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Patent Law and the Assurance Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Shubha Ghosh
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Extract

Patent law is often understood through the fiction of social contract. The author argues that this fiction does not offer an adequate economic or political theory of patent law, that is, one that will explain the unique relationship between government and property that patents entail. As an alternative to social contract theory, a regulatory theory of patent law is developed based on the assurance game taken from game theory. The assurance game is used to show how patent law serves to regulate the invention process and the market for innovative products.

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Research Article
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Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , July 2005 , pp. 307 - 332
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Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2005

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References

A longer version of this article was published as “Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred,” 19 Berkeley Technology Law Journal (2004), with permission.

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82. See Gordon, supra note 66 at 642.

83. See Eldre d v. Ashcroft, supra note 1 at 192 (stating that perpetual copyright term, and by inference patent term, would violate the limited times provision of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution).

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85. See ibid.

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88. See ibid. at 1027-28.

89. The mathematical derivation works as follows. Under a probabilistic version of the game, there is a fifty per cent chance that the game will be played again and fifty per cent that it will not at each time period. This means that each payoff of the game has to be discounted by the probability that the game will actually be played during a particular time period. Suppose the two players start out reciprocating. Then there will be no need to retaliate and the players will reciprocate forever. The resulting payoff is 5 units discounted by the probability that the game will be played during a given period. The total payoff will be the sum of all of these discounted payoffs, an infinite series. The sum turns out to be 10, as presented in the table. Now suppose that one (or both) of the players fail to reciprocate. Then there will be retaliation forever under the terms of the game so that each play receives 3 discounted by the probability that the game will be plated during a given period, another infinite series. The sums of those infinite series are presented in the table.

90. See Skyrms, Stag Hunt, supra note 62 at 10-13; Skyrms, Social Contract, supra note 62 at 76-79 (discussing evolution of institution of property out of reciprocity described as correlated convention).

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96. Ibid. at 482.

97. Ibid. at 495.

98. Ibid. at 474.

99. See, e.g., Merges, Robert P., “Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis” (1992) 78 Va. L. Rev. 359 at 376-77 (discussing various forms of secrecy).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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101. See, e.g., Macey, Jonathan R., “The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues” (1989) 74 Cornell L. Rev. 923 at 926-27Google Scholar (discussing market integrity); Fukuyama, Francis, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995) at 23–32.Google Scholar

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105. See ibid. at 105-09; Bergstrom, supra note 62 at 83-84.

106. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, “Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools” in Expanding the Boundaries, supra note 57, 123 at 133-35.

107. See Jerome H. Reichman, “Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Inventions” in Expanding the Boundaries, supra note 57 at 25-29; Petra Moser, “How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation?: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs,” Working Paper 9909, National Bureau of Economic Research (August 2003).

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114. See discussion in Lessig, Lawrence, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (New York: Penguin Press, 2004) at 213–48 (analyzing litigation strategy in Eldred and discussing failure to argue case in terms of actual harms created by the legislation).Google Scholar

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117. For a discussion of the administrative complexities of patent law, particularly with respect to the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, see Nard, Craig Allen, “Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts” (1995) 56 Ohio State L. J. 1415 at 1419-25Google Scholar. Professor Orin Kerr is critical of Professor Nard’s administrative view of patent law. See Kerr, Orin S., “Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State” (2000) 42 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 127 at 134 (presenting a purely private law model of patent law that ex Pressly describes patents as a contract).Google Scholar

118. See Rubin, supra note 4 and accompanying discussion in text.

119. See ibid.

120. For a survey of the literature and caselaw, see Tom, Willard K. & Newberg, Joshua A., “U.S. Enforcement Approaches to the Antitrust-Intellectual Property Interface” in Anderson, Robert D. & Gallini, Nancy T., eds., Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy(Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1998) 343 Google Scholar; Carrier, Michael A., “Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox” (2002) 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 at 807-15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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122. See Gathii, supra note 112; Ghosh, Shubha, “Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights” (2001) 53 Fla. L. Rev. 789 at 799-802.Google Scholar

123. See Gathii, supra note 112.

124. See Merges, supra note 116.

125. See Rai, Arti K., “Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform” (2003) 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1035 at 1122-27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lemley, Mark A., “Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office” (2001) 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495.Google Scholar

126. See Rai, supra note 125 at 1040-41; Ghosh, Shubha & Kesan, Jay, “What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office” (2004) 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1219 at 1250-51.Google Scholar

127. See, for an analogous discussion, Kieff, F. Scott, “The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Patent-Obtaining Rules” (2003) 45 Boston C. L. Rev. 55.Google Scholar

128. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 126 at 1248 for further discussion.

129. For an overview, see Bagley, Margo A., “Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law” (2003) 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469 at 473-77.Google ScholarPubMed

130. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

131. See, e.g.,Greenpeace, Ltd. v. Plant Genetic Systems N.V. et al., 28 IIC 75 (1997).

132. Professor Bagley argues against such decoupling. See Bagley, supra note 129 at 516.

133. See Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 at 347-48 (1880) (Court stating that patent law did not displace police power). For a discussion of the relationship between intellectual property and the police power, see Ghosh, ibid. at 402-03.

134. The analysis of this problem under the prisoner’s dilemma rests on how non-cooperation is framed. If patents are viewed as an exception to the police power or competition law, then extending patenting to certain subject matter may provide a means to escape regulatory schemes. Within the United States, however, it is clear that patents do not provide a safe harbor from the exercise of the police power. See discussion in Webber, supra note 133.

135. See Ho, Cynthia M., “Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men”(2000) 2 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y, 247 at 248 (stating that seekers of patent were planning to re Press the invention).Google Scholar

136. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,467 U.S. 986 (1984).

137. To put this another way, the grant of a patent creates a legal interest that can be regulated just like property can be regulated. For a discussion of how law creates regulable interests, see Scott, James C., Seeing Like A State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998) at 53–84.Google Scholar

138. See, e.g., McSherry, supra note 60; Krimsky, supra note 60.

139. For a discussion of patent law’s relationship to non-commercial activities, see Strandburg, Katherine J., “What Does The Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain” 2004 Wisc. L. Rev. 81 at 135-38Google Scholar. Bagley, supra note 129; Rai, Arti K., “Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science” (1999) 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 at 81-88.Google Scholar

140. Lindbloom, Charles, The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001) at 258–64.Google Scholar

141. See ibid. at 271.

142. See Kaufer, supra note 63 at 2-3.

143. Statute of Monopolies, 21 James I, ch.3 (1623).

144. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 69 at 35-36 (pointing out the central role of the state in the system of intellectual property in contrast with real property).

145. For a criticism of the reward theory of patent, see Abramowicz, Michael, “Perfecting Patent Prizes” (2003) 56 Vand. L. Rev. 115 at 127-58.Google Scholar

146. See Kaufer, supra note 63 at 1-2.

147. See Lindbloom, supra note 140 at 117-19.

148. See ibid. at 118.

149. See Allison, John R. & Tiller, Emerson H., “The Business Method Patent Myth” (2003) 18 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 987 at 1079 (describing how the nonobviousness requirement has become more slack).Google Scholar

150. See ibid. at 1078 (discussing subjectivity of patent granting process).

151. See Lindbloom, supra note 140 at 207-08.

152. See ibid. at 226-27.

153. See ibid. at 102-06.

154. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 149 at 1078.

155. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 at 150 (1989) (Court explaining how novelty and non-obviousness criteria in tandem further values of competition and exploitation of public domain knowledge).

156. See Lindbloom, supra note 140 at 262-63.

157. See discussion found in essay, supra note 108.

158. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between scientific discovery and democracy, see Kitcher, Philip, Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 114–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar