What Mr. King said and did about parliamentary government constitutes his most important and distinctive contribution to the development of our constitution, and to Canadian political ideas. This is partly because parliamentary government is the very essence of our constitution; partly because Mr. King had an enormous amount to say about it, and an unrivalled opportunity to put his ideas into practice; and partly because this is the one field in which his ideas were completely original.

This is notably true of his theory of the Crown. Two facts about it are unmistakable. First, he did not believe in the “rubber stamp” theory. In the 1926 crisis, he said three times, once in the House of Commons and twice in his opening campaign speech, that there would be circumstances in which the Crown would be justified in refusing dissolution. He also said, before the vote on the Robb motion, that if Mr. Meighen's Government were defeated, and did not resign, the Governor-General should dismiss it, and he himself would take responsibility for the dismissal. This is about as far from the “rubber stamp” theory as anybody could get. Second, except in its remoteness from the “rubber stamp” theory, Mr. King's theory was startlingly different from the received doctrine of British parliamentary government. A single example will dispel any doubts. If there is one firmly established point in British constitutional practice, it is that a retiring Prime Minister has no right even to offer advice as to his successor, let alone have it accepted.

It is apparent to the most casual observer that Guatemala possesses natural advantages which, if properly utilized, should make it possible for the Republic to achieve a relatively favourable position among the nations of the Americas both in living standards and in economic stability. Yet development down to the middle of this century has barely scratched the surface of these latent possibilities.

Behind this paradox lies the unusual nature of Guatemala's endowment. Geological history has given this mountainous, tropical country extremely fertile volcanic soils and a range of altitudes which offers a wide variety of climates. Yet, by the same token, the rugged and broken topography has hampered transportation and communication and created such obstacles to all types of development that potentially productive areas still remain virtually inaccessible. These same factors tend to perpetuate the cultural isolation which continues to characterize large segments of the rural population of the Republic.

There are, of course, many other problems besides transportation and communications. For example, the Pacific coastal plain–the most promising agricultural area in Guatemala–will remain largely unproductive until its malaria and other debilitating diseases have been conquered. In a population predominantly rural settlement tends, at present, to be concentrated in the central and western highlands where a large Indian population cultivates marginal land on a subsistence basis, while more productive agricultural areas frequently lack labour.

Adequate descriptive accounts of the Newfoundland fisheries have more than once been given, and it would be superfluous to attempt another within the limits of this note. Only a few of the essential features of the industry need be called to mind as background to a more analytical discussion of its problems and prospects.

Newfoundland and codfish have been almost synonymous terms for 450 years, ever since John Cabot brought back to Europe his reports of the teeming fish in the vicinity of the island. Although with the passing years other fisheries have been developed, especially herring, lobster, salmon, seal, and whale, the cod fishery remains by far the most important branch. The other fisheries, although in the aggregate important, are still subsidiary and for the most part are followed by men who are cod fishermen as well.

The economic importance of the fisheries derives chiefly from the fact that together they form an industry which easily takes the lead in giving employment. It may even now be true that a majority (although not a large one) of the population depends either directly or indirectly upon the fisheries for its main source of livelihood. Over the long run, the number of fishermen seems to be decreasing. In 1935 the number was about the same as in 1891, and shows a considerable decline from the numbers engaged in the intervening census years. During and since the recent war there has been considerable fluctuation in the numbers of fishermen, but there appear to be somewhat fewer today than in 1935.

Apart from the voluminous literature on pragmatic issues of employment policy written after the appearance of J. M. Keynes's General Theory, relatively few authors have probed the conceptual foundations of unemployment theories. The object of this essay is to review or reinterpret the main analytical systems that have been used in attempts to explain unemployment, to discuss their relevance to reality, and to suggest an alternative model.

Consistency as an Optimum Property of Classical General Equilibrium Systems. Classical general equilibrium theory, in particular Pareto's system, may be interpreted in two ways: either in the sense that once the equilibrium values of the variables are realized, the economic system will remain stationary as long as the parameters of the equations remain unchanged; or, and this applies to Pareto more than to Walras, in the sense that the equilibrium values, in a certain competitive framework, represent an “optimum” situation, any deviation from which involves a welfare-loss.

The set of equilibrium prices and quantities is the solution of a system of equations implicitly assumed to be consistent. The equilibrium values are in fact those that render mutually compatible the results of the maximizing behaviour of individuals, given the psychological and technological parameters and the initial distribution of assets. In order to yield an equilibrium solution, a system of equations must be consistent. But, although consistency is necessary for an optimum solution, it is not sufficient.

The phrase “Progress and Poverty” in this title is borrowed from Henry George, but in this paper it is applied to a geographic paradox much broader than the one the famous single-taxer had in mind. For Henry George the principles implicit in the expression were universal; but the paradox of the inevitable survival of poverty in spite of economic progress existed within the limits of each nation or even of its smallest community. Progress and poverty as Henry George saw them were ubiquitous and inseparable companions. The progress and poverty referred to in the present paper are, it is true, inseparable companions in history; but the contrast is not between classes within one country or region, but, more generally, between different countries, between different regions of the world.

As for the disequilibrium mentioned in this title, it is broader than that about which so much has been written recently and which is sometimes referred to as “the Dollar Problem.” The condition referred to here is not merely a condition of the present day; it is very old. It embraces the dollar problem and many others. It is not exclusively economic but has implications of equal importance for political and social life. It is the disequilibrium which arises from the persistent disparity in rates of technological progress between different areas or regions of the world.

Since well before the turn of this century economists have been attempting to explain the phenomena associated with pricing in the transportation industry. Of recent years this subject has received both descriptive and prescriptive treatment at the hands of welfare economists. In the course of this paper it will be argued that the current descriptive theory is based upon a fundamental misconception of the nature of transportation output and that, in consequence, the policy prescriptions, even when they are right, are usually right for the wrong reasons.

As a starting point it will be useful to recall a controversy which began with a journal article, written some sixty years ago, in which Professor Taussig was endeavouring to show that railway rates could be fitted within the framework of general price theory. He argued that the wide differentials which were apparent in the railways' charges for their services could be explained by the preponderant influence of joint costs. If this were true, the rates charged for output A would be the consequence of passive adjustments in price to changes in the output of B in response to changes in demand for the latter product. Actually Taussig argued that the commodities transported (e.g., coal and copper) were sold to different consumers and should be treated as different products. Many years later the criticisms of Professor Pigou precipitated a lengthy debate over the validity of the joint cost doctrine, Pigou contending that railway output was homogeneous and measurable in units of ton-miles.

In the Spring of 1951, after more than three years of planning, the organized leadership of the Canadian co-operative movement made a determined effort to persuade the Government of Canada to support before Parliament a bill to incorporate a national co-operative credit society–a national co-operative central bank. While this attempt did not succeed, the co-operative leaders, far from abandoning the proposal, intensified their efforts to secure this incorporation, and a campaign is being conducted throughout the country. In this article an examination will be made of the central co-operative credit societies now existing in the different provinces of Canada; their economic function will be considered and elements of strength and weakness found in them will be analysed. While the emphasis will centre on the provincial units, certain observations on the proposed national co-operative credit society will also be made.

The principles of co-operative banking can be derived from observation of existing institutions. During the 1930's well-developed systems of co-operative credit were operating in almost every civilized country in the world. While these banking systems professed a certain similarity of purpose, embracing such characteristics as non-profit operation, low interest rates to borrowers, the accumulation of funds for the development of co-operatives, and the like, they exhibited a wide variety of organizational structures. Some of these societies served only co-operatives, while others dealt with the general public; some served only credit societies, others all types of co-operatives; some were primarily systems of agricultural credit, while others served urban tradesmen and producers; some operated under the aegis of the state while others were independent of state aid; some practised open membership, while others accepted as members only certain racial or religious segments of the population. Thus the problem of classification of co-operative banking systems is a difficult one.