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RUSSIA'S 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2021

William PARTLETT
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Abstract

This article will place the 2020 amendments to the Russian Constitution in comparative perspective. Although these amendments were officially justified as strengthening the Russian state in order to tackle emerging new problems, they constitutionalise already-existing legislative trends from the last twenty years. They therefore do little to overcome existing problems of Russian state building. What was the reform process about then? It was intended to project the image of reform by involving the people in a staged process of constitutional change while further entrenching the power of the current political elite. The constitutional reforms therefore demonstrate the symbolic role that constitutional law can play in seeking to ensure the survival of mature or later-stage forms of authoritarian populism. This kind of ‘theatrical constitution-making’ is a broader reminder of how the expressive aspects of constitutional change can be (ab)used by established authoritarian regimes.

Keywords

RussiaConstitutionAmendments 2020Populism
Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 23 , December 2021 , pp. 311 - 342
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

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Footnotes

*

Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School

References

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2 See, for example, Chapters 1 and 2, Russian Constitution. Amended text available (in Russian) at http://kremlin.ru/acts/constitution. There is currently no English-language translation of the amended Constitution. The pre-amendment text that includes the text of Chapters 1 and 2 can be found at: Constitute, ‘Russian Federation 1993 (rev 2014)’, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Russia_2014?lang=en. See also Partlett, W and Krasnov, M, ‘Russia's Non-Transformative Constitutional Founding’ (2019) 15(4) European Constitutional Law Review 644CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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24 Brubaker, note 14 above; D Landau, ‘Personalism and the Trajectories of Populist Constitutions’ (2020) 16 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 13.1 (arguing how scholars have generally converged on a ‘thin’ definition that describes a number of populism's unifying characteristics); C Bickerton and C Accetti, Technopopulism: The New Logic of Democratic Politics (Oxford University Press, 2020) (describing how populism often rejects ideology altogether as leaders seek to represent the whole people).

25 D Landau, ‘Populist Constitutions’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 521.

26 Ibid, pp 360–61. See also J Mansbridge and S Macedo, ‘Populism and Democratic Theory’ (2019) 15 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 59, pp 59–77. C Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’ (2004) 39(4) Government and Opposition 542, p 543 (describing populism as the struggle between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’).

27 Brubaker, note 14 above.

28 Ibid, pp 365–66.

29 Jan-Werner Mueller, ‘Populism and Constitutionalism’ in C R Kaltwasser, P Taggart, P O Espejo and P Ostiguy (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp 597–98.

30 Brubaker, note 14 above, p 365.

31 K Scheppelle, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 The University of Chicago Law Review 545 (discussing how leaders in both Hungary and Poland consolidated centralised power in party by eliminating independent courts through a process of stacking courts with loyal judges).

32 Brubaker, note 14 above, p 366.

33 F Fabbrini and A Sajo, ‘The Dangers of Constitutional Identity’ (2019) 25 European Law Journal 457.

34 N Chronowski, M Varju, P Bárd, and G Sulyok, ‘Hungary: Constitutional (R)evolution or Regression?’ in A Albi and S Bardutzky (eds), National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (TMC Asser Press, 2019).

35 Brubaker, note 14 above, p 365.

36 W Partlett, ‘The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making’ (2012) 38 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 193 (relying on a particular conception of constituent power).

37 L March, ‘Populism in the Former Soviet States’ in C R Kaltwasser, P Taggart, P O Espejo, and P Ostiguy (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp 222–24 (describing President Lukashenko as the most consistent populist in the former Soviet republics).

38 Brubaker, note 14 above, pp 364–65.

39 See, for example, Hungarian Constitution, Preamble and Article L (describing the importance of Hungary's ‘historical constitution’ grounded in Christianity as well as that marriage is the ‘union of man and a woman’). In Poland, the government has signed a law making it a crime to suggest that Poland was complicit in any war crimes. U Belavusau and A Wójcik, ‘Polish Memory Law: When History Becomes a Source of Mistrust’ (New Eastern Europe, 19 February 2018), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/02/19/polish-memory-law-history-becomes-source-mistrust.

40 Article L, Hungarian Constitution 2011.

41 N W Barber, Principles of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2018).

42 W Partlett and Z Nwokora, ‘The Foundations of Democratic Dualism: Why Constitutional Politics and Ordinary Politics Are Different’ (2019) 26 Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 177.

43 N Robinson and S Milne, ‘Populism and Political Development in Hybrid Regimes: Russia and the Development of Official Populism’ (2017) 38(4) International Political Science Review 412.

44 L Aron, ‘Yeltsin Russia's Rogue Populist’ (Washington Post, 3 June 1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/06/03/yeltsin-russias-rogue-populist/043c753b-5b20-40b0-9838-3d8881218228.

45 March, note 37 above, p 222.

46 Ibid.

47 D Remnick, ‘Yeltsin Sworn in as Russian President’ (Washington Post, 11 July 1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/07/11/yeltsin-sworn-in-as-russian-president/533c96df-a858-44a7-8827-eab25130a551.

48 M C Walker, The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp 83–85.

49 Partlett and Krasnov, note 2 above, pp 644–67.

50 W Partlett, ‘Crown-Presidentialism’ (2022) International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming).

51 Partlett and Krasnov, note 2 above.

52 T Burrett, ‘Charting Putin's Shifting Populism in the Russian Media from 2000 to 2020’ (2020) 8 Politics & Governance 193, p 196.

53 C Bickerton and C Accetti, Technopopulism: The New Logic of Democratic Politics (Oxford University Press, 2020) (describing how populism rejects partisan democratic dialogue and instead sees the leader as representing the whole people and solving their problems); S Hanson, ‘Instrumental Democracy: The End of Ideology and the Decline of Russian Political Parties’ in V L Hesli and W M Reisinger (eds), The 1999–2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp 163–85. See also M Maruelle, ‘Putin's Regime and the Ideological Market: A Difficult Balancing Game’ (Carnegie Institution White Paper, 16 March 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/putin-s-regime-and-ideological-market-difficult-balancing-game-pub-68250.

54 C Mudde and C R Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’ in M Freeden and M Stears (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp 495–98 (describing authoritarian populism as a distinct type of populism linked to right wing movements); B Bugaric, ‘Central Europe's Descent into Autocracy: A Constitutional Analysis of Authoritarian Populism’ (2019) 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law 592; B Bugaric, ‘The Two Faces of Populism: Between Authoritarian and Democratic Populism’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 390.

55 Bickerton and Accetti, note 53 above.

56 D Trenin, ‘Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West’ (Carnegie Endowment, 1 March 2007), https://carnegieendowment.org/2007/03/01/russia-redefines-itself-and-its-relations-with-west/3lz.

57 M Laruelle, ‘Putin's Regime and the Ideological Market: A Difficult Balancing Game’ (Carnegie Task Force White Paper, 16 March 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/putin-s-regime-and-ideological-market-difficult-balancing-game-pub-68250.

58 J Lassila, ‘Aleksei Naval'nyi and Populist Re-ordering of Putin's Stability’ (2016) 68(1) Europe-Asia Studies 118.

59 Ibid.

60 ‘Two Higher School of Economics Professors Explain How the Russian Constitution Keeps Democratisation Hopes Alive’ (Meduza, 6 December 2018), https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/12/06/two-higher-school-of-economics-professors-explain-how-the-russian-constitution-keeps-democratisation-hopes-alive. Based on an interview that can be found here: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/12/05/78819-dni-konstitutsii.

61 E Ferris, ‘There's More to Russia Than Putin’ (Foreign Policy, 6 August 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/06/theres-more-to-russia-than-putin.

62 W Partlett, ‘Putin's Artful Jurisprudence’ (The National Interest, 2 January 2013), https://nationalinterest.org/article/putins-artful-jurisprudence-7882?nopaging=1 (explaining how Putin has used legal changes to weaken two key parts of the elite: regional leaders and wealthy oligarchs).

63 ‘Putin Criminalizes Rehabilitation of Nazism’ (Russian Legal Information Agency, 5 May 2014), http://www.rapsinews.com/legislation/20140505/271257417.html.

64 A Pertsev and M Solopov, ‘What Putin Reads’ (Meduza, 17 July 2020), https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/07/17/what-putin-reads (describing how the Kremlin invests heavily in polling to understand and shape popular opinion).

65 S Wengle and C Evans, ‘Symbolic State-Building in Contemporary Russia’ (2018) 34(6) Post-Soviet Affairs 384, p 388.

66 Yudin, note 15 above (arguing that polls showing the personal support for Vladimir Putin are critical to regime legitimacy); Frye, Gehlbachb, Marquardt and Reuterd, note 15 above (arguing that Putin's personal approval ratings are a critical ‘source of legitimacy for the President and his regime); see also Surkov, note 16 above (describing Putinism as grounded on the trust relationship between the president and the people).

67 Barber, note 41 above.

68 M JC Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd ed (Liberty Fund, 1998), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vile-constitutionalism-and-the-separation-of-powers.

69 Barber, note 41 above.

70 Vile, note 68 above, pp 1–3; Barber, note 42 above.

71 W Partlett, ‘Separation of Powers Without Checks and Balances’ in W Simons and T Borisova (eds), The Legal Dimension in Cold War Interactions: Some Notes From the Field (Brill, 2012).

72 Partlett, note 50 above.

73 Article 10, Russian Constitution.

74 Partlett, note 50 above.

75 E V Gritsenko, ‘Federalism and Local Self-Government in the Light of the Russian Constitutional Reform of 2020’ in Aziz Ismatov, Kaoru Obata, and Herbert Küpper (eds), Dynamics of Contemporary Constitutionalism in Eurasia: Local Legacies and Global Trends (forthcoming 2021).

76 M Hyde, ‘Putin's Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia’ (2001) 53(5) Europe-Asia Studies 719.

77 M Krasnov, ‘The Legislative Powers of the Russian President: A Necessity or Servility?’ (2011) 83(4) Comparative Constitutional Review 1, p 9 (in Russian).

78 Federal Law No 131-FZ of 6 October 2003 ‘On the General Principles of the Organisation of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation’.

79 Decision of the Constitutional Court No 33-P of 18 July 2018.

80 R V Babun, ‘Local Self-Government in Russia. A New Stage of Municipal Development’ (2018) 60(8–9) Problems of Economic Transition 624.

81 I Busygina, M Filippov, and E Taukebaeva, ‘To Decentralize or to Continue on the Centralization Track: The Cases of Authoritarian Regimes in Russia and Kazakhstan’ (2018) 9 Journal of Eurasian Studies 61, p 62.

82 W E Pomeranz and K Smith, ‘Commentary: Putin's Domestic Strategy: Counting the Trees, Missing the Forest’ (Reuters, 31 May 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-domestic-commentary-idUSKCN0YM08V.

83 F Burkhardt, ‘Institutionalizing Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia's Presidential Administration’ (2021) 73(3) Europe-Asia Studies 472.

84 I Krastev, ‘Putin's New Orchestra’ (NY Times, 27 January 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/opinion/putin-government-change.html (arguing that ‘[b]y constraining the powers of the president, empowering Parliament, and making himself the ultimate power center beyond the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin would create institutional competition that is not now present’).

85 Putin speech to the Federal Assembly, note 6 above.

86 Article 112.3, Russian Constitution (amended version).

87 Article 83(d1), Russian Constitution (amended version).

88 Articles 113, 83(b), Russian Constitution (amended version) (respectively).

89 Article 80.2, Russian Constitution (amended version).

90 Article 83(e3), Russian Constitution (amended version).

91 Article 83(e1), Russian Constitution (amended version).

92 Putin speech to the Federal Assembly, note 6 above.

93 Article 83, Russian Constitution (amended version).

94 Article 95(2), Russian Constitution (amended version).

95 Article 107.3, Russian Constitution (amended version).

96 See, for example, Article 71(g), (m), (t) Russian Constitution (amended version)

97 Article 80(2) Russian Constitution (amended version)

98 Article 132(1) Constitution RF (amended version)

99 O Van Cranenburgh, ‘Big Men Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type, and Democracy in 30 African Countries’ (2008) 15 Democratization 952; S Rose-Ackerman, D A Desierto, and N Volosin, ‘Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Philippines’ (2011) 29 Berkeley Journal of International Law 246.

100 G Maltz, ‘The Case for Presidential Term Limits’ (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy 128 (2007).

101 A Baturo, ‘Continuismo in Comparison: Avoidance, Extension, and Removal of Presidential Term Limits in The Politics of Presidential Term Limits’ in R Elgie and A Baturo (eds), The Politics of Presidential Term Limits (Oxford University Press 2019).

102 W Partlett, ‘Constitutional Design and Post-Soviet Presidential Succession: The Kazakh Model?’ (International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 1 May 2019), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/05/constitutional-design-and-post-soviet-presidential-succession-the-kazakh-model. This is also the approach taken by President Vladimir Putin in 2008 when he remained de facto head of the country despite stepping down from the president.

103 A number of different mechanisms are possible. See, for example, D Tull and C Simons, ‘The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits Revisited’ (2017) 52 Africa Spectrum 79 (discussing the use of court decisions in Senegal (2012) and Burundi (2015) to restart the clock on presidential term limits).

104 Baturo, note 101 above, pp 83–84.

105 C Buckley and A Wu, ‘Ending Term Limits for China's Xi Is a Big Deal. Here's Why’ (NY Times, 10 March 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-term-limit-explainer.html.

106 Reforming Centralism and Supervision in Armenia and Ukraine, in The Annual Review of Constitution-Building Processes 2015 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2016).

107 Article 81, Russian Constitution (current version). Available at (in Russian): http://kremlin.ru/acts/constitution.

108 Article 81(3), Russian Constitution (amended version).

109 Article 81(31), Russian Constitution (amended version).

110 B Geddes, J Wright, and E Frantz, How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse (Cambridge University Press, 2018) (arguing that personalised dictatorships are less stable); E Frantz, Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2018).

111 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, note 110 above (arguing that personalised dictatorships are less stable); Frantz, note 110 above.

112 L Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State Sovereignty’ (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 31.

113 Seventh Amendment of the Basic Law of Hungary (2018), https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf.

114 Article L, Hungarian Constitution.

115 G Halmai, ‘The Making of ‘Illiberal Constitutionalism’ with or without a New Constitution: The Case of Hungary and Poland’ in D Landau and H Lerner (eds), Comparative Constitution Making (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p 310.

116 Federal Law ‘About Government Policy of the Russian Federation in Relationship to Compatriots Abroad’ (Федеральный закон от 24.05.1999 N 99-ФЗ (ред. от 23.07.2013) ‘О государственной политике Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом’)

117 Federal Law ‘About Basic Guarantees of the Rights of Children in the Russian Federation’ (17.12.2009).

118 See Case of Bayev and Others v. Russia (Applications nos. 67667/09, 44092/12, and 56717/12) [2017] ECHR (describing these laws).

119 S Chan, ‘Russia's ‘Gay Propaganda’ Laws Are Illegal, European Court Rules’ (NY Times, 20 June 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/europe/russia-gay-propaganda.html.

120 G Bogush and I Nuzov, ‘Russia's Supreme Court Rewrites History of the Second World War’ (EJIL Talk Blog, 28 October 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-supreme-court-rewrites-history-of-the-second-world-war.

121 Article 15, Russian Constitution.

122 Article 17, Russian Constitution.

123 Articles 19–25, Russian Constitution.

124 This use of the constitution in Russian exceptionalism has echoes of American exceptionalism where the Constitution emerges as a symbol of sovereign power that resists international influence. See, for example, S Gardbaum, ‘The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism’ (2008) 107 Michigan Law Review 391.

125 Article 671, Russian Constitution (amended version).

126 Ibid.

127 Articles 68–69, Russian Constitution (amended version).

128 Article 79, Russian Constitution (amended version).

129 Decision of the Russian Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015. Available in English at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/resume%202015%2021-%D0%9F.pdf.

130 Y Khalikova, ‘Russia's Cat and Mouse Game with International Court’ (Riddle, 28 March 2020), https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-cat-and-mouse-game-with-international-courts.

131 W Partlett and T Khramova, ‘Interpretation and the Impossibility of Implementation in Russian Prisoner Voting’ (International Association of Constitutional Law, 18 August 2016), https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2016-posts/2016/8/18/analysis-interpretation-and-the-impossibility-of-implementation-in-russian-prisoner-voting.

132 The constitutional provision draws from the wording of the Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Law on the Election of the Russian President which forbids an individual from running for office who holds foreign citizenship or residency.

133 Article 78.5, Russian Constitution (amended version) (leaders of the federal bureaucracy); Article 119, Russian Constitution (amended version) (judges).

134 Article 71(t), Russian Constitution (amended version).

135 Article 81.2, Russian Constitution (amended version).

136 Section 44, Australian Constitution.

137 Re Canavan [2017] HCA 45.

138 Putin speech to the Federal Assembly, note 6 above.

139 Decision (Opredelenie) of the Russian Constitutional Court, 4 December 2007, http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision16866.pdf.

140 Barber, note 41 above.

141 Landau, note 25 above, p 524.

142 See H Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin Books, 1963) (the social question).

143 D Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 189, p 208.

144 S Berman and M Snegovaya, ‘Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy’ (2019) 30(3) Journal of Democracy 5, pp 13–14.

145 A Toplišek, ‘The Political Economy of Populist Rule in Post-Crisis Europe: Hungary and Poland’ (2020) 25 New Political Economy 388, pp 395–96 (describing how in Hungary and Poland a number of policies have been put in place seeking to raise the minimum wage and provide tax credits and benefits for working families).

146 A Weiss-Wendt, Putin's Russia and the Falsification of History: Reasserting Control over the Past (Bloomsbury, 2020).

147 The text of the law is available at http://kremlin.ru/acts/20912.

148 M Edele, ‘Fighting Russia's History Wars: Vladimir Putin and the Codification of World War II’ (Fall/Winter 2017) 29(2) History & Memory 90.

149 Article 7, Russian Constitution.

150 Article 7, Russian Constitution.

151 See, for example, Decision of the Russian Constitutional Court from 5 December 2017 (striking down a provision in federal law denying an insurance pension to an individual on the basis that the recipient was attending university in a foreign country).

152 P Barenboim and N Merkulova, ‘25th Anniversary of Constitutional Economics: The Russian Model and Legal Reform in Russia’ in F Neate and H Nielsen (eds), The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform (Yustitsinform, 2007), p 172.

153 Article 75(5), Russian Constitution (amended version).

154 Article 75(7), Russian Constitution (amended version).

155 Article 75(6), Russian Constitution (amended version).

156 Article 671(3), Russian Constitution (amended version).

157 Article 671(4), Russian Constitution (amended version).

158 A Soboleva, ‘Indexing words. Why the ‘Social’ Amendments to the Constitution Are Not Only Meaningless, But Also Harmful’ (The Insider, 28 March 2020), https://theins.ru/politika/208840 (in Russian).

159 G Di Bella, O Dynnikova, and F Grigoli, ‘Fiscal Federalism and Regional Performance in Russia’ (2018) 4 Russian Journal of Economics 108, p 114. In 2016, regional spending represented 95 percent of general government expenditure for housing and utilities, 80 percent for education and cultural activities, and around 85 percent for health including spending by territorial extra-budgetary medical funds.

160 World Bank, ‘Russian Federation: Reducing Poverty through Growth and Social Policy Reform’ (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, World Bank, 2005) Report No 28923-RU, p 114.

161 Pomeranz and Smith, note 82 above.

162 Burkhardt, note 83 above; Pomeranz and Smith, note 83 above (describing how the regions lack the funding and resources to implement presidential decrees).

163 See, for example, The Decision of the Russian Constitutional Court, 10 December 2019 (finding that rehabilitated victims of political repressions as well as any children born in the Gulag system or in exile have the right to receive housing in the cities where their families lived at the time of the repression), available at: https://rg.ru/2019/12/19/ks-dok.html.

164 Decision of the Russian Constitutional Court, 14 January 2020, http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision448507.pdf.

165 V Hart, ‘Democratic Constitution-Making’ (Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, 1 July 2003).

166 Partlett, W, ‘The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making’ (2012) 38 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 193Google Scholar; See generally, E J Sieyes, What Is the Third Estate? (S E Finer (ed), M Blondel (trans), Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp 121–22 (describing the ‘constituent power (pouvoir constituent)’ of the people to break with the pre-existing order to build a new one).

167 Partlett and Nwokora, note 42 above (explaining how best to structure constitutional politics to ensure that the people are able to genuinely speak).

168 W Partlett, ‘Expanding Revision Clauses in Democratic Constitutions’ in G Negretto (ed), Constitution-Making in Democratic Orders (in press, forthcoming 2020) (discussing how rules in revision clauses can help to guard against abusive constitutional change).

169 See, for example Partlett, note 38 above.

170 Partlett, note 168 above (discussing how rules in revision clauses can help to guard against abusive constitutional change).

171 Article 3, Russian Constitution.

172 Putin speech to the Federal Assembly, note 6 above; A Troiankovski, ‘Putin's Power Shakeup: Here Are Six Takeaways’ (NY Times, 15 January 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/world/europe/russia-putin-government.html.

173 Presidential Order, ‘On the Working Group on the Preparation of Proposals for Amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation’, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62589 (in Russian).

174 Article 135, Russian Constitution.

175 Federal Law, ‘About Referendums in the Russian Federation’, 28 June, 2004, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_48221 (in Russian).

176 Articles 11–16 of the Law.

177 ‘Moscow to Hand Out $145M in ‘Prizes’ to Voters for Putin's Constitutional Reforms’ (Moscow Times, 11 June 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/11/moscow-to-hand-out-145m-in-prises-to-voters-for-putins-constitutional-reforms-a70553.

178 See, for example, ‘Russia Bars Campaigns Against Reforms Extending Putin's Rule’ (Moscow Times, 2 June 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/03/russia-bars-campaigns-against-reforms-extending-putins-rule-a70470.

179 V Putin, Address to the Nation, 30 June 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/63584.

180 A Roth, ‘It Looks Like a Gameshow: Russia's Pseudo-vote on Putin's Term Limits’ (The Guardian, 26 June 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/26/it-looks-like-a-gameshow-russias-pseudo-vote-on-putins-term-limits.

181 Request (Zapros) of President Vladimir for the Constitutional Court to Review the Amendments, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62989 (in Russian).

182 Decision of the Russian Constitutional Court, 16 March 2020, http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision459904.pdf (in Russian).

183 V Putin, Meeting with the Working Group on Drafting Proposals for Amendments to the Constitution, 3 July 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/63599.

184 Y Gorokhovskaya, ‘Why Putin Needs a Nationwide Vote’ (Institute for Modern Russia, 16 June 2020), https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3123-why-putin-needs-a-.

185 This was underpinned by the link between law and state development in the Russian legal tradition.

186 O Rumiantsev, Konstitutsiya devianosto tret'ego. Istoriya ivalenie [The Constitution of Ninety Three. A History of Influences] (Moscow 2013), pp 31–35, 294–97. In the late Soviet period, a number of academics discussed the importance of the law-based state for Russian state building. See, for example, Valery Zorkin, Chicherin (Moscow: Yuridicheskya Literatura [Legal Literature] 1984) (in Russian).

187 Rumiantsev, note 186 above, pp 31–35, 294–97.

188 M A Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Harvard University Press, 1987), p 8.

189 Ruskola, T, ‘Legal Orientalism’ (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 179, p 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

190 J Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province: A Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization in Siberia (Macmillan Press in association with the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, 1996), p 208.

191 Lamb, S, Stalin's Constitution: Soviet Participatory Politics and the Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution (Routledge, 2017)Google Scholar.

192 Ibid, p 1.

193 Sharlet, R, ‘The New Soviet Constitution’ (1977) 26(5) Problems of Communism 1, p 5Google Scholar.

194 Berman, H J, ‘The Educational Role of the Soviet Court’ (1972) 21 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

195 Krastev, I, ‘Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism’ (2011) 22(2) Journal of Democracy 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussing the mechanisms and resilience of ‘new authoritarianism’).

196 ‘Lukashenko: All the Changes Will Start with the Constitution, Not Maidan Riots’ (BelTA News Agency, 9 July 2020), https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-all-the-changes-will-start-with-the-constitution-not-maidan-riots-131627-2020.