Canadians never tire, and never will tire so long as they are Canadians, of considering the influence of the United States on their economic, political, and social structure. For many years past the United States has been the most important external influence on Canada. Since the war, it has become so much the predominant external influence that the traditional Canadian practice of balancing between the influence of Britain and the United States is no longer an effective procedure. Certainly in the economic sphere the United States constitutes the only real threat to Canadian independence and it will remain our chief economic preoccupation as far ahead as one can see.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some aspects of the economic side of the relationship between the United States and Canada. In so doing I shall attempt to outline some of the main facts with emphasis on the changes which have occurred since before the war and to offer a few reflections on the meaning of these facts in terms of Canadian interests and Canadian policies.

Even the briefest examination of the facts makes it clear that our ties with the American economy have become closer and more important during the past decade than ever before. Today 60 per cent of our commodity exports go to the United States compared with less than 40 per cent before the war. Almost three-quarters of our commodity imports come from the United States compared with less than two-thirds before the war. Though foreign trade in total has been playing a gradually decreasing part in our national economic life, our business with the United States occupies just as large a part in Canadian activity as it did in most pre-war years. Canadian exports of goods and services to the United States in 1955 were equivalent to about 14 per cent of the national production, and Canadian imports of goods and services from the United States to about 18 per cent.

I doubt very much if I can effectively shovel any more platitudes on the huge heap of them that have been piled on Canadian-American relations in the past. I will, however, do my best to produce a few more. I have been lured on to this platform by nothing more worthy than personal vanity, and, since accepting the invitation, I have been regretting my weakness. There is nothing I can add to this subject that has not been said, in one or another form, a score, a hundred times, before. Yet here I am, pretending to have a thesis, and I suppose I had better produce one.

What I have to say, such as it is, is addressed to persons my own age or older, and I was 59 last April. Younger persons, or most of them, will wonder what all the shouting is about—if there is any shouting; and I would suggest to the programme committee of this association that they might consider having a repetition of this paper next year, or the year after, read to them by somebody who is 29, and not 59 years of age. The effect, at least on the older members, might be salutary and perhaps even startling.

The reason why I make this suggestion is that I was brought up in an old school, a school which thought about Canadian-American relations in a context very different from that which has become necessary now. It was a school in which one of the great teachers was John W. Dafoe, who was my master for 20 years and whose memory I will honour for whatever years are left to me. But the cardinal thesis of that school was that, at all costs, Canada had to fight its way out from under the traditional influence of British imperialist and colonial rule; and that one of the best ways of doing it was to use the influence of the United States as a counter-balance against the pressure from Westminster.

In any study of Canadian industry today, words such as growth and development quickly come into their own. The very scope and rapidity of the changes have introduced a new pace which in many ways is unique. Some of the reasons are not hard to trace. Once growth reaches a certain stage it seems to accumulate momentum. The proximity of Canada to the United States and her access to the industrial technology of that country have also contributed greatly.

A large measure of the expansion of Canadian industry has been the result of extensions of United States corporate activity into Canada through the establishment or development of branches and subsidiaries. In this manner, United States industrial technology, supported by abundant sources of financing in that country, has speeded and extended the process of Canadian development. And important parts of the growth which provide sources of supply for United States industry are in turn closely linking Canadian growth to growth in the United States economy. Participation by British and European enterprise and industry to a greater degree than formerly should also be noted, although it is much smaller in scale than the parts sponsored by United States industry. The pace of development would have been much slower had there not been this borrowing of non-resident resources both technological and financial. In the past half-dozen years or so, over half the increase in investment in Canadian industry has been owned by non-residents. That suggests the degree of financial assistance. It would be very difficult to evaluate the borrowing of technology but in some industries it has been very great and has provided the indispensable “know-how” without which ventures would carry much greater risks. Most of this increased investment has taken the form of equity ownership and control which carries with it potential claims to participate in subsequent growth in the rapidly developing, commodity-producing industries—manufacturing and mineral production.

When I was invited to present a paper on “Problems of Public Administration in International Organizations” I readily accepted as I am a firm believer in the efficacy of public discussion of important issues. Ordinarily, the selection of a topic in this broad field would offer unlimited choice, but taking into account recent changes in the international political scene, there was no doubt in my mind about the subject on which I should speak.

Anyone associated with the activities of international organizations over the past ten years has inevitably been impressed by the intense desire of the poorer countries for improved standards of living through accelerated economic development. Equally impressive has been the substantial response of the more advanced countries.

Reflecting their mutual interest in achieving social progress and economic development, and acting in fulfilment of article 55 of the United Nations Charter, governments of most advanced countries (outside the Soviet sphere) increased the flow of bilateral aid in the early post-war period and at the same time joined in establishing a number of new international agencies and programmes for economic development. In the time at my disposal today I will not attempt to describe in detail the different concepts underlying each of these programmes. But it will give some indication of their objectives and scope if I mention the large amounts of bilateral aid now being provided by the United States through the International Cooperation Administration and by Canada and other Commonwealth countries under the Colombo Plan. At the same time international organizations have increased their programmes substantially. Loans extended by the International Bank since the war now exceed $2½ billion.

The increasing importance of institutional investors in the provision of private and public long-term credit has focused the attention of economists on the activities of these investors in the saving-investment process in the economy. Institutions have become crucial factors in the determination of the nature and the extent of the expansion that takes place in industry and business, and of the nature and extent of credit supplied, including the relationship between equity and debt in the capital structure of corporations. In addition, they are important suppliers of public credit, particularly in time of heavy government borrowing, as in wartime. Also, from the point of view of government policy, they are important in determining the nature and types of credit controls needed in inflation and deflation.

The life insurance companies merit particular attention not only because of the size but also because of the nature of the funds under their administration. Their funds, amounting to some $6 billion, represent almost 50 per cent of institutional funds, excluding those administered by the banks. The assets of these funds comprise approximately 20 per cent of the total long-term public and private debt, including mortgages, in Canada. In contrast to other institutions, life companies acquire their funds as the result of contractual saving on the part of millions of policyholders. Thus their funds exhibit, and will continue to exhibit, a sustained growth. Since they are the result of personal saving, the income arising from their investment is important to a large segment of the economy, and the way in which they are invested is important for the nation as a whole.

In many countries of the Western Hemisphere the nineteenth century witnessed the gradual expansion of the franchise. This development was made possible in the English-speaking world by the fact that the political creed of the power élite—liberalism—created a climate of opinion favourable to a belief in the inevitability of progress and the perfectability of man. The decision about who was to govern, and in general terms the way in which government was to be carried out, was to be made by the majority of the adult population. The necessity of deciding such important matters would, it was thought, induce the voters to rise to the occasion demanded by their new responsibilities: they would, on the whole, become politically educated, informed, and wise. In casting their ballots men were expected to bear in mind the public good, not private gain. John Stuart Mill, for example, in opposing the secret ballot, argued that a person's vote

is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly a matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good. Whoever has any other idea of it is unfit to have the suffrage; its effect on him is to pervert not to elevate his mind. Instead of opening his heart to an exalted patriotism and the obligation of public duty, it awakens and nourishes in him the disposition to use a public function for his own interest, pleasure, or caprice. … In any political election … the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his private advantage.…

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to place within the context of Canadian historical development an economic institution that has been relatively neglected. This institution is the customs administration. The justification for introducing it into the main stream of Canadian history is to be found in its ubiquity and pervasiveness, its antiquity and traditionalism, and its consequent conservatism and resistance to change. Such an institution seems capable of providing a strong element of continuity in Canadian development, and thus to invite analysis.

The English customs administration was transplanted from a European island economy to a continental environment which contained elements markedly unfavourable to easy transition and adaptation. The administration has been called upon to meet constantly changing conditions, and, in so doing, has had to deal with a commercial community which must exist, for the greater part, on the basis of short-run decisions. As the administration has struggled toward long-run stability and uniformity of procedure, it has produced anomalies. It has had serious effects on business expectations by creating delay and uncertainty, and, on occasion, by insisting on excessive formality. The incidence of the burden imposed by the customs administration was probably not determinable, but its net effect has been to contract international trade.

The customs is of ancient origin, and by the time it became relevant to Canadian history it had already undergone, in Europe, a great deal of scleriasis. It is the English customs that we are to be concerned with mostly in this analysis, since the Canadian customs, not surprisingly, is of pretty strictly Anglo-Saxon origin. According to Professor Gras, “the English Customs originated at home, on the initiative of the king, through prerogative right, and in money dues rather than prises.”

On February 21, 1951, in reply to a question in the House of Commons which rather pointedly raised the issue of the Government's attitude and intentions with regard to more direct “bargaining” with the staff associations, the Prime Minister stated: “From the very nature of employment in the public service, there can be no bargaining agent for the nation comparable with the employer in industry who has at his disposal funds derived from payments for goods or services. The funds from which salaries are paid in the public service have to be voted by parliament and parliament alone can discharge that responsibility.” Having presented this formal position with its hint of the “sovereign employer” theory, Mr. St. Laurent went on to say that the Government was not contemplating any steps to provide its employees with the same facilities for negotiation as are provided for private employees “… because it is considered that the appropriate machinery for these purposes was set up by P.C. 3676 of May 16, 1944, which established the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada, and the subsequent Treasury Board Minute of March 8, 1945, approving the constitution of the Council.” The latter part of the Prime Minister's statement provides the text for this paper. What is the National Joint Council? How has it worked out in practice? To what extent does it provide an acceptable alternative to collective bargaining?

Increasingly in the last few years, and more particularly in recent months, the effectiveness of compulsory government-sponsored conciliation in labour disputes has been called into question. Unions and employers alike have begun to ask not only whether the delays required by Canadian law make a worth-while positive contribution to the settlement of disputes, but whether in some cases they do not actually impede the reaching of a settlement.

In the midst of this debate it is of interest to recall that the principle of compulsory delay and conciliation has had a prominent and generally respected place in Canadian labour law for fifty years. The original Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 introduced the then revolutionary idea that an enforced waiting-period, accompanied by investigation, would so modify the perspective of the parties in a labour dispute that many stoppages of work would be avoided; and this principle has stood virtually unaltered in Canadian law ever since. The significant changes which have taken place since 1907 have been in the application of the principle rather than in the principle itself. As Professor Woods pointed out to this Association last spring, the use of compulsory conciliation and delay, originally meant to encompass all types of dispute, has come to be limited to one of the four main types, namely, negotiation disputes. At the same time, the range of industry in which the principle is being applied has been greatly extended. In the original I.D.I. Act, it was applied compulsorily only to industries held to possess the character of a public utility; it was applied to other industries only when desired by both parties.

Radio's pre-eminent position as a medium of news is one factor often mentioned as tending to ensure its continuing vitality. There are indeed no reasons for questioning radio's present advantages in that field. First among these, though perhaps only temporarily, is the elementary fact that radio, as compared with television, enjoys nearly universal coverage. Well over 95 per cent of all households in Canada have radios but not quite 50 per cent have television. Moreover, radio has a certain flexibility in reporting news. It can provide up-to-the-minute bulletins more frequently and more quickly than the newspaper, and it can be set up for on-the-spot coverage where access via television would be much more difficult, costly, and time-consuming. The greater flexibility of radio also stems from the way it is used: newscasters do not have to choose between news value and picture value when covering or selecting a story. Finally, there is the great advantage over print that radio shares with television: the listener is given less opportunity to evade the actual content of the news than the newspaper reader, who is free to ignore items dealing with “serious” news if these fail to interest him. Furthermore, the amount of attention given to items in radio news bulletins, even if exposure is casual and non-deliberate, is determined more by the presentation than by the dispositions of the listeners.