteristics” of the jury are “impartiality and representativeness”.
35. Rose v. The Queen, (1972) 19 Criminal Reports 66 at 68-69 (Qc. S.C.). “There is no reason, in the present circumstances, to conclude that women are deprived of their freedom and equality before the law because they have not been called upon to serve as jurors. Such a function is not an essential attribute of the citizen's freedom and equality before the law; it is, rather, a costly responsibility that has not been imposed upon them to date.”[our emphasis]
36. Author's note. There is a play on words here with the French homonyms “pairs” (peers) and “pères” (fathers).
37. Brodsky, G. & Day, S., “Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?”, (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989) at 281–84Google Scholar, where the Table of Sex Equality Decisions clearly shows that of the 44 lawsuits based on section 15 of the Charter in the three years following its adoption, 35 were initiated by men, and only 9 by women. The same is true in the United States. See MacKinnon, C., “Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination” in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 44Google Scholar.
38. Symes, supra at 695.
39. Ibid. at 771. However, the essentials of the problem did not elude Iacobucci J., who also said: “[i]t is difficult to argue that history has not conflated the “needs of businessmen with the needs of business,” as Professor Macklin suggests. Therefore, to the extent that traditional income tax law would classify child care expenses as “personal” simply because such expenses are incurred in order to make the taxpayer “available” to the business—and in the absence of s. 63—it might be correct to assert that the changing composition of the business class and changing social structure demand a reconceptualization”.
40. On this subject, see the exhaustive review of Brownmiller, S., Femininity, (New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984)Google Scholar. We may also point out that the entirely social character of “femininity” poses a problem in the case of lesbians. How do they manage to escape the process of socialization, at least in its aspect of mandatory heterosexuality?
41. Scott, J., “‘Genre’: Une catégorie utile d'analyse historique” (1988) 37/38Les Cahiers du G.R.I.F. 125 at 126Google Scholar. Scott adds: “Gender also emphasized the relational aspect of the normative definitions of femininity […] to introduce a relational concept into our vocabulary of analysis. “[G]ender” was a term proposed by those women who maintained that research on women would fundamentally transform the paradigms within each discipline. Feminist researchers pointed out very early that the study of women would add not only new themes, but would also impose a critical reexamination of the premises and criteria of existing scientific work.” Ibid. [our translation]
42. de Beauvoir, S., Le Deuxième sexe (Paris: Gallimard, Collection Folio/Essais, 1949) [republished in 1976, Vol. I]Google Scholar. [our translation]
43. Scott, supra, note 41 at 140. [our translation]
44. Delphy, C., “Le patriarcat, le féminisme et leurs intellectuelles” (1981) 2 Nouvelles Questions Féministes 59 at 65Google Scholar. [emphasis added] [our translation]
45. MacKinnon, C. A., Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) at xiiiGoogle Scholar.
46. Laqueur, supra, note 22 at 12, and the sources cited there.
47. MacKinnon, supra note 45 at 40 [our emphasis].
48. Thibaudeau, supra note 8 at 205-06. In this passage, Hugessen J.A. also notes: “On the other hand, legislation which imposed a physical test which could more easily be met by most men would have a disproportionate effect on women even if some men failed the test and some women, with difficulty, met it. The test would be qualitatively different even for those women who succeeded and would be vulnerable to attack as discriminatory on the grounds of sex. In each case the impact of the legislation must be weighed; it is not enough simply to count the numbers affected.”
49. Young, C. F. L., “It's All In The Family: Child Support, Tax, and Thibaudeau” (1995) 6:4Forum Constitutionnel 107 at 109Google Scholar. See also Philipps, L. & Young, M., “Sex, Tax and Character: A Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada” (1995) 2 Revue d'études constitutionnelles 221 at 240–47Google Scholar; Zweibel, E., “Thibaudeau v. R.: Constitutional Challenge to the Taxation of Child Support Payments” (1993–1994) N.J.C.L. 305 at 317Google Scholar.
50. Petit Robert, supra note 1, definition of the word “charrue”.
51. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, The Unabridged Edition, (New York: Random House Inc., 1967)Google Scholar.
52. Viau, L., “L'égalité des sexes en droit criminel: un parcours dans fin?” (1996) 1 Revue canadienne de droit pénal 89 at 101 [our translation]Google Scholar.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid at 101-05.
55. On this subject see generally Boivin, M., “La féminisation du discours: le pourquoi” (1997) 9 Revue Femmes et Droit 235 [and the sources cited in that article]Google Scholar.
56. de Beauvoir, supra note 42 at 14-15 [our translation].
57. Ibid.
58. Rousseau, J. J., Émile ou De l'éducation (Paris: Gamier Frères, 1907) at 430–40Google Scholar, cité in Gallant, C., La philosophie…au féminin (Moncton, N.-B.: Éditions d'Acadie, 1984) 37 [our translation]Google Scholar.
59. See the discussion above.
60. See “Medical Science Wrestles with ‘Third Sex’” The Ottawa Citizen (12 April 1997) A5.
61. Thibaudeau, supra note 8 at 204-05.
62. Ibid. at 204.
63. “Smelling a Rat in Medical Research” article taken from The Economist, reproduced in the Globe and Mail (22 March 1993) A7 under the heading “Gender”. The author adds: “This is just one example of the ways in which medical research has been biased by taking the male as typical of the species among humans as well as animals.”
64. Ibid. at A7. “[S]tudies demonstrating ASA's efficacy were conducted almost entirely on men. The animal tests of potential drugs for stroke have mostly been done on male rats, too, and young ones, at that.”
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. See, in particular, Quebec, Premier Rapport de la Commission des droits civils de la femme (Dorion Commission) 6 February 1930 at 9, where we find the following assertion: “[A]gain in the area of private rights, woman, as woman, has the same rights as man, and may exercise them all as man may do. She may not, it is true, be appointed guardian, except of her own children, but this is a quasi-public responsibility, involving the interest of a third party. As far as civil rights strictly speaking are concerned, the law does not remove any from woman because she is woman.” [our translation]
69. Juteau, D. & Laurin, N., “L'évolution des formes de l'appropriation des femmes: des religieuses aux ‘mères porteuses’” (1988) 25:2Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 183 at 190Google Scholar [sources omitted]. The authors add: “By recognizing that the collective appropriation of women precedes their private appropriation, we understand why the lot of women has improved so little. A person does not escape her sex class by eluding private appropriation or by selling her labour force.” Ibid. at 192 [our translation].
70. See generally on this subject, Boivin, M., “L'évolution des droits de la femme au Québec: un survol historique” (1986) 2 RJFD 53 at 55–58Google Scholar.
71. The public/private distinction is used as an intellectual support both for the doctrine of the “two spheres” and for the liberal doctrine of “rights and freedoms”, that escape state control. The liberal state was, originally, the assembly of male heads of families. See, in particular, Dhavernas, O., Droits desfemmes, pouvoir des hommes (Paris: Seuil, 1978) at 341–42Google Scholar. Women and children were represented by the father in the “public” world. State power stopped at the door to the home, where the husband/leader assumed responsibility for maintaining order in the family. To accomplish this, he had two complementary legal tools at his disposal: the wife's legal duty to obey, and the right of punishment that authorized him, in particular, to have his children imprisoned at his request, to have his wife forcibly brought back to the house or to beat her, without however going so far as to kill her.
72. See, in particular, Millet, K., La politique du mâle (Paris: Stock, 1971) at 39Google Scholar: “[P]laying a role of mediator between the individual and the social structure, the family ensures control and compliance where the political and other authorities do not suffice. As fundamental instrument and basic unit of the patriarchal society, the family and its role are prototypes.” [our translation]
73. Dumont, M. et al. , L'histoire des femmes au Québec depuis quatre siécles (Montreal: Le Jour, 1992) at 365Google Scholar [hereinafter Clio Collective].
74. 48 Vict. 1885, c. 32. The employer must also allow one hour for the noon meal, which is not counted in the hours of work. This law applied only to firms with more than 20 employees. Ibid. at 193.
75. The irony of ironies is that at the very moment the family is breaking down and feminists are rejoicing at the fact, other groups that have never been able to enjoy the benefits accruing to those who live as a “couple”—people in common-law relationships, gays and lesbians—are demanding them. See, in particular, Egan, supra note 12 and Miron, supra note 13.
76. She ironically comments:
“[T]hat this inequality stems from the ITA rather than from the family law system might perhaps be more clearly illustrated with a simple hypothetical. Let us suppose that, in a new initiative designed to respond to the high costs of maintaining separate households, the government decided to provide a net subsidy of $1,000 to all separated couples with children in order to help them meet their childrens' [sic] financial needs. Let us further suppose that this $1,000 net subsidy was accomplished by giving $2,000 to the non-custodial spouse and by clawing back $1,000 in tax from the custodial spouse. Finally, let us assume that although the new program provides that the custodial spouse may attempt to claim his or her rightful share of the net subsidy via existing procedures within the family law system, no formal mechanism is implemented to ensure the equal division of these additional benefits and liabilities. Does such a program confer an advantage upon custodial spouses? Does it create an unequal burden or benefit?” Thibodeau, supra note 8 at 654-55.
77. Eichler, M., “Les six péchés capitaux sexistes” Les Cahiers de recherche du GREMF (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1985) 3Google Scholar. These research sins are: over-generalization or under-specification; assuming a natural dualism between the sexes; assuming an identical social reality for the two sexes; assuming a behaviour pattern appropriate to sex; the double standard; and taking things out of context.
78. Thibodeau, supra note 8 at 653. See the scathing dissent of L'Heureux-Dubé J.
79. On this subject in general, see Philipps & Young, supra note 49 at 295-96, where the authors denounce the family ideology that does not give any economic consideration to the (volunteer?) labour of women.
80. Thomas, A., Who can see the “other” in mother? Intertidal Life, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984) at 136Google Scholar.
81. On this subject, see in particular Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly c. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489; Canadien National v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114. These principles, applied in the human rights codes, likewise apply to the interpretation of section 15 of the Charter; see Andrews, supra note 18; Symes, supra note 9.
82. Miron, supra note 13 at 498. [our emphasis]
83. Hawthorne, N., The Scarlet Letter (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. Inc., 1948)Google Scholar. [Novel first published in 1850].
84. Ibid. at 266-67.
85. Art. 188, C.C.L.C
86. Symes, supra note 9 at 522.
87. On this subject, see Boyd, S., “Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? Women, Work and Family” (1996) 15 The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 161Google Scholar.
88. This slogan is generally attributed to the American theoretician Robin Morgan. See Morgan, R., ed., Sisterhood is Global, The International Women's Movement Anthology (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984) at 815Google Scholar.
89. In the words of Mary Two-Axe Early, who led the struggle for equality of indigenous women: “No woman is free until all women are free.” Words reported in the Globe and Mail (29 May 1992) A3. She deplores the fact that less than 2% of “C-31s”—the indigenous women who recovered the status as “Indians” following adoption of Bill C-31 in 1985—have been authorized to return to their community of origin.
90. See, e.g., Lorde, A., Sister Outside (Freedom: The Crossing Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Hooks, B., Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990)Google Scholar; Razack, S., “Beyond Universal Women: Reflections on Theorizing Differences Among Women”, (1996) 45 R.D.U.N.-B. 209Google Scholar.
91. I am borrowing the phrase from the title of an article by the sociologist Juteau-Lee, Danielle, “Visions partielles, visions partiales: Visions (des) minoritaires en sociologie” (1981) 13 Sociologie et Sociétés 33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
92. For Quebec, see Clio Collective, supra note 73 at 466, where the criticisms and explanations are listed.
93. On this subject, see generally Rhode, D. L., “Feminist Critical Theories” (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 617 at 619CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
94. Ibid.
95. Deconstructionists like Derrida, Cixious, Irigaray and Kristeva question the existence of an essence of a being that maintains its unity in time and space, namely a unified and integrated identity, and the essential relationship between language and reality that is called truth, since language and reality are variable and in movement. For a summary of the relationship between feminism and postmodern thought, see Tong, supra note 27 at 217-33.
96. Rhode, supra note 93 at 619. See, for example, the changes that have occurred in the English word “egregious”, which has moved from meaning “prestigious” to meaning “remarkably bad”. The Random House Dictionary, supra note 51.
97. See, for example, Bertrand, M.-A., “Une Théorie post-moderne (sic) du Féminin” (1992) 7 C.J.L.S. 213CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Collin, F., “Praxis de la différence: Notes sur le tragique du sujet” (1992) 46 Les Cahiers du GRIF 125CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Guillaumin, C. “Femmes et théories de la société: Remarques sur les effets théoriques de la colère des opprimées” (1981) 13 Sociologie et Sociétés 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; St-Hilaire, C., “Le féminisme et la nostalgie des grands Récits” (1994) 23 Cahiers de recherche sociologique 79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
98. On this subject generally, see Iyer, supra note 17 at 179-07.
99. See in particular the study of Duclos, N., “Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights Cases” (1993) 6 RFD 25Google Scholar. See also Crenshaw, K., “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Colour”, in Danielson, D. & Engle, K., After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (New York: Routledge, 1995) 57Google Scholar.
100. Iyer, supra note 17 at 185 ff. See in particular Décary J.A.: “On the evidence presented, [the adoption of section 63 I.T.A.] favours women more than men, and the respondent has no complaint about this. I do not see how a provision which favours all women could directly or indirectly infringe the right of women to equality, and I am not prepared to concede that professional women make up a disadvantaged group ….” Symes, supra note 9 at 531.
101. de Beauvoir, supra note 42.
102. Iyer, supra note 17 at 189.
103. Miron, supra note 13 at 498.
104. Ibid.
105. Razack, supra note 90 at 217.
106. To repeat the terms of Gisèle Halimi: “[t]he greatest victory of feminism will be its disappearance, after its goals have been attained.” See Halami, G., Une embellie perdue (Montreal, Gallimard, 1993) at 184Google Scholar. [our translation]
107. On this subject in general, see Brooks, D. L., “A Commentary on the Essence of Anti-essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (1994) 2 Feminist Legal Studies 115CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
108. “[…] the appellant's Charter arguments did not consider the importance of viewing s. 63 as a complete response to child care expenses. I believe that one effect of this approach is that the appellant's arguments were presented in a curious isolation. We were invited to consider the Charter only with respect to self-employed women, and it was suggested to us that a remedy could be granted, without the need to consider the position of other women, other parents, or the government's overall response to child care needs.” Symes supra note 9 at 773.
109. Ibid. at 767-68.
110. Ibid. at 773.
111. On this subject in general, see “Les acquis du féminisme en droit”, supra note 28.